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NOVEMBER CANE HALL

COMMENTARY



Framework for the Jewish State

RICHARD H. S. CROSSMAN

Does Social Discrimination Really Matter?

CAREY McWILLIAMS

The Attack on Western Morality

JULIEN BENDA

Jewish Culture in This Time and Place

A SYMPOSIUM

Dirty Ralph—A Story

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The Outlook for France's Jews

SHERRY MANGAN

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Journey to America

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Opinion Polling: Science or Business?

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
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COMMENTARY

FRAMEWORK FOR THE JEWISH STATE

The New Boundaries of Zionist Aspiration

RICHARD H. S. CROSSMAN

WHEN Mr. Bevin made his decision to refer the Palestine issue to UN, the sceptics talked about "the political atmosphere" of the United Nations and prophesied that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would commit themselves to support a clean-cut decision. The issue would be submerged in intrigue.

Neither the proceedings nor the report of Unscop have confirmed these doubts and suspicions. On the contrary, the Unscop report is an extraordinarily statesmanlike document. The world press has naturally paid most attention to the recommendations of the

majority and the minority. But in fact the most impressive part of the report is the analysis of the Palestine problem with which it begins, and which was unanimously approved by the fourteen members of the Committee.

It is worthwhile to compare Unscop with the many previous commissions that have examined the Palestine problem. All of them, with the exception of the Anglo-American Committee, were exclusively British and relied on a secretariat drawn from the Colonial Office. Even our Anglo-American Committee had a secretariat composed of State Department, Foreign Office, and Colonial Office appointees. Unscop, by contrast, had a secretariat composed of a Mexican, a Chinese, and an American Negro released from the State Department. With two exceptions (the delegates from Yugoslavia and from India), the Committee's members were impartial and objective to the highest degree. It is not unfair to say that both the exclusively British committees and the Anglo-American Committee were bound to look down on the Jewish-Arab problem from the point of view of a great power and to regard both Whitehall and the administration in Jerusalem as judges rather than participants in the dispute. What distinguished Unscop from all its predecessors was its ability to view the problem on a new level and to see the conflict as a triangular

RICHARD H. S. CROSSMAN, brilliant young member of Parliament and one of England's most influential political journalists, was a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into Palestine. On his return, he wrote the internationally discussed book *Palestine Mission*. He is a member of the editorial board of the *New Statesman and Nation*. In his two and one half years in Parliament, Mr. Crossman has been leader and spokesman of the "Keep Left" group in the British Labor party, strong opponents of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's foreign policy. Mr. Crossman was born in England in 1907. He was graduated from New College, Oxford University, where he later became a fellow and tutor. Mr. Crossman has just returned to England after a short visit in this country. This is the first of a series of articles which will try to chart the post-Unscop perspective of Jewish aspirations in Palestine from different points of view.

conflict between the Jews, the Arabs—and the British.

Unscop had another notable advantage. Englishmen and Americans who study the Middle East are bound consciously or unconsciously to be influenced by the requirements of strategy and commerce. We on the Anglo-American Committee, for instance, had lengthy consultations both with British General Headquarters in Cairo and with the British Commanding Officer in Palestine. The desirability both from the British and from the American point of view of a British base in Palestine could not be absent from our minds in drafting our recommendations. So too, we could not avoid making a distinction between the attitude to be adopted towards representatives of sovereign Arab states and that which was proper in dealing with the Jewish organizations. The Arab representatives could speak with authority and relations with them had to be on the diplomatic plane, whereas our relations with the Jews were those of government representatives with private citizens. It was almost inevitable that an English or an American Committeeman would unconsciously draw the conclusion that whereas the Arab case was that of a group of nations, the Jewish case was a matter of philanthropy. Thus the essential fact that in Palestine two nations were in conflict was obscured both in the public hearings and in private conversations.

In all these points the Unscop Committeemen—none of whom represented a great power directly concerned either with Middle Eastern strategy or Middle Eastern oil—had a tremendous advantage over their predecessors.

IT is worth dwelling at some length on the analysis of the problem agreed to by every Committeeman. Why does this seem to me at least as important as the solutions offered in the concluding pages?

There has never been much difficulty in propounding "solutions" of the Palestine problem. The real difficulty is to bring home to the politicians who formulate policy the fundamental facts about Jewish and Arab

nationalism, so that their discussions are at least based on an agreed body of facts. In a matter so overclouded with propaganda, the politician, as much as the man in the street, clutches at the nearest argument which suits his unconscious prejudices and seeks to justify the vital decisions which expediency dictates. A British foreign secretary, concerned to protect oil interests against a Communist threat, has no difficulty in seeing the reasonableness of the case presented by the Arab League. An American president, caught between the conflicting pressures of the State Department and the political machine in New York State, is easily persuaded by the argument that American soldiers have no place in the Middle East.

Now for the first time a really impartial committee has made an investigation on the spot and, despite strong differences about the conclusions to be drawn, it has reached agreement *on the facts* upon which any solution must be based. It has provided, therefore, a firm framework upon which in the future the responsible politician will certainly have to build.

IN BROAD outline, Unscop accepts without qualification the analysis of the meaning of the Mandate and of the validity of the Jewish and the Arab case first given by the Peel Commission. The Arab claim that the Mandate is "illegal" is dismissed, after careful consideration: and here the findings of Peel are strengthened by the further elucidation of the McMahon letters given by the British Government in 1939. On the other hand, Unscop agrees with all previous commissions in holding that the terms of the Mandate, while not excluding the creation of a Jewish state, certainly did not make this obligatory upon the Mandatory. The Jewish commonwealth, as distinct from the National Home, is a reasonable objective of Jewish aspirations but is not something which world Jewry can claim by legal right. Here the report goes on to draw a new conclusion. It argues that the Mandate was clearly based on the assumption that sooner or later Arab hostility would weaken and disappear:

This seems to have been the basic assumption, but it proved to be a false one, since the history of the last twenty-five years has established the fact that not only the creation of a Jewish State but even the continuation of the building of the Jewish National Home by restricted immigration could be implemented only by the use of some considerable force. It cannot be properly contended that the use of force as a means of establishing the National Home was either intended by the Mandate or implied by its provisions. On the contrary, the provisions of the Mandate should preclude any systematic use of force for the purpose of its application. In its preamble, the Mandate states that the Principal Allied Powers agreed to entrust Palestine to a mandatory Power for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The guiding principle of that Article was the well-being of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves.

It has been suggested that the well-being of the indigenous population of Palestine might be ensured by the unfettered development of the Jewish National Home. "Well-being" in a practical sense, however, must be something more than a mere objective conception, and the Arabs, thinking subjectively, have demonstrated by their acts their belief that the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State against their will would be very much opposed to their conception of what is essential to their well-being. To contend, therefore, that there is an international obligation to the effect that Jewish immigration should continue with a view to establishing a Jewish majority in the whole of Palestine, would mean ignoring the wishes of the Arab population and their views as to their own well-being. This would involve an apparent violation of what was the governing principle of Article 22 of the Covenant.

This interpretation of the Mandate is obviously of the greatest importance. For if the Mandatory cannot be obliged to facilitate Jewish immigration by the use of force against the Arabs, it is obvious that the use of force to prevent Jewish immigration is even further removed from the terms or intentions of the Mandate. On this point Unscop is consistent. Having relieved the British from the responsibility for forcing Jews into Palestine against armed Arab resistance, the report then tersely states:

Since 1939 Jewish immigration into Palestine has been determined in accordance with the White Paper of 1939,

and recalls the fact that the findings of the Mandates Commission on the White Paper were:

(a) That the policy set out . . . was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate;

(b) That, regarding the possibility of a new interpretation of the Mandate, with which the White Paper would not be at variance, four members "did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate . . .," while the other three members of the Commission considered that "existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided that the Council did not oppose it."

After referring briefly to Arab opposition to the White Paper it continues:

Against the background of an active Jewish war effort and intensified Nazi persecution of the remnants of European Jewry, enforcement of the White Paper provisions stimulated efforts to bring illegal immigrants into Palestine. The action of the Administration in circumventing illegal immigration by the seizure of immigrant ships led to constant and serious friction accompanied by mounting Jewish resistance.

and it concludes this section with the words:

. . . the White Paper expressed the conviction of the Mandatory that, with a defined addition of a specified number of immigrants, the National Home must be regarded as fully established. That policy, modified by the admission for the time being of 1,500 Jewish immigrants per month, still stands. The recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews, while in substance accepted in the mandatory Power's constitutional proposals of 1946-47, was not put into practice. Similarly, no effect has been given to the Anglo-American Committee's recommendation for the rescinding of the Land Transfer Regulations and providing for "freedom in the sale, lease or use of land irrespective of race, community or creed."

This objective statement of historical fact indicates clearly enough Unscop's view of Mr. Bevin's policy in Palestine. It refutes completely Mr. Attlee's statement in Parliament that the Labor Government has never

stood for the White Paper and is not carrying it out; and shows clearly enough that the British blockade of Palestine *against* the Jews accords just as little with the Mandate as any attempt to *enforce* Jewish immigration on the Arabs.

WHERE the report diverges most sharply from Mr. Bevin's attitude is in its assessment of the factors in Palestine of which account must be taken in any future solution. Mr. Bevin has frequently described the conflict between Jew and Arab as "racial" and "religious." His chief objection to a Jewish state is that its creation implies the existence of a Jewish *nation*. Mr. Bevin recognizes Arab nationalism as a natural force which must be given political recognition. But for him Jewish nationalism is something perverse and artificial, the creation of Zionist propaganda; and his policy in Palestine has been based on the assumption that this "synthetic" Jewish nationalism could be suppressed by force and the Jews be constrained to accept a solution which denied it political recognition.

Here the Unscop report is clearly against him. It assumes throughout that the Jewish and Arab claims to nationhood and independence are equally real and that both of them involve non-Palestinian forces. Just as the "Arab world" regards Palestine as a test case, and fights not for Palestinian independence, but for Arab unity, so the Jewish world too is involved in the fate of Eretz Yisrael. The Palestinian Jews and Arabs cannot therefore be considered *in isolation*. What is needed is a solution which reconciles the antagonism between world Jewry and the Arab League and makes possible cooperation between them.

Here again the analysis is just as important as the majority or minority findings. Unscop, like the Anglo-American Committee, came to the conclusion that Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem *in general*. (Two members dissented from this view and one expressed no opinion.) Impressed by the Arab birth rate—which in proportion to the Arab population is

the highest in the world—and the limited area and resources of the country, the Committee reached the conclusion that, even under the most favorable political conditions, the number of Jewish immigrants must be severely limited. Palestine could not find room even for all of the Jewish displaced persons in Germany and Eastern Europe, far less for the Jewish populations of other countries.

This conclusion, which of course runs counter to certain extreme Zionist aspirations, is the basis not only for the unanimous findings of the Committee but for the majority report. Cooperation between world Jewry and the Arab world in the Middle East is only possible if a strict limit is set to Jewish immigration by the Jews of Palestine themselves, and if world Jewry clearly recognizes that the majority of its members, under any foreseeable conditions, will remain part of the Diaspora. A solution of the Palestine problem must involve a changed attitude to Jewish immigration by the Christian countries of the West, and a contribution by them to the solution of the DP problem. Equally, it depends on the surrender by the Zionist organizations of the cherished principle that every Jew has the right to go to Palestine.

I have myself argued at length for this position. So long as Palestine is regarded as a potential place of refuge for any Jewish community threatened with persecution, there is no possibility of peaceful cooperation with the Arabs. The Jewish commonwealth, to survive and to fulfill its social purpose in the Middle East, must not be regarded either by the Christian or Jewish communities of the West as a "dumping ground" for unwanted Jews, or, to put it more politely, as *the* solution of the Jewish problem.

World Jewry must return to its original concept of the National Home as an élite community which can create in Eretz Yisrael an élite Jewish civilization, such as can become truly indigenous to the Middle East. The Jewish *nation*, as distinguished from the Jewish *people*, must be strictly confined to the Jews of Palestine, though it will remain tied by bonds of consanguinity and religion to the Jews of the Diaspora, as Britain is to

her Dominions, or as European countries are to the Americans who once emigrated from them. Once this principle is accepted, it follows that the best contribution which the Western democracies can make to the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth is to relieve the pressure upon it by themselves accepting large numbers of Jewish refugees, and so enable the Agency to return to a policy of selective and restricted immigration into Eretz Yisrael.

TURNING now from the unanimous findings to the differences in Unscop which led to a majority and a minority report, we are at once struck by the relatively small margin which divided the Committee. Everyone agreed that the Mandate was no longer workable and that the interpretation of it on which British policy has been based since 1939 was not in conformity with it. Everyone agreed that the use of force by the Mandatory—either to facilitate or to prevent Jewish immigration—made a mockery of its provisions, which certainly did not foresee the erection of a British “police state” detested by every inhabitant of Palestine. Finally, everyone agreed that though both the Jewish and the Arab nations in Palestine were fully competent to manage their own affairs, independence could only work if Palestine continued to be a single economic unit in the development of which the two peoples cooperated. The point of difference between the majority and the minority rose on *how* this combination of political independence and economic unity could best be achieved. The minority favored a federal state: the majority, partition and a customs union.

The difference here is fundamental. The federal state, though it has been dismissed by the Arab Higher Committee and by the Arab League, would be an *Arab solution*, since the federal government, elected by an Arab majority, would have the power to prevent further immigration. So too, partition is a *Jewish solution*, because it permits in a part of Palestine immigration limited only by the absorptive capacity of the country.

In the last analysis, there is only one issue

in Palestine, immigration. This is the sole test applied equally by Jew and Arab to any solution, and by this test the majority came out in favor of the Jews, and the minority—an Iranian, an Indian, and a Yugoslav-backed the Arab side. That the minority report was dismissed by the Arab League is here irrelevant. The Arabs have consistently maintained opposition to the Balfour Declaration *as such* and were therefore bound formally to oppose the minority report even though it offered them 90 per cent of their case. In private negotiation, they would adopt a very different attitude.

But the Arab intransigence has had one important result. It leaves the majority report as the only practicable solution with any international backing. The report was signed by every member of the Committee with any pretense to impartiality, including the Swedish, Dutch, and Canadian representatives, whose countries had no reason for feeling bias either way. Thus the case for a Jewish commonwealth in part of Palestine, first propounded ten years ago by the Peel Commission, has now been given the most authoritative backing. Partition must now be admitted to be the method of ending the Mandate with the least injustice to either party and with the best chance of creating the basis for Jewish-Arab cooperation.

THE actual scheme of partition propounded is in the main workmanlike and sensible, and a great deal less difficult to carry out than that of the Peel Commission. It rightly aims at the objective, not of separating Jew and Arab—that is physically impossible and economically undesirable—but of enabling them ultimately to work together. Recognizing the futility of all paper schemes for a bi-national constitution so long as the issue of immigration is unresolved, it bases itself on the twin principles of political separation and economic integration. The two states will enjoy full sovereignty but they will be bound by a customs union.

The frontiers of the Jewish state are rightly drawn to exclude the wholly Arab mountains of the center but to include the Negev

in the South. It is curious, however, that, whereas Western Galilee is excluded from the Jewish state, the purely Arab towns of Beersheba and Jaffa are not. For the scheme to work satisfactorily, Jaffa should be made a free port and Beersheba be given to the Arabs in exchange for part at least of the seaboard north of Acre and of the Galileean mountains. Such rectifications would not be difficult to make, once the plan were accepted in principle.

The real weakness of the majority report, as has become clear enough in the debates of the UN Assembly, was that it completely overlooked the problem of enforcement. It merely recommends that Britain should retain her responsibilities for two years. During this period she shall:

(a) Carry on the administration of the territory of Palestine under the auspices of the United Nations and on such conditions and under such supervision as may be agreed upon between the United Kingdom and the United Nations, and if so desired, with the assistance of one or more Members of the United Nations;

(b) Take such preparatory steps as may be necessary for the execution of the scheme recommended;

(c) Carry out the following measures:

(1) Admit into the borders of the proposed Jewish State 150,000 Jewish immigrants at a uniform monthly rate, 30,000 of whom are to be admitted on humanitarian grounds. Should the transitional period continue for more than two years, Jewish immigration shall be allowed at the rate of 60,000 per year. The responsibility for the selection and care of Jewish immigrants and for the organizing of Jewish immigration during the transitional period shall be placed in the Jewish Agency.

(2) The restrictions introduced by land regulations issued by the Palestinian Administration under the authority of the Palestine (Amendment) Order-in-Council of 25 May 1939 shall not apply to the transfer of land within the borders of the proposed Jewish State.

This recommendation was so evasive that it seemed likely to threaten the rest of the plan. It was surely obvious enough that the British government, having once referred the matter to UN, was unlikely to accept the responsibility of enforcing the decision alone. The Committee itself, in its analysis, gave

ample grounds for its view that *neither* the enforcement of the White Paper *nor* the imposition of partition could be achieved except against armed resistance. The Jews would use military force against a continuance of the blockade and the Arabs against its discontinuance. Since this was so, the most vital task of Unscop was to recommend the precise ways and means by which the UN would exert its authority during the transition period. Instead of doing so, the Committee merely handed the problem back to Mr. Bevin, with the vague suggestion that he might ask other powers to help him in carrying out a policy with which he is in violent disagreement. His riposte was obvious enough, and Mr. Creech-Jones delivered it with considerable effect. The resulting deadlock was inevitable.

THE solemn and unequivocal statement that Britain would give up the Mandate came as a surprise to many Americans. It has been far too readily assumed that "strategic interests"—never clearly defined—would compel Britain to retain Palestine as a military base, under any circumstances.

This view was partly based on "wish-fulfillment." There are obvious reasons why the State Department would wish to see Britain responsible for Palestine and to avoid any direct American interference in this troubled area. As Bartley Crum has shown clearly enough in his *Behind the Silken Curtain*, the State Department and the present American military command are vitally concerned to safeguard American oil interests by remaining on good terms with the Arab states. Middle Eastern oil—a useful auxiliary in peacetime—would become absolutely vital to the United States in the event of war with Russia. At the very least steps must be taken to prevent it falling into Russian hands. On the other hand, it would be extremely risky for any American administration to participate openly in the appeasement of the Arab League on the Palestine issue. Obviously, therefore, it was the course of prudence to stay on the sidelines and to leave this task to Mr. Bevin.

This course, however, was made impossible by Mr. Creech-Jones' second statement at Lake Success. The British economic crisis had so weakened the country that the Foreign Secretary was unable, however much he may have wished to do so, to sustain his Middle Eastern policy. Having failed to break Jewish resistance to the White Paper by force, he was determined either to bring America into the Middle East or to get out of Palestine. The British tactic in UN was to "put the heat" on the Americans. This was only possible if Mr. Creech-Jones really meant what he said when he spoke of evacuation. There had to be a *real* threat of imminent withdrawal, if America was to be persuaded to intervene.

It has always been a matter of dispute whether or not Palestine is an essential part of any British or Anglo-American Middle Eastern security system. In the short run it would have been convenient no doubt to move the British garrison in Egypt northwards to Gaza, whence it could still control Suez. But the Suez Canal is no longer the focus of Middle Eastern strategy: what matters now are the oilfields and it is at least doubtful whether Palestine is of much use for their protection in a war against the USSR. In peacetime, troops are not needed to guard the pipeline and in wartime it is the Persian Gulf which is the vital area. It may well be that, in evacuating Palestine, Britain is pursuing a far-sighted strategic policy. That at least is Winston Churchill's view.

Viewed in the perspective of Palestinian politics, a British evacuation was always preferable, for all parties, to the maintenance of the *status quo*. Unscop, like the Anglo-American and the Peel Commissions, had unanimously come to the conclusion that the British police state could not be permitted to continue. But how should it be wound up? There were only two alternatives—a *de jure* and a *de facto* partition. The majority recommendation was for a partition with the full backing of UN. The minority report, which proposed federation, would have led to a *de*

facto partition, when the central government reached its inevitable deadlock. So too a British evacuation without a UN plan would lead to a *de facto* division of the country, in which the frontiers of the Jewish state would be drawn not by a UN boundary commission but by the Haganah.

THE issue at Lake Success, as I write, is at least sharp and clear. Either UN enforces partition or Britain withdraws and leaves Arab and Jew to fight it out.

This means that the decision will be made not in the Foreign Office but in the State Department. The United States can insure the necessary two-thirds majority in the Assembly, if she uses her influence in Latin and Central America. The United States can persuade two of her "satellites" to be prepared to send contingents to an international police force for Palestine, and so persuade Russia to instruct two members of the Eastern bloc to follow suit. The United States, through her oil interests, can exert influence on King Ibn Saud, to prevent a *jihad* (holy war). If Mr. Marshall and Mr. Truman really want to see the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, now is their chance. They can transform Palestine into a Middle Eastern Switzerland, envied by all, but intact because each great power is content to abstain from interfering if others agree to do the same.

As I write, the future is still uncertain. Much will depend on what happens in the detailed discussion of the partition plan. Efforts will certainly be made to whittle down the Jewish state to the frontiers and status of the Morrison-Grady plan. There will be defeatists who deny the possibility of creating an international police force at short notice, and of persuading the smaller powers to accept responsibility. But all these doubts will be swept aside, if the United States is willing to take the Russians at their word and to accept the challenge of Mr. Creech-Jones. Britain has stepped down; it is America's turn to take the lead.

DOES SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION REALLY MATTER?

"Exclusiveness" in a Democracy

CAREY McWILLIAMS

WITH few exceptions, leaders of American Jewry seem to regard "social discrimination" as an insignificant manifestation of prejudice, hurtful, annoying, vexatious, but not really important. "It is a happy chance for the American Jew," wrote Ralph Philip Boas, "that his age-long persecution has either ended or has degenerated into petty social discrimination in this country."

Underlying this view, one can detect certain assumptions: that social discrimination is merely an anachronistic survival; that it has no real function in the scheme of prejudice; and that it can never lead to more serious discriminations. "The barrier is social," said Meyer S. Isaacs, "it cannot disturb the civil rights, the political equality of all Americans."

Just as Jews have discounted the importance of social discrimination, so well-disposed Gentiles have labelled it a social eccentricity—something to be shrugged off,

IN RECENT years it has become popular to be superior to the problem of social discrimination—"pin-pricks," "mere snobbery," so goes the current belief; why give it serious concern, when there are so many "important" phases of anti-Semitism to worry about? Here CAREY McWILLIAMS, who has given many years of thinking and writing to minority problems, subjects prevalent notions about social discrimination to a sober analysis, in the light of the facts. From 1939 to 1943 Mr. McWilliams was Commissioner of Immigration and Housing in California. He contributes frequent articles to national magazines; and among his books are: *Factories in the Field* (1939), *Ill Fares the Land* (1942), *Brothers Under the Skin* (1943), and *Southern California Country* (1946). His latest book, on anti-Semitism, will be published shortly by Little, Brown and Company. He was born in Colorado in 1905 and attended the University of Southern California.

to be laughed at. But is it really only snobbery, detached from social, economic, and political realities? Social discrimination is habitually rationalized as "freedom of association." It reflects, one is told, merely the gregarious impulse of individuals of similar tastes, interests, and backgrounds to associate together. By implication, only the morbidly sensitive would think of assigning important political and social effects to so harmless and "human" a tendency; and in fact it is considered bad form to raise the issue. The trustees of the university club in the average American city would be highly indignant if it were suggested that the exclusion of Jews should be regarded as a significant manifestation of anti-Semitism.

YET even the most casual inspection of any American community is sufficient to establish that social discrimination not only fosters prejudice in many ways, but is closely related to more basic discriminations.

In most American cities, the reins of social control can usually be traced to a particular "prestige" club or similar institution. This is not to imply, of course, that the club actually exercises a decisive influence in the community; its membership constitutes a profile of the dominant elements. But the omissions from the membership will also indicate which groups occupy a secondary or subordinate role in community affairs. Almost universally the social club is a mechanism by which ruling or dominant elements establish, solidify, and perpetuate their hold on social leadership. It is precisely for this reason that membership is invested with a premium value and is regarded as highly desirable.

In The Social Life of a Modern Com-

munity (1941), a study of "Yankee City," Dr. Lloyd Warner and his associates found, for example, that institutions of this sort help to maintain higher and lower ranking in the community; that they function as a mechanism for placing people in the class hierarchy; and that they serve to impede movement out of the middle class into the upper class. In short, they organize, regulate, and guide the course of upward social mobility. The selective policies of such institutions have, of course, a dual effect: they impede upward movement for the groups excluded; but they smoothe the way for those included. "The self-made man finds club life one of the best ways of entry into the ruling classes," says Dr. Crane Brinton of Harvard in his article on "Clubs" in *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. And Dr. Warner reports of Yankee City: "If a man were accepted by one of the upper class clubs, his position in the society became higher and more secure. However, this same association, by refusing to admit certain individuals who wished to join it, might prevent their rise into a higher society than they at that time occupied."

"Prestige" institutions show little concern with the "innate congeniality of like-minded persons." Existing to protect the positions of power and influence held by their members in the community, they concentrate on organizing social power by exclusion. The more groups that can be excluded, the less power will have to be shared. This is exactly what is implied by the term "exclusive": the function of an exclusive institution is to exclude. The impersonal hotel-like atmosphere of the club completely belies the premise of congeniality and comradeship. In Los Angeles, where I live, everyone knows that the Athletic Club is less exclusive than the University Club and that the latter is less exclusive than the California Club. Initiation fees, dues, and eligibility rules neatly correlate with the measure of exclusiveness. "The largely non-overlapping groups," wrote Dr. Robert S. Lynd in *Middletown*, "carefully selected for prowess in business, highly competitive, and consti-

tuting a hierarchy in the prestige their membership bestows, exemplify more than do churches or lodges the prepotent values of the dominant group of business men of the city."

However, institutions of this sort do more than symbolize the exclusion of certain groups: they organize the distribution of the best social and economic positions. As an anonymous Jewish writer observes, "it is natural that men whose social life is spent together should desire to be associated together in business. . . . *This consideration . . . will arise in concerns where social life is well developed*, as in banks, where the officers are apt to belong to clubs of one kind or another" (*The Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1924, emphasis added). The lodge of the small town is much less likely to be exclusive than the city club, for the hierarchy of the clubs reflects the hierarchy of the large, impersonal, corporate enterprise—position in one is linked up with, and makes easier the achievement of, position in the other. The professional groups in particular are drawn to these aggregates of social power, for they are well aware of the fact that higher social position not only attracts clientele but becomes an important measure of professional standing.

A PART from considerations of this order it is quite apparent, as Dr. Lynd has observed in *Civilization and Group Relationships*, "that the overwhelmingly dominant criterion of significant likeness in our culture is likeness in wealth." In nearly all social clubs today, regardless of their origins, the culturally desirable intricate interplay of human likenesses and differences is little valued. Our social system is one in which "both the joining and the aims of organizations are not free and spontaneous but controlled by the need to muscle in on an apparatus of power which controls life chances in the culture." That the aims of organization are stated in other terms should not be permitted to conceal a reality so unmistakable.

In a society verbally devoted to demo-

cratic ideals, invidious distinctions are often masked, for even the rich acknowledge allegiance to these same ideals. Still and all, in our kind of social order, what passes for society will be seen to be based on wealth in its own right. The very absence of a landed gentry and titles of nobility, coupled with the pervasiveness of democratic shibboleths, compels the moneyed classes in this country to emphasize a rigid social exclusiveness as a means of protecting economic and political power. Indeed, social exclusiveness takes on a peculiar significance in a nominally democratic society, for it is entirely arbitrary and therefore impenetrable. Thus it is that where prestige has been based on the aristocratic concept, as in Great Britain, the Jew is more likely to win his place by achievement, as witness the careers of Disraeli, Sir Herbert Samuels, and Viscount Reading. The situation is not quite the same in the United States.

"In the United States," writes David Riesman of the University of Chicago, "the locus of social power is not personified in a hereditary aristocracy. There is no feudal hierarchy, no established church, little military tradition, save in the South. Social prestige in the sense of dominating the American scene is attached to the big industrialists whose names or companies are household words: the Fords, the DuPonts, the Eugene Graces. A satellite glow attaches to the navy, the bishopric, the plantation owners, and the diplomatic services. . . . Every one of these rosters is conspicuously clear of Jews. The intellectual professions, in which Jews share: doctors, lawyers, professors, the civil service as a whole, have no accepted social place, even as compared with Europe" (*Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1942).

In a democracy, social discrimination requires the exclusion of *groups*, since the comparative fluidity of the social structure makes the exclusion of *individuals* both difficult and awkward. From the point of view of wealth, social grace, and culture, individual Jews clearly meet the canons of social acceptability; nor can they be distinguished

racially. Hence they must be excluded as a group, by name, as a matter of policy.

Moreover, to be effective, such exclusion must be practiced in *all institutions* in which membership confers high social positions. It would never do, of course, for the prestige town club to accept Jews if the equivalent country club excluded them. The policy of exclusion must, therefore, embrace the entire domain of social life as well as the outlying precincts which the socially élite have determined to pre-empt, namely, the fashionable hotels, resorts, residential districts, etc. It is not surprising, then, that the exclusion of Jews from clubs, hotels, summer resorts, and residential districts in the United States, according to Salo W. Baron and other observers, is more widespread than it was in Germany before 1933.

It is absurd, therefore, to regard social discrimination as an unorganized, private, personal prejudice. A policy of systematic exclusion is a phenomenon of an entirely different order. Discrimination against *groups* can only be effective if it is adhered to as a matter of policy throughout the whole gamut of social life. This implies consensus, which in turn implies *organization*. If it were simply a question of some individuals liking and others not liking Jews, one would expect a clear diversity in practice; but the practice, at certain levels of society, is uniform, consistent, and well-nigh universal.

IT is revealing that *at one time* a few Jews belonged to many "prestige" clubs. Where Jews were present on the scene before the community started to grow—before the status lines were sharply drawn—they were often taken into membership with a naive unawareness of their Jewishness or a marked indifference to the fact. Jesse Seligman was a founder, at one time a vice-president, of the Union League Club of New York; but his son was blackballed for membership in 1893. In some cities, the exclusionist policy dates from the First World War; in others it did not emerge until the late 30's; while in some cases, of course, it became apparent

at a much earlier date. By and large, however, the tendency to exclude Jews became more pronounced during the 20's. For example, the trustees of a Milwaukee club requested the resignations of eight or ten Jewish charter members in 1928. In almost every case, the edge of exclusion has been deliberately sharpened by an insulting exception for "those now in good standing." Even where the membership has passed from father to son, either by long standing custom or by express provision, the new policy has pointedly excluded the son.

How this policy has been adopted can be illustrated by one of many similar cases. The Gipsy Club is perhaps the outstanding prestige organization in Huntington, West Virginia, a city of about 90,000 population with a small Jewish community which is nearly as old as the city itself. For many years a few Jews were members of the club. Descendants of old Jewish families, they were, for the most part, well-educated, wealthy professional men. In 1939 the by-laws of the club were amended to read that only "gentlemen of non-Jewish origin" should be eligible for membership with the usual exception of those then in good standing. The Jewish members offered to resign and to provide formal assurances that no further Jewish applications would be filed, if the amendment were withdrawn. Needless to say, the offer was rejected and the amendment adopted.

The meaning is clear: drawing a line after Jews were once accepted indicates a studied and systematic scheme of exclusion. What the bar reflects, in other words, is not so much a prejudice against Jews, as a desire to augment social power by excluding one of the few *groups* whose exclusion finds sanction in the *mores*.

Of the various "white" groups, Jews are about the only element that can be readily excluded from the category of the socially acceptable. They are not Christians; they are mostly late-comers; and they often occupy a special niche in the economy. Other ethnic groups would unquestionably have been excluded were it not for the curiously

mixed character of the American population and the peculiar geographical concentration of minority elements. Where Scandinavian immigrants, for example, have been settled and concentrated since an early date, it has been difficult to exclude them as individuals have prospered and acquired status. Admitted to upper class symbols in one community, the bar against Scandinavians would lose its snobbish effectiveness elsewhere.

It should be noted, too, that while the Negro cannot be accepted because he is regarded as a member of an inferior race, this charge is practically never raised against the Jew. This tacit admission of racial and cultural equality outlines the purpose of exclusion more sharply. Social discrimination, involving the unequal treatment of equals, directly implies "an alteration in competitive power of those presumed to possess a freely competitive status" (*Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*), and lays bare the meaning of exclusion. Other ethnic groups have also been denied access to social power in relation to their numbers and wealth; but, over the years, it has been impossible to exclude these groups, as *groups*, with anything like the effectiveness with which Jews have been excluded.

THE exclusion of Jews from "Greek-letter" fraternities and sororities parallels their exclusion from social clubs and is similarly motivated. It is silly to speak of college fraternities as though they were the end-product of some instinctive process by which like-minded individuals are sorted into special categories. Freshmen are rushed for the most specific and tangible reasons: social standing, wealth, family connections, special talents, athletic ability, and so forth. Fraternities, like clubs in later years, are the pools and generators of social power and prestige: those with it enter them, those entering them, heighten their potency. Social alliances formed in college naturally tend to carry over into adult life.

After four years in prep school and four years in college, the average non-Jewish student has been thoroughly instructed in the

function of prejudice. Most students go to college, as John Berryman has pointed out in a memorable short story, with "a gently negative attitude toward Jews" which they have "ingathered from the atmosphere of an advanced heterogeneous democratic society." But this "gently negative attitude" is soon made self-conscious and crystal-clear by social discrimination. If social discrimination represented a personal aversion to Jews, then it is interesting to speculate on how Vincent Sheean, with no prior familiarity with Jews, made the mistake of joining a Jewish fraternity at the University of Chicago (an experience vividly described in *Personal History*). I once made a similar mistake when, after being pledged to a fraternity, I innocently proposed the name of a Jewish friend. My education in social life was as swift and unforgettable as Sheean's.

The exclusionist policies of the college fraternities are, like those of the social clubs, rationalized as "freedom of association." Speaking at the annual meeting of the National Interfraternity Conference in New York on December 1, 1946, Dr. H. E. Stone, Dean of Students at the University of California, said:

"It is no accident that specific demands have been made to break all racial bars to fraternity membership and that specific cases have arisen to force the issue.

"The mass strikes, the effort for economic domination of the individual, the new race pressures and the opposition to secret selective associations are off-springs and outgrowths of a philosophy of 'social action' deeply imbedded in a host of government agencies and taking its root in Marxian concepts."

Here, by clear implication, a challenge to the exclusionist policies of the fraternities is correlated with an attack on the economic system; one can only surmise, therefore, that Dean Stone considers secret selective associations a prop to economic privilege.

The exclusion practiced by fraternities and sororities is, in turn, closely related to the admission of students and the selection of faculty. University instructors and ad-

ministrative officials are often members of fraternities which practice exclusion. Noting this fact, Heywood Broun once shrewdly suggested that "part of student prejudice might be traced to professorial or presidential policy." It cannot be denied that Jews have had a difficult time securing faculty appointments; that particular departments, in many institutions, have been traditionally closed to them; and that advancement has been retarded by anti-Semitic prejudice. This pattern of discrimination, in turn, is part of a much larger pattern to be found in the secondary schools, both public and private.

Social discrimination in American colleges and universities is also related to the more basic discrimination implicit in the quota system. The exclusion of Jews from fraternities and sororities seems to have preceded the rise of the quota system. In any case, it is apparent that social discrimination supports and buttresses the quota system.

What is not so apparent is that the quota system represents the logical extension of a basic discrimination against Jews in the economy. A year or so ago, Dr. Albert Sprague Coolidge of Harvard testified before a legislative committee that "we know perfectly well that names ending in 'berg' or 'stein' have to be skipped by the board of selection for scholarships in chemistry." For it seems that years ago the university had entered into a "gentlemen's agreement" to this effect with the chemical industry, which supplied the funds for the scholarships and which happens to be rigidly exclusionist. Thus the one exclusion re-enforces the other. In fact, if one keeps in mind, as Charles Beard has pointed out, that the tycoons of American industry were largely of North European stock, mainly English and Scotch-Irish, and of Protestant background, then it is clear that social discrimination must have as one of its major effects the containment of the Jews within a ghetto-like segment of the economy.

BLUNT, overt, and utterly lacking in finesse, the extent of discrimination against racial "minorities" in the United

States can be measured statistically. However, discrimination against the Jew as businessman, as doctor, as lawyer, as salesman is often hard to identify and is generally passed off as merely another manifestation of "competition." The higher one ascends on the social and economic ladder, the less overt and the more urbane does the pattern of discrimination become. The most significant discrimination against Jews occurs at the middle or upper-class level where group competition is most apparent. Hence it is not surprising that one study shows that high extremes in anti-Semitic attitudes belong to the middle socio-economic class, or that the score on anti-Semitic attitudes among university students should increase directly with the amount of the father's income. This peculiarity of the distribution of anti-Semitic attitudes is surely significant.

Most forms of social discrimination reflect—in the sense in which Durkheim once said that myth imitates society, not nature—the anomalous position that Jews occupy in the American economy. Without citing the evidence, it can be said that Jews do not figure significantly in either commercial or investment banking; that their participation in the insurance business is negligible; and that, in general, they are a distinctly minor factor in American finance. With the exception of waste products—symbol of exclusion rather than a badge of influence—they have been systematically excluded from the heavy industry segment of the economy. Equally non-"Jewish," according to the *Fortune* survey of 1936, are such industries as coal, auto, rubber, chemical, shipping, transportation, ship-building, petroleum, aviation, railroading, private utilities, lumber, agriculture, mining, dairy farming, food processing, and the manufacture of heavy machinery. The garment industry excepted, Jewish participation in the "light industries" field is largely restricted to the distribution end. Here the important fact to be noted is that—apparel goods excepted—Jews have been rigidly excluded from the important "chains."

Generally speaking, the businesses in which Jews are influential are those in which

a large risk-factor is involved; those peripheral to the economy; new businesses and those originally regarded as unimportant; and businesses which have traditionally carried a certain amount of social stigma, such as the amusement and liquor industries. Not being able to penetrate the key industries—those that have a decisive influence on the economy—they have been compelled to occupy the interstitial positions. In short, it is not the volume of business they control or their success or failure which is important, but rather the relationship of so-called Jewish businesses to the total economy.

The fact that Jewish businesses are essentially marginal has manifold collateral ramifications. "The most important office law business in America," reads the *Fortune* survey, "such as the law business incidental to banking, insurance, trust-company operation, investment work, railroading, patents, admiralty, and large corporation matters in general is in the hands of non-Jewish firms many of which, even though they have numerous Jewish clients, have no Jewish partners."

If Jews can be isolated socially and economically, their competition can often be turned into a positive advantage. For example, in Los Angeles, the credit end of the retail jewelry business is largely controlled by Jews; the "cash" stores by non-Jews. Since risks and losses are greater, the credit stores must emphasize volume and to increase volume they are driven to cut prices. In this situation the cash stores can use anti-Semitism as a variety of advertising and can capitalize prejudice in the form of higher prices. If the cash stores were to absorb the credit stores, a certain amount of competition and some unfavorable trade conditions might be eliminated. But it is extremely doubtful that the cash stores would want to absorb the credit stores even if they had the power to do so, for it is to their advantage to maintain the present relationship.

JUST as Jewish businesses are marginal, so Jews constitute a marginal class in America. In socio-economic terms, they are in the

middle of the middle class. The trading group among them is almost three times larger than the national average; the professional group about twice the national average; while agriculture claims only about one per cent of the gainfully employed. There can be no doubt, therefore, that a large section of American Jewry is concentrated in the lower-middle and upper-middle classes. Furthermore, Jews have come to occupy, as Jacob Lestchinsky has observed, "a redundant position between the Anglo-Saxon and the other ethnic groups," particularly those which have not yet developed their own middle class.

Thus the pattern of social discrimination clearly reflects an economic reality. While it has been impossible to subordinate Jews, in the sense that Negroes and Mexicans have been subordinated, it has been possible to isolate them economically, or, to put it another way, to exclude them from key control positions in the economy. In a thoroughly subordinated minority, social discrimination is unnecessary. It would never occur to the average fraternity, any more than it would occur to the trustees of the California Club in Los Angeles, that they should bar Negroes by express provision. But Jews, who occupy parallel status positions and who cannot be distinguished racially, require a special policy of exclusion to maintain the monopoly on social power. The effect—and the function—of this exclusion is to contain them within certain segments of the economy.

And, of course, this successful economic containment makes the social discrimination all the easier to justify. For the types of businesses in which Jews are concentrated fail to invest ownership with social power and prestige. These businesses, as Mr. Riesman has pointed out, lack the artisan beginnings, the long identification with certain family names, and the intimate relationship to a particular community which have placed so many American industrial families at the top of the social pyramid. Clothing stores and motion picture theaters are not nearly so impressive as mines and mills, fac-

tories and railroads. To keep the Jew in his corner, so to speak, it has been necessary to divest him of social power; once divested of this power—or denied access to it—his economic position makes it impossible for him to recapture or to acquire it.

POLITICAL life issues from social life, as John Berryman has said, "like a somatic dream." A group occupying a weak or exposed social position is a group that invites economic and political, as well as social discrimination. Certainly the anti-Semitic agitator seeks to exploit the cleavage which social discrimination makes visible. No one knows better than the anti-Semite that the Jews have failed to enter the citadels of power and that their economic position is exposed. The agitation of the anti-Semite is premised upon the assumption that this cleavage exists; otherwise he would be as much in awe of Jews as he so obviously is of the tycoons who control American industry.

Finally, social discrimination completes the circle it begins by imprinting indelibly throughout the whole society the very prejudiced attitudes that permit it to be born. "The erection of such barriers [in social institutions]," Dr. Monroe Deutsch has written, "tends to create or accentuate in the minds of some of our so-called first citizens a feeling that Jews *per se* are a separate and more or less segregated and undesirable group. If you decline to let a man eat beside you in a club, merely because he is a Jew, you are certainly helping to drive a nail into the wall of exclusion. In discussing the situation in Nazi Germany the point has often been made that those who, though not members of the party, nevertheless accepted the acts of the Nazis and helped perpetuate them in power cannot avoid sharing responsibility for the horrible deeds that were perpetrated by those whom they supported in office. I wonder whether the members of some of our exclusive clubs (*exclusive* in the proper use of the term) are not, unthinkingly (it may be), in spirit aligning themselves with Father Coughlin and Gerald L. K. Smith."

The failure of both Jews and Gentiles to admit the importance of social discrimination—to see that it has a function—is to be explained by the tendency in American culture to deny the existence of realities which conflict with our equalitarian ideals. "Democracy of feeling is expected of us," as Charles Horton Cooley once said, "and if we do not have it we usually simulate it." Thus we rationalize social discrimination as "freedom of association" or the right to select associates. The folk-belief that any American can become a millionaire and therefore eventually entitled to practice some form of social discrimination has, in effect, robbed this type of exclusion of its edge. As long as Jews are given a theoretical right to enter any trade, business, or profession, and their civil rights are safeguarded, they are almost powerless to object to a form of discrimination which they, in turn, are also privileged to practice in a limited way should they so desire.

THOSE who minimize the importance of social discrimination overlook the fact that, our equalitarian pretenses to the contrary notwithstanding, the upper classes are still the upper classes. Practices that they initiate are imitated by other groups and the old adage of "monkey sees, monkey does," becomes most pertinent. The snobishness of the "prestige" club is often reflected in the service clubs and in the civic organizations, and, embodied in these institutions, comes to be accepted as part of the natural order of the universe. I find it significant that in Minneapolis, where social discrimination has been most pronounced, there should also be a strong current of anti-Semitism in the labor movement. To be properly understood, anti-Semitism in the United States should be studied from the top down and not from the bottom up. The business executive who achieves the Nirvana of membership in the X Club, selects for his junior executives men who are ascending the socio-economic ladder in the same fashion. Seeing how the system works, the junior executives apply exclusionist policies

in the selection of their assistants, often without being told to do so.

It is for this reason that Jews encounter the most persistent discrimination, as employees, in precisely those sectors of the economy whose top levels link up with the centers of social power. Thus Jews have always experienced great difficulty in securing "white collar" office or clerical jobs in insurance companies, banks, private utilities, and heavy industry. This social discrimination in the end works not merely to exclude Jews from the "plums" of our economic order but from bread-and-butter jobs in large areas of employment.

The effect of this "closed shop" attitude on the part of the industrial and financial giants is to intensify the pressure of Jewish applicants for jobs in those businesses which have pursued a less systematic policy of exclusion, and to re-double the pressure to enter the free professions. These pressures, in turn, perpetuate the marginal economic position of the Jews. Issues of this kind take on, furthermore, an ever-increasing gravity as more of the national economic life falls within the orbit of exclusive trusts and monopolies.

That social discrimination is important is fully realized by those who practice it, despite their pious disclaimers and innocent assurances. A year or so ago, Judge Harry Hollzer, long a distinguished and highly respected federal district court judge, died in Los Angeles. Judge Hollzer was one of the leaders of the Jewish community. A meeting to plan a memorial in his honor was called at the California Club. "There we were," as one of the members present told me, "planning a memorial for Judge Hollzer in a club which would have refused his application for membership. It occurred to me, as we sat there at luncheon, talking about Harry Hollzer, that the best way we could have honored him, if we had really wanted to honor him, would have been to eliminate a certain section from the by-laws. For a moment, I thought of suggesting this as a memorial, and then I glanced around at those present and a good impulse was inhibited."

THE ATTACK ON WESTERN MORALITY

Can European Ideals Survive?

JULIEN BENDA

IT WOULD seem to me that what, in their inquiry, the editors of COMMENTARY call the crisis of civilization could be called with fair exactness the crisis of Hellenic-Christian morality, and more exactly still the crisis of Socratic-Christian morality: Socratic in the sense that it obligates men to respect certain values transcending their particular interests of time and place—in other words, and stated in absolute terms: justice, truth, law, fidelity to engagements; Christian, in so far as it requires as its base a respect for the human person, whatever

PHILOSOPHER and man of letters par excellence, JULIEN BENDA represents French rationalism at its best. He occupies, at the same time, a unique position inside his own country as a much feared censor of political and intellectual morality. He was born in Paris in 1867, specialized in mathematics at school, and became a disciple of the Neo-Kantian philosophy represented by Charles Renouvier. His literary career began with the Dreyfus Affair, in which he took a sharp stand against the prosecution—not because Dreyfus was a fellow-Jew, but because his legal rights were being violated. In the late 1920's, M. Benda's *Le Trahison des Clercs* (*The Treason of the Intellectuals*), castigating the failure of contemporary intellectuals to maintain their critical balance in the face of political issues, created a sensation that spread beyond the borders of France. He has also published *La Fin de l'Eternel*, *Belphégor*, *La Jeunesse d'un Clerc*, and many other works, at the same time contributing to *La Nouvelle Revue Française*, *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*, and other periodicals. In 1936 and 1937 he lectured in this country under the sponsorship of the Alliance Française. During the late war he was among the intellectuals adhering to the Resistance, and peace saw him extend his activities as a lecturer and protagonist of French culture to Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. The present essay, translated by George Becker, is the fourteenth in the series "The Crisis of the Individual."

his condition, from the moment that he presents the moral characteristics of the human species. Because of its opposition to the instincts of domination, to what the Church calls the "pride of life," one might also call this: intellectual morality (the morality of the intellectual).

I would have you note at once that I speak of the person in so far as he presents the moral characteristics of the human species. My position—and here I am in opposition to the Church and to a certain type of democracy, for which any man is sacred by reason solely of the fact that he presents the anatomical characteristics of the species—my position is that the human person has a right to this designation, and in consequence to the respect it implies, only if he has been capable of raising himself to a certain level of morality, one that consists precisely in respecting this personality in others—let us say, if he is able to rise to the conception of the rights of man.

This amounts to saying that, while I do not admit the concept of biological races, I do admit that of moral races, that is, of groups of men who have been able to attain to this morality, of which others have shown themselves incapable. The word "race" is perhaps not altogether accurate here, since nothing proves that the low moral level of these latter groups is in any way fated or that it is forever impossible for them to escape from it; although the deep-seatedness of their cult of force, its tenacity, its at times naive unconsciousness often might lead one to believe that.* In any case, in await-

* I cannot refrain from citing an incident that seems symbolic to me. At the time of the occupation of the Rhineland following the armistice of 1918, one of my friends, an officer in the unit at Cologne, was talking about the war with the manager of his hotel, and he was touched by the good

ing the liberation of these groups, if it ever will take place, the first groups have the duty to deal with the second in no way on a footing of equality and, if not to subject them, at least to compel their respect.

The Socratic-Christian Morality Was the Only One Honored a Few Years Ago

LET us return to Socratic-Christian morality.

This is the moral atmosphere in which men of my generation—and those much younger—were brought up, at home as well as at college (which was probably the case in your country, too). This atmosphere revealed itself, among other ways, in the teaching we received from our masters, in categorical censure of the dismemberments of Poland in the 18th century, in denunciation of the methods of perjury and *fait accompli* practiced by Frederick II, in the refusal to pay honor to success won by no matter what means (little respect for Louis XI, none for Machiavelli), in admiration for the Roman consul Regulus—who returned to Carthage, where the worst tortures awaited him, because he had given the Carthaginians his word—or, again, in the way that Fustel de Coulange's *La Cité Antique* was praised to us, in so far as the author therein berated the Romans for "their detestable maxim": "*Salus populi, suprema lex esto* (let the safety of the people be the supreme law)," and ap-

sense of that man, by his resignation, by his disposition to acknowledge the wrongs committed by Germany and the legitimacy of her expiation. But when they parted, the good hotel-keeper sighed out this conclusion: "And to think, sir, that all this would never have happened if the Belgians had let us have our way!" To me this candor is the opposite of disarming.

This constancy of the German spirit seems real to one of the historians who has studied it most seriously: "He [Herder] will reveal to us," says Lévy-Bruhl, "the secret continuity that, in the midst of appearances, binds without interruption the Germany of the 19th century, which we call realistic, to that of the 18th, which we contrast to it as idealistic. The antithesis is false: there are not 'two Germanies'; there has been only one evolution, now favored, now impeded by the intervention of neighboring nations, the different phases of which appear to be more closely interlinked the greater the distance and the higher the elevation from which History surveys them" (*L'Allemagne depuis Leibniz*).

plauded the infusion of a certain degree of Christianity into political mores.

The acceptance of such a morality seemed to us a thing so self-evidently established, so commonplace, that we did not even think it could be discussed. We knew, of course, that states did on occasion violate it; but we held that they did so with regret, while denying that they were violating it and, more surely still, refusing to derive any glory from it. Respect—at least verbal, perhaps even hypocritical—for Hellenic-Christian morality seemed to us a definitive achievement of humanity, one we had come to believe natural to such a degree that we could not conceive it possible to put forward any other as an avowed and codified teaching.

Deliberate Assaults Against this Morality at the End of the 19th Century—the Preaching of Pragmatic Morals

Now in this we gave proof of a strange blindness, and our first awakening—how brutal!—was anti-Dreyfusism in 1897. At the end of the 19th century—a capital date, from this point of view, for the moral history of humanity—movements of considerable importance formally came out in opposition to the Hellenic-Christian morality as we have just defined it. They professed in substance that they did not know what this *abstract* justice was, this *abstract* truth, valid for all men in all times and all places. They were acquainted only with justices of *circumstance*, truths *relative and determined by the interests of the group to which they related*, truths that *changed along with those interests*. Even more, they professed themselves ignorant of those so-called rights—even as qualified above—inherent in the human person whatever he might be; and also ignorant of that egalitarianism derived from Christianity of which the French Revolution and democracy have been the inheritors. Instead they believed that there existed categories of men destined to command and that the good of the whole, bound up with the supremacy of these men, might very well necessitate their over-riding the convenience of those whose function it is to obey.

This crusade has shown itself in three great collective deeds.

FIRST, German nationalism: Even at the beginning of the 19th century the Arndts, the Schlegels, the Görres rose up in the name of "the chosen people"; and in attacking the French Revolution in particular, and in coming out against the acknowledgment of any universal principle—against, notably, the universally recognized equality of rights—Arndt expressly opposed any recognition of political rights that Germany might accord to the Jews. And hostility to all idea of a morality fixed and superior to circumstances, the basis of Socratic teachings, is clearly formulated by Fichte in the seventh of his *Addresses to the German Nation*: "The essence of inferior peoples [read "France"—J.B.] is their belief in something definitive, firm, immutable. Whoever believes in a principle that is immutable, constant, and therefore dead, believes in it only because he is dead himself." (Note the equation, though grossly sophistical, of immutable principle with dead principle. As if an immutable principle—for example, that of justice—had not been made *living* by the manner in which *living* beings could embrace and defend it. Fichte was able to observe, the day the soldiers of the Revolution crushed the army of his nation at Jena, that men could believe in immutable principles and show themselves singularly far from being "dead themselves.")

On the morrow of their victory in 1870, the pan-Germanists made this position even more plain by declaring, for example, that the future of the Germanic world lay in strengthening still more "what it has been able to save from Christian influence" and that the greatness of Germany consisted in being released from "all sympathy for humanity."* In 1914, the same learned men declared that the violation of Belgian neu-

trality was just because it conformed to the interests of Germany in the circumstances then existing, and asserted that they did not know the meaning of this universal notion of justice with which people were attempting to overwhelm them. Cecil Rhodes had already declared at the time of the Boer War: "This war is just, because it is useful to my country." To be sure, he was only a business man; but an intellectual, Kipling, took a similar attitude. Dare I say that it was quite close, almost violently close, to that of William James at the time the island of Cuba was grabbed by his compatriots (see his *Letters*, II, pp. 73-74)?

It is unnecessary to chronicle how the Nazis brought this movement to its perfection—though they did not invent it—by decreeing that they did not know what a universal truth was, but that, for them, the sole criterion of truth—even scientific—was whether it made the German people strong*; while at the same time they officially promulgated the unworthiness of Christianity because of its universality. In addition, their formal opposition to Hellenic-Christian ethics appears sharply in their religion of "dynamism," in the proscription of anything that might arouse in their consciences a brake moderating their avidity.† We find, certainly, very little in the way of apology for dynamism in the Socratic dialogues or in the Gospels.

A SECOND movement, of more recent origin, plainly directed against the Hellenic-Christian morality, is Marxism—more exactly, Russian Communism.

We know that one of the principal articles of Marxism is the denunciation of the attachment of certain men to the so-called "transcendental" commandments of the conscience, to what Marx calls with pity the "divine" part (Socrates called it that, too) of humanity, and the declaration that the human species will cease to be enslaved only

* Texts cited by Andler, with hundreds more of the same order, in *Le Pangermanisme Continental*, pp. 67 and 123. See also, and above all, *Le Pangermanisme Philosophique*, by the same author.

* Speech of Dr. Frick, the Minister of Public Instruction, to the students of Munich in October 1935.

† Plato would say, their *pleonexia*: the desire always to have more.

on the day it frees itself from such afflictions. Marxism similarly admits of no stable truth, but rather of a truth essentially variable and determined by the interests of the moment.

When, at the time of the NEP, Lenin found that he had to call error what he had stated the evening before to be truth, one historian—Mark Vishniak—observed that this about-face was greatly eased for him by his sovereign “disdain for all absolute values.” Likewise we may read in Stalin’s *Speech on the Five-Year Plan* a vibrant apology for the contradictory as a “vital value” and “instrument of combat.”* I do not need to remind the reader that if, in a controversy with a Marxist, he invites the latter to have some regard for logic, he finds himself immediately characterized as a “frightful bourgeois” who “still believes in absolute principles of the mind.”

Besides, the decision to disqualify all fixed principles and admit no other law than that of circumstances is the essence of the “Hegelian dialectic” as deformed by the Marxists; that is to say, it is the essence of an instrument foreign to all disinterested thought but uniquely adapted to action, and therefore the exact contrary of the Socratic teachings.† In addition, disdain for disinterested thought is clearly formulated by this dictum of Marx: “Real [read “Communist”—J.B.] humanism has no more dangerous enemy than speculative idealism.”

As to the notion of abstract justice as identical with itself for all times and all places,

* Note a similar declaration by Mussolini: “Let us beware of the mortal pitfall of coherence.” We must observe that the novelty here lies in the glorification of the fact of contradiction if interest demands it; for, in point of fact, the contradictory has always existed, and among all nations.

† We here oppose Sovietism, and more generally Russian civilization, to Socratic Greece, which seems to us to have had no influence upon Russia—but we do not oppose it to the Greece which was irrational and impregnated with Asiatic culture, and of which Dionysianism, Orphism, and a certain philosophy of Plato are the notorious manifestations. Even present-day Russia is far from appearing hostile to the latter Greece, which one may call the anti-Socratic one. Thus the Soviet government has erected a statue to Heraclitus, who, with his denial of all fixed principles, is the direct ancestor of dialectical materialism.

Communism teaches that we have here a pure invention of the metaphysicians; that the idea of justice is dictated to us by the economic conditions in which we live, and varies with them. For our part we have the impression that the nations that Nebuchadnezzar dragged about the plains of Chaldea with rings in their noses, the unfortunate man that the lord of the Middle Ages snatched from his wife and children and bound to the millstone, the youth that Colbert nailed to the bench of the galley for his whole existence, were all very strongly of the opinion that an abstract justice was being violated in their cases and considered that their lot was in no way a just one from the viewpoint of economic conditions of their times. What we stress here is that this *purely relative* conception of justice furnishes an apology to all violators of the human person, to the violators of Belgium in 1914 as well as to the assassins of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Nor did they fail to make use of it.

FINALLY, a third movement loosed itself, some fifty years ago, against Socratic-Christian ethics—this time among the intellectuals; a movement whose great promoters would seem to be: Nietzsche with his “morality of the master” and his thesis that Socrates, by preaching rationalism, began the decline of Greece; Georges Sorel, with his *Reflections on Violence* (a book that was a world-wide success), and his *Le Procès de Socrate*, in which one can read that the condemnation of that philosopher was justified by reason of his universalist teachings; and, finally, the learned men of the *Action Française*. At least when out of pontifical hearing, these last willingly acknowledge their anti-Christian activity (I speak of them in the present, for they still exist, even if their periodical has disappeared). According to them, Christianity—which they oppose to Catholicism*—is the inspiration of many a revolutionary dogma, notably of democratic egalitarianism. Their leader, Charles Maur-

* An anti-Christian campaign, also in the name of Catholicism, was likewise carried on at the end

ras, said this a hundred times. They admit their anti-Socratic activities less readily, inasmuch as they make a cult of Greco-Roman humanism. It can hardly be denied, however, that their religion of success, which they assert should be sought "by all means," as well as their rejection of current morality for the class of men to which they themselves belong, derive from the theses of Calicles and his peers rather than from his interlocutor. Likewise, their cult of reason, which, according to them, should work principally for the maintenance of a social hierarchy dear to them, and their cult of truth—but they call this cult barbarous if it operates outside all social considerations*—and related to a pragmatism that is indeed the antipodes of the disinterested idealism preached by the master of Crito.

This third movement, even though it is directed at intellectuals, has not failed, on that account, to become a sizeable one. All the more so since many a Boeotian has thought to acquire the title of intellectual by adhering to it.

The first and third of these movements reinforced each other in one direction: anti-Semitism. Which is, in large part, perfectly logical. Since, as his adversaries declare, the Jew is very often "rootless," he finds himself on that account the natural champion of values stated in absolute terms and the born enemy of those who wish them to be only relative and historical. Moreover, because of his atavism of the oppressed, the Jew is organically and fanatically devoted to respect for the human person. One may well agree with the head of the *Action Française* that Christianity, in so far as it is a school of abstract justice and democratic egalitarianism, stems through the Prophets from a Jewish source.†

However, these enemies of absolute values

of the 19th century, but in a manner much more patrician, much less suited to reach the masses, by Rémy de Gourmont and his group of the *Mercur de France*.

* See my *The Treason of the Intellectuals*.

† In like fashion Rosenberg persecuted the Jewish heritage in Christianity. (See Rauschnig: *The Revolution of Nihilism*.)

describe them as Jewish not so much because this happens to be true as because these values are thereby rendered *ipso facto* odious to a whole world, thanks to the unpopularity attached to the name of Jew—an unpopularity due to reasons quite different from the political reasons flaunted here, and quite anterior to them. We know what increased strength these learned men derive from this sort of maneuver. Thus the Nazis oppose "German" truth to the "Jewish truth of Einstein." They would evidently find a smaller audience if they contrasted it simply with "scientific truth," above all if they added that this scientific truth was that of such non-Jews as Leibniz, Euler, and Weierstrass, to name some of the great mathematicians from the other side of the Rhine. In the same spirit, certain enemies of Socratic values assert that since Pericles the Greeks have been Jews.

The Treason of the Intellectuals

THESE considerations demonstrate that the editors of COMMENTARY are completely correct in regarding the collapse of moral values here under discussion as being other than a by-product of the recent war. And also when they observe that the most serious thing is not so much the downfall of these values as the refusal to believe in the importance of maintaining them—or rather, I would say, the desire to perform a scalp dance over their collapse and raise up hymns to the values that announce their negation. In the face of such a spectacle one thinks of the bandit in Tolstoy's story: the hermit who receives his confession declares with stupefaction, "The others, at least, were ashamed of their immorality; but what is to be done with this one who is proud of it?"

The exaltation of this new "morality" is the work, and could only be the work, of intellectuals, who were also endowed with a literary talent that could hold the attention of the crowd and could furnish it with a semblance of arguments and striking formulas (Nietzsche is the crucial example here).

This, exactly, constitutes what I have call-

ed the treason of the intellectuals. To be sure, it has not created this human immorality, but it has brought it to a singular peak. Men did not wait for the author of *Zarathustra* or for Rosenberg to practice the "will to power" in spite of all the rights of others, but morality made them ashamed of doing so. Today a new morality provides them justification, and this increases their self-assurance no little.

Moreover, justification of their violence is offered them by the very institution that was to be expected to scold them: the Papacy recognized Victor Emanuel III as "Emperor of Ethiopia," and many a prince of the Church bowed down before the resounding slaps in the face administered to human dignity by Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. How can one expect the man on the street not to mock at the rights of the human person when the highest moral magistracy gives such an example?

Two Forms of Pragmatic Ethics Particularly Triumphant at Present

IF THE collapse of Socratic-Christian morality in favor of pragmatic morality dates from well before the war, this downfall now seems to me, nevertheless, to be taking on forms that are new—if not in nature, at least in the intensity of their affirmation and in the extent of their adoption. I see two principal new forms:

(1) The religion of *order*. One may say that the religion of order, in so far as it is in opposition to rights of the individual, has replaced, at least in France, the religion of the nation as we saw it manifested at the beginning of the century in Barrès and Maurras. It has so completely replaced it that, with the appearance of fascist states that negated the rights of the individual, the greater part of these Frenchmen—with Maurras at their head—supported the cause of these states, in spite of the latter's expressed intention of humbling the French nation. And the day came when we saw these Frenchmen rejoice—the "divine surprise" of Maurras—over the defeat of their country to the profit of one of those states. It is in the

name of order that these people continue to attack French democracy today, making an appeal, not without success, to all the "right-thinking" people of Europe, regardless of whether they belong to a nation, like Germany, fundamentally hostile to their own.

Need I demonstrate that the idea of order is based essentially on the restriction and negation of the rights of the individual? Men seem at all times to have understood this instinctively. I find it significant that they have erected statues to Liberty, Justice, Science, Art, Charity, and Peace, but never to Order. The immense present prestige of the idea of order is a powerful indication of the decline of respect for the person.

(2) The particular good fortune enjoyed today by Marxist dogma in so far, as we remarked above, as it tends to recognize no moral values—justice, truth, reason—except as determined by practical considerations—or, more exactly, by economic interest. I must point to the adherence—very noisy, and impressive to the common man—given today to these doctrines by high scientific and philosophic authorities, at least in France (I think it is the same in America). I think particularly of their adoption of what the Marxists call "dialectical materialism," which teaches that, in order to understand history, it is necessary to commune with the "historical process"—more exactly, the economic process—instead of looking at it from outside. This constitutes a position that is purely mystical and, formally, is a negation of reason, since the essence of the latter is to translate reality into rational terms, not to merge with it. It is a doctrine that is essentially practical or attempts to be so. Dialectical materialism, says Maurice Thorez, a pupil of Lenin, is "a guide for action"—from which standpoint it is very natural that it should be glorified by a political party whose sole aim is to win out in the here-and-now.

But it is a serious matter when this doctrine is exalted by men whose function it used to be to glorify the exercise of disinterested intelligence, and to act as a counterweight to those who are interested only in how to get the better of others. Let us add

that these thinkers want to recognize only a collective consciousness—"the individual consciousness can be no more than the reflection of the collective consciousness," says Marx; with the result that a man on a desert island would have no consciousness. All this includes, whether they wish it or not, disdain for the individual consciousness and its essential inviolability.

Socratic-Christian Morality Could Not Be Saved by Pragmatic Christianity—It Seems Definitively Lost Save for a Few

IN THE face of this crisis of civilization, it is asked whether a return to religion might not be a remedy. If I call religion Christianity, the return to religion appears to me to be the evident remedy, since the evil consists, according to all that I have just said, in the desertion of it by the world, and—a matter much more serious—in the desertion of it by its moral leaders. Yet we must see a return to a Christianity that, being faithful to its essential nature, preaches eternal values

transcending practical considerations, and not to a Christianity that proclaims itself a principle of "action," of "dynamism"—a "shock" Christianity that declares itself a principle of "evolution," a principle of solid political establishment. This latter Christianity is more alive than ever, and, far from acting as a check on the "realism" of the modern world, it seems to me to be its strong adjutant.

As to whether this crisis be "a transition toward another society endowed with better values," I confess that I cannot see how the cult of purely material satisfactions—even in favor of all and not for some people only—can lead to values I would consider "better." I see how these might lead to a humanity happier in one sense, but happiness is not for me the criterion of human value. I think that the cause of civilization such as we understand it is—to borrow a phrase from COMMENTARY's inquiry—a lost cause. There will always remain, nevertheless, isolated beings who will serve it. And, in reality, was it not always this way?

JEWISH CULTURE IN THIS TIME AND PLACE

A Symposium

BELOW we publish five of the many responses to our request for comments on Elliot E. Cohen's "Jewish Culture in America," which appeared in the May 1947 issue of COMMENTARY. It is our intention to publish some further selections from these comments in later issues.

Mr. Cohen's article spoke for the creation of a specifically Jewish culture in America that, without confining itself within the traditional bounds of religion or the new secular bounds of nationalism, would speak to Jews and the rest of the world with the same pertinence that the highest culture of the West in general does. Drawing no sectarian lines, this American Jewish culture would welcome the best efforts of Jews inside and outside the Jewish community

to make Jewish experience in this country meaningful. But, hopefully, it would depend on the organized Jewish community to provide these efforts with the core of both an audience and financial support. . . .

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A Palace for Everybody

DAVID BAUMGARDT

IT is not only Jews who are too often tempted to consider culture the mere "marmalade added to the bread and butter of daily life." Kierkegaard once said, rightly, that all men should and could live religiously in a palace, but they generally prefer to use only the dog kennel nearby. Jews, for many comprehensible reasons, are even more attracted than other people to life in the kennel of materialistic—or idealistic—platitudes, and tend to put the old palace of Jewish culture on display only when they want to show off before friends—or opponents.

But if we do not dare to take the musty covers off the chairs and sofas of our old palace of the Jewish spirit, if we do not venture to make use of the palace and its treasures, if old and new Jewish wisdom does not serve to answer the real problems of our modern life, we shall remain cultural pariahs, however much we boast of our previous and present intellectual and artistic achievements.

If we have inherited a palace of Jewish culture, it naturally makes little sense to speak only the language of the kennel. It is a mere obsession of well-meaning cultural leaders of the modern age to value nothing but popularized thought and—in addition

—even thoughts hardly worth popularizing.

To fight against this obsession is, as Mr. Cohen pointed out, in no way undemocratic. On the contrary, as gifted children resent being treated as children, so gifted cultural laymen resent being fed with second-hand cultural nourishment when they could receive original and creative work.

It is hardly believable that American Jewry should respond less to a "highbrow" Jewish magazine than German Jewry responded to such periodicals as *Der Jude* or *Der Morgen* only a short time ago. If, in the short period of its existence, COMMENTARY has done nothing but give the lie to those faint-hearted people who prophesied failure two years ago, it has already performed a useful service.

As an old saying goes, true democracy aspires to make everyone live in a palace, not in a hut; and true culture seems to me far more democratic than many highbrows or lowbrows assume. There are enough cultural cads among highbrow professors and other intellectual specialists, and, fortunately, there are countless highly perceptive people among cultural laymen. (It is no small comfort to hear that Mr. Cohen can testify to this fact on the ground of first-hand experience.) Let these perceptive laymen enter the palace of Jewish culture and tell the specialists that their reports on its façade are often not good enough.

If Jewish culture is understood to be primarily for our own use, all the unhealthy and spasmodic efforts at total assimilation to our non-Jewish environment, or total dissociation from it, will disappear, and the plague of blueprints for our culture will disappear with them. The cry for blueprints in creative work is as paradoxical as it is the sure sign of cultural impotence. What lover cares for fixed rules telling him how to approach his loved one? What romantic or mystic is interested, first of all, in definitions of mysticism or romanticism? Strange to say, it is generally only the people who handle exact, scientific concepts most carelessly who seek definitions of intellectual tendencies that, by definition, must exclude definitions.

The non-scientific part of every living culture is characterized by intellectual aspirations that cannot and do not want to be defined, or even described, beforehand. The propagandists and cultural intermediators who are mainly interested in programs, directions, rules, and blueprints, generally exhaust their energies completely in setting up these blueprints and in boasting about them—so that programs become a substitute for the matter itself, as the Fourth of July speech becomes an *ersatz* for real democracy.

True culture, it cannot be said often enough, is *das Lied, das aus der Kehle äringt* (the song that spontaneously pours out of one's throat) and does not obey any dictate or plan or purpose from the outside. Culture is also *Lohn der reichlich lohnet in sich selbst* (the reward richly rewarding in itself). If culture is primarily meant to please or displease others and not meant originally for home consumption, it will be of no value to anyone, either to others or to ourselves.

Jeremy Bentham once said, ingenuously, in answer to the question—how can one get the reputation of being a great humanitarian?—that there was only one way: to be truly benevolent and to make efforts to put your fondness of people into practice. There is only one way to have culture: by feeling a dire need for it and to satisfy that need.

We have to turn to the Jewish past and its great masters of thought, feeling, and action—but not because they are toploftiness and tall talk to us, and to others, and not because we want to demonstrate how different or how similar this Jewish greatness is against other types of human greatness. We must

turn to the great Jewish past because we feel that questions were asked and answers prepared in it that, more than many Christian or other kinds of answers, will help us ask our own questions and prepare our own answers. This, despite the deep and genuine esteem we may have for the great cultural achievements of others. The creative community, no less than the creative individual, needs considerable nourishment from alien sources but, with few exceptions, mother-milk remains a particularly vital form of food.

However, with all this and more to be said, who can foretell whether we can expect a flowering of American Jewish culture in the near future? It is most reassuring to hear that a critical and experienced observer is very hopeful. But beyond any optimism or pessimism in our approach to culture—life, including the life of Jewish culture in America, must be lived through; and no rosy or gloomy forecast can or should alter the character of the joyful and disheartening experiences unavoidably linked up with it.

Creating a Cultural Atmosphere

HANNAH ARENDT

CULTURE, as we understand it today, made its appearance rather recently and grew out of the secularization of religion and the dissolution of traditional values. When we talk about the Christian culture of the Middle Ages, we are using the term loosely and in a sense that would have been almost incomprehensible to medieval man. The process of secularization may or may not have undermined the foundations of religious faith—I am inclined to think that this undermining has been less decisive than we sometimes assume; in any event secularization transformed religious concepts and the results of religious speculation in such a way that they received new meaning and new relevance independent of faith. This transformation marked the beginning of culture as we know it—that is, from then on religion became an important part of culture, but it no longer dominated all spiritual achievements.

Even more important for the establishment of culture than the mere dissolution of traditional values, was that great fear of oblivion which followed close upon the 18th century's Enlightenment and which pervaded the

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whole 19th century. The danger of losing historical continuity as such, along with the treasures of the past, was obvious; the fear of being robbed of the specifically human background of a past, of becoming an abstract ghost like the man without a shadow, was the driving power behind that new passion for impartiality and for the collecting of historical curiosities that gave birth to our present historical and philological sciences as well as to the 19th century's monstrosities of taste. Just because the old traditions were no longer alive, culture was stimulated into being, with all its good and all its ridiculous aspects. The stylelessness of the last century in architecture, its insane attempts to imitate all styles of the past, was only one aspect of what was really a new phenomenon called culture.

CULTURE is by definition secular. It requires a kind of broadmindedness of which no religion will ever be capable. It can be thoroughly perverted through ideologies and *Weltanschauungen* which share, though on a lower and more vulgar level, religion's contempt for tolerance and claim to "possess" the truth. Although culture is "hospitable," we should not forget that neither religion nor ideologies will, nor ever can, resign themselves to being only parts of a whole. The historian, though hardly ever the theologian, knows that secularization is not the ending of religion.

It so happened that the Jewish people not only did not share in the slow process of secularization that started in Western Europe with the Renaissance, and out of which modern culture was born, but that the Jews, when confronted with and attracted by Enlightenment and culture, had just emerged from a period in which their own secular learning had sunk to an all-time low. The consequences of this lack of spiritual links between Jews and non-Jewish civilization were as natural as they were unfortunate: Jews who wanted "culture" left Judaism at once, and completely, even though most of them remained conscious of their Jewish origin. Secularization and even secular learning became identified exclusively with non-Jewish culture, so that it never occurred to these Jews that they could have started a process of secularization with regard to their own heritage. Their abandonment of Judaism resulted in a situation within Judaism in which the

Jewish spiritual heritage became more than ever before the monopoly of rabbis. The German *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, though it was aware of the danger of a complete loss of all the past's spiritual achievements, took refuge from the real problem in a rather dry scholarship concerned only with preservation, the results of which were at best a collection of museum objects.

While this sudden and radical escape by Jewish intellectuals from everything Jewish prevented the growth of a cultural atmosphere in the Jewish community, it was very favorable for the development of individual creativity. What had been done by the members of other nations as part and parcel of a more collective effort and in the span of several generations, was achieved by individual Jews within the narrow and concentrated framework of a single human lifetime and by the sheer force of personal imagination. It was as individuals, strictly, that the Jews started their emancipation from tradition.

It is true that a unique and impassioned intensity possessed only the few and was paid for by the fact that a particularly high percentage of Jews occupied themselves as pseudo-cultural busybodies and succumbed to mass culture and the mere love of fame. But it still brought forth a remarkably great number of authentic Jewish writers, artists, and thinkers who did not break under the extraordinary effort required of them, and whom this sudden empty freedom of spirit did not debase but on the contrary made creative.

Since, however, their individual achievements did not find reception by a prepared and cultured Jewish audience, they could not found a specifically Jewish tradition in secular writing and thinking—though these Jewish writers, thinkers, and artists had more than one trait in common. Whatever tradition the historian may be able to detect remained tacit and latent, its continuance automatic and unconscious, springing as it did from the basically identical conditions that each of these individuals had to confront all over again for himself, and master by himself without help from his predecessors.

There is no doubt that no blueprint and no program will ever make sense in cultural matters. If there is such a thing as a cultural policy it can aim only at the creation of a cultural atmosphere—that is, in Elliot Cohen's words, a "culture for Jews," but not

a Jewish culture. The emergence of talent or genius is independent of such an atmosphere, but whether we shall continue to lose Jewish talent to others, or whether we will become able to keep it within our own community to the same extent that the others do, will be decided by the existence or non-existence of this atmosphere. It is this that seems to me to be the problem. One may give a few suggestions on how to approach it.

There is first of all that great religious and metaphysical post-Biblical tradition which we will have to win back from the theologians and scholars—to both of whom we owe, however, a large debt of gratitude for having preserved it at all. But we shall have to discover and deal with this tradition anew in our own terms, for the sake of people to whom it no longer constitutes a holy past or an untouchable heritage.

There is on the other hand the much smaller body of Jewish secular writings—dating from all periods, but particularly from the 19th century in Eastern Europe; this writing grew out of secular folk life and only the absence of a cultural atmosphere has prevented a portion of it from assuming the status of great literature; instead it was condemned to the doubtful category of folklore. The cultural value of every author or artist really begins to make itself felt when he transcends the boundaries of his own nationality, when he no longer remains significant only to his fellow-Jews, fellow-Frenchmen or fellow-Englishmen. The lack of Jewish culture and the prevalence of folklore in secular Jewish life has denied this transcendence to all Jewish talent that did not simply desert the Jewish community. The rescue of the Yiddish writers of Eastern Europe is of great importance; otherwise they will remain lost to culture generally.

Last but not least, we shall have to make room for all those who either came, and come, into conflict with Jewish orthodoxy or turned their backs on Judaism for the reasons mentioned above. These figures will be of special significance for the whole endeavor; they may even become the supreme test of its success or failure. Not only because creative talent has been especially frequent among them in recent times, but also because they, in their individual efforts towards secularization, offer the first models for that new amalgamation of older traditions with new

impulses and awareness without which a specifically Jewish cultural atmosphere is hardly conceivable. These talents do not need us, they achieve culture on their own responsibility. We, on the other hand, do need them since they form the only basis, however small, of culture that we have got; a basis we shall have to extend gradually in both directions: the secularization of religious tradition and rescue from folklore of the great artists (mostly Yiddish) of secular folk life.

WHETHER such a development will be realized nobody can possibly foretell. COMMENTARY looks to me like a good beginning and it certainly is a novum in Jewish cultural life. The reason for some optimism, however, is in the last analysis a political one.

The Yishuv in Palestine is the first Jewish achievement brought about by an entirely secular movement. There is no doubt that whatever may happen to Hebrew literature in the future, Hebrew writers and artists will not need to confine themselves to either folk life or religion in order to remain Jews. They are the first Jews who as Jews are free to start from more than a pre-cultural level.

The Jewish people of America, on the other hand, live a reasonably safe and reasonably free life that permits them to do, relatively, what they please. The central and strongest part of diaspora Jewry no longer exists under the conditions of a nation-state but in a country that would annul its own constitution if ever it demanded homogeneity of population and an ethnic foundation for its state. In America one does not have to pretend that Judaism is nothing but a denomination and resort to all those desperate and crippling disguises that were common among the rich and educated Jews of Europe.

The development of a Jewish culture, in other words, or the lack of it, will from now on not depend upon circumstances beyond the control of the Jewish people, but upon their own will.

Judaism vs. Jewishness

JACOB B. AGUS

MR. COHEN's article, it seems to me, fails to touch upon the core of the problem. If American Jewish culture be defined as those cultural achievements which are pro-

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duced by the Jews of America, then there is certainly at present, and there will be in the future, a tremendous Jewish culture on this soil, fairly in line with the massive contributions of our people to the national cultures of Germany, France, Austria, and Hungary. However, if men of Jewish birth contribute to American or world culture as Americans and as citizens of the world, there is no special reason or justification for organized Jewish community effort on behalf of such a culture. . . .

If we should think of ourselves as primarily an underprivileged group on the American scene (which I do not think we are), then a good case can be made for the organization of a special effort on behalf of artists, scientists, and writers of Jewish faith. I believe such an effort would defeat its own purpose and would ultimately degenerate into a ghettoized WPA. In any event, such a project has nothing whatever to do with Jewish culture, even in the vague sense which Mr. Cohen assigns to the term.

If then, as Mr. Cohen agrees, we are not to equate Jewish culture with the manifold productions of racial Jews, it becomes necessary to know what we are talking about and what we are striving for in the endeavor to build up a Jewish culture. Mr. Cohen tries to take advantage of the current popular distrust of reason by ridiculing "the Man with the Plan." But, the plain fact is that, in advance of such a plan or program, built around a goal or set of goals, he is talking about nothing at all. When the collective activity of Jewish people derives from a central drive or purpose, then all activities, no matter how peripheral and unimportant in themselves, add up to form an organic whole. But, when all you have are disparate, unrelated undertakings, that are supposedly justified by reference to an entity called "Jewish culture," which is itself amorphous, rootless, and purposeless, then you have nothing but chaos and confusion.

Mr. Cohen mentions in the beginning of his article a number of elements constituting culture, but forgets about those elements in the rest of his article. Jewish culture, he rightly says, is of "deepest necessity." It should provide the *raison d'être* of Jewish life, especially for the masses of the religiously "unaffiliated." But it is this very purpose of Jewish community existence that he studi-

ously ignores in the remainder of the article.

When he speaks of the content of Jewish culture, he mentions the persistent questioning concerning problems of human destiny. Obviously, these are the central questions of all cultures, barring none; they are "persistent" to the extent the culture thrives. One need not begin by tackling the problem of defining Jewish culture, if one lives within the traditional stream of Jewish life and aspiration. Life is prior to thought. But when one dismisses out of hand the traditional and Zionist strands of culture in the name of a new creation, the least he can do is to envisage clearly what he wants to do and why.

He rejects, I think rightly, bare group-survival as a worthy goal. Though he condescends to place the Talmud on a par with Jewish humor, he does not accept a Hebrew, Zionist culture. What purpose of group existence then will so-called Jewish culture serve? In American Jewish life, we must not forget, Jewish cultural activity, however variously conceived, must stand as the goal of Jewish group life. Otherwise, why should not Jews assimilate and disintegrate within the American melting pot even as all the other national-cultural groups willingly commingled to produce the great American nation? Jewish group persistence is not now the product of natural environmental factors. The natural course of development for individual Jews, stripped of the loyalties of Judaism, is to drift into the gray mass of the outside world. "Enhancing self-respect" is not going to slow this trend; all the ethnic groups which comprise the American nation respect themselves, yet they freely intermarry with other groups and contemplate with equanimity the eventual disappearance of their ethnic minority in the stream of American life.

JEWISH culture must be conceived within the framework of the emergent status of American Israel; otherwise, it is merely meaningless noise in the midst of a rapidly dispersing crowd. There are three types of status available in American life: racial, national, and religious. The term, cultural, is in itself neutral, since it may be of any one of these three types. To say, therefore, that one doesn't care about intellectual quibbling as to what we are and what we want

to become, and that he is interested in Jewish culture, is to evade the issue. One is reminded of the girl who raved about a lecture she heard. Her mother asked her what the lecturer said. The girl protested, "He wasn't supposed to say anything; it was just cultural."

If American Israel is to occupy the status of a religious community in American life, then the Jew who belongs to it, however tenuously, knows the purpose of Jewish group existence, and the non-Jewish world, too, accepts completely this status in our uni-cultural but multi-religious nation. So long as a Jew does not openly sever his ties with Judaism, he belongs within the periphery of the faith. Around the core of the Jewish religion, there are numerous concerns, relating in a variety of ways to the central core, which may be denominated "cultural" activities. Jewish culture in that event has meaning, purpose, content, and a fairly definite border-line, which, by the way, does not include "Jewish rye bread," in spite of Mr. Cohen's testimony concerning its "inner value." If the status he advocates is the one of a national minority, then Jewish culture must be molded into a Hebraic or Yiddish pattern. Doubtless then, Mr. Cohen realizes that this status is in American life merely a phenomenon of transit.

All national groups merge slowly or rapidly into the American nation. If, then, the "home of Israel is like all the other nations," there is no reason to labor for a reversal of the current of Americanism in the case of the Jewish group. Secular Jewish nationalism is in America an invitation to assimilation, even as in Eastern Europe it functioned as an anti-assimilationist philosophy.

Mr. Cohen's words make sense only on the assumption of American Israel constituting at present and seeking for the future the status of a self-inclosed racial group. To be sure, he specifically rejects this conception, yet the concept of a "Jewish culture," which he advocates is meaningless on any other basis. Since it is not religious and it is not nationalistic, it can only be racist, no matter how strongly racism is consciously disavowed. I agree that it is possible for the American Jewish community so to organize or rather mismanage its life as to become in its own eyes and in the eyes of the non-Jew-

ish world a segregated community. . . . I strongly challenge the assumption that we are even now reduced to this category, and I bitterly condemn those aggressive secularists who, by the momentum of their own so-called "Jewish leadership," would drive American Jewry into the status of racial minority. I cannot see how any Jewish young man could possibly be happier thinking of himself as a non-Aryan than he would be as a member of a religious congregation of Israel.

It is the business of the Jewish community to cultivate and to foster the ideals and standards of Judaism, not of "Jewishness." It is the business of writers and editors to serve the ends of Judaism, and not to distort them by making confusion worse confounded and levelling Jewish culture to the point where it cannot but become a self-hating and self-glorifying racism, sometimes mystically self-segregating, sometimes passionately battering against the barriers of segregation: an altogether unlovely phenomenon without meaning or purpose.

A Betrayal of Universalism

BENJAMIN GINZBURG

I CANNOT for the life of me see any sense in the idea of promoting a Jewish culture in America, any more than I can see any sense in the idea of promoting a Ginzburg culture or a Cohen culture. I do not deny that I am a Ginzburg, descended from a long line of Ginzburgs, and I do not deny that I am by birth a Jew and descended from a long line of Jews. But I do not see that this creates any necessity to understand myself as a Ginzburg or as a Jew, or to develop "positive content" of Ginzburgism or Jewishness in my philosophy of life or cultural outlook.

In fact my reason tells me that in so far as I import "positive content" of Ginzburgism or Jewishness into my philosophy of life, I distort and falsify that philosophy of life. Hitler to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no Jewish truth and there is no Aryan truth. There is only a universal truth, a truth accessible to all men without the intervention of family, race, nation, or sect. . . .

As everybody knows, the religion of Judaism, after its crude tribal stage, developed the vision of a universal God, a God of Justice, to replace the vengeful God of a par-

ticular family, clan, or nation. However, Judaism—and the same is true of other revealed religions—is still tied by an umbilical cord to its origins in tribal religion. The set of beliefs and practices which constitutes Judaism is not something to be freely accepted by the individual after rational analysis—it is something imposed on him through family ceremonies and family pressure during childhood.

There are many for whom this order of ideas still constitutes a living reality, many who seek honestly to propagate the inherited religion of the Jews as a way of life. With them I can have no serious quarrel, since I know that every living religion gropes towards the universal truth. . . .

BUT Mr. Cohen's appeal is directed not to those for whom religious Judaism is still a living thing, but rather to those for whom it has ceased to live. Mr. Cohen rejects religious Judaism as a way of life. He seeks to propagate Jewishness without Judaism—a clan outlook without the upward groping for the universal truth which redeems traditional religion. He thus commits the crime of Lot's wife—he looks backward instead of forward.

The implicit justification that Mr. Cohen makes for Jewish culture—to a large extent he simply assumes Jewish culture as an axiom not needing demonstration or justification—is that it is necessary in order to provide Jews with a proper sense of adjustment. The familiar argument is that Jews come up against the fact of their Jewishness through anti-Semitism, but that is a negative way of learning Jewishness. What is needed is to have a positive approach to Jewishness. We must, as Mr. Cohen puts it, know "the facts about our Jewish past, to give warrant for our self-acceptance and content to our pride as Jews."

. . . The great trouble with this line of argument is that in the guise of making the prejudice of anti-Semitism more supportable, it reintroduces the notion of group responsibility for individual actions which lies at the base of all prejudice. If I can take pride in the fact (or reputed fact) that my ancestors wrote the Ten Commandments, then the anti-Semite is justified in persecuting me because he is told that my ancestors were Christ-killers. Except for being born a Jew, I personally had as little to do with the Ten Commandments as with the killing of Jesus.

But if my individual being is to be swallowed up in my Jewish essence, as the Jewish culturists would have it, then the blood feud which the anti-Semites have been carrying on for two thousand years against the descendants of the Jews of Palestine is right and proper.

The argument about pride of race and tradition may make anti-Semitism more supportable to Jews, but what does it do for other victims of similar prejudices? What about the poor Negro who is lynched because of anti-Negro prejudice? He may not have any princely ancestors to fall back upon for pride of race; and he may not have any great cultural tradition to identify himself with. For him, according to the philosophy of the Jewish culturists, there can be no psychological or spiritual salvation. He may cry, "My Lord, my Lord, why hast thou forsaken me!", but no answer is vouchsafed because he has no distinguished ancestors.

The whole argument of the Jewish culturists about "negative" and "positive" knowledge can be turned completely around. They tell us that Jews who take a universal outlook come up against their Jewishness negatively through anti-Semitism, and that they need to be redeemed by a positive knowledge of Jewishness—by Jewish culture. But who called Jewish culture positive? The very argument that the Jewish culturists use in support of their program indicates that the Jewish culture they put forward is nothing but the expression of the negative fact of anti-Semitism. Without anti-Semitism they would have no excuse for peddling their nostrum of Jewish culture.

It is the universalists, on the other hand, who insist that one's philosophy of life should be determined by positive and not negative considerations—by the positive ideals of morality and reason, rather than by the failure of many people to attain and live up to these positive ideals. Granted that a large part of the human race has not yet achieved moral and intellectual enlightenment, does this mean that the rest of us have to go out of our minds and conform to a mad world?

I HAVE stressed the moral and intellectual objections to Mr. Cohen's plea for a Jewish culture because moral and intellectual ideas constitute the most important part of any human cultural activity. They are also

the most important elements in Mr. Cohen's program for Jewish culture.

Culture in the aesthetic sense—the creation or appreciation of art—is linked not to abstract universal principles or ideals, but to the beauty of a concrete individual context. We see beauty not in general, but in an individual scene, in an immediate concrete experience. In this sense culture is of necessity local, regional, linguistic (as far as literary art is concerned), and ethnic (in the sense of sharing group memories).

These aesthetic individualizations of human culture do not by themselves interfere with the universality of human moral ideals and abstract intellectual principles. The various peoples of Europe, for example, have different aesthetic experiences. The beauty of the French language is not the same as the beauty of the English language, any more than the beauty of the French landscape is the same as the beauty of the English landscape. Also the unity of French history—the group memories of Frenchmen—is distinct from the unity of English history. But all such facts do not normally prevent the peoples of Europe from being united in the same culture intellectually and morally.

Conflict with universal moral ideals arises, however, whenever there is a disturbance of the basic conditions making for aesthetic individualization of the various cultures. Thus, let two peoples make war upon one another, and the national consciousness of each people ceases to be a purely aesthetic consciousness—an experience of shared memories enjoyed in and for itself. It becomes soured into a political or moral nationalism. Not only has such a nationalism no aesthetic value but in its preference for one group above the rest of humanity it violates rational morality.

In certain parts of Europe the ethnic consciousness of the various groups is so disturbed—even without war—that the possibility of a national art is destroyed without the ethnic groups being able, as yet, to fuse into a larger group-aesthetic consciousness. That may be too bad from the point of view of art, but there is little one can do about it. Humanity has its hands full organizing the basic economic and political conditions for a peaceful life, without having to guarantee a national artistic consciousness for every linguistic or historical group.

If these reflections are applied to the ques-

tion of Jewish culture in America, it can be seen at once that the trend of life in America is such as to prevent the spontaneous development of an aesthetically adequate Jewish group consciousness. Such a group consciousness existed under the circumstances which governed the life of Jews in Eastern Europe, but in the United States, with all the impulses that Jews have for mingling with others economically, intellectually, politically, and, to a certain extent, socially, there is no natural basis for an adequate group consciousness.

A GREAT part of most current discussions of Jewish culture is devoted to bemoaning the absence of a Jewish group consciousness in America. But, after all, what can we expect? Jews speak the same language as other Americans, attend the same schools, read the same books, are members of the same political parties. And since religion does not play much of a role in the life of Jews—or for that matter, in the life of Americans generally—we cannot rely on differences of religion to individuate Jews as a group.

If, then, we are to have a Jewish group consciousness, it must be created by the use of a forced draft of Jewish nationalism. Such a nationalism, as I have previously indicated, betrays the basic ideals of universalism which it took humanity so long to achieve. But will it make for a healthy Jewish culture in the aesthetic sense? No, because it cannot undo the conditions that make Jews look to ideas and associations outside their own fold. All it can do is warp the perspective of Jews without creating for them the aesthetic experience of a Jewish group consciousness.

It may well be that because of anti-Semitism and other factors Jews may never feel themselves as aesthetically integrated in American life as other elements for whom the bars of prejudice do not exist. Or it may even be that the whole texture of American life will never be as aesthetically integrated as is the texture of the older established nations. So what?

In this troubled age, when we must all gird ourselves for the task of preventing world-wide atomic destruction, when we must deal with the need for bread and life and freedom for hundreds of millions, the question whether some group or other is or is not to have the joys of sharing common aesthetic experiences is of singularly little mo-

ment. The essential thing is that all the sons of Noah work together in a spirit of peace, cooperation, and human understanding.

The Old Conditioning

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH

I PLAN to quote a good many of the sentences in "Jewish Culture in America" in what I am writing on Hellenistic Judaism and its art, especially the protest against the isolation of cultures: "People continually ask whether a cultural product is 'Jewish' or 'American,' seeming to assume that these two traditions are mutually exclusive." The contrast would have point, perhaps, if we were comparing life in a New England village in 1820 with life in a Polish ghetto at the same time (although New England was so steeped in the Old Testament that it frequently out-Jewed the Jews), but Mr. Cohen's feeling is completely right that after people have been living together the question becomes increasingly artificial. The idea applies to the Jews of Hellenistic Egypt and Rome as well as to those in the Bronx, because it formulates a basic and unalterable factor in civilization. True, when the rabbis bring up a boy on the Talmud and Midrash he is not brought up on Shakespeare and Whitehead. But every decade—as Milton Klonsky pointed out in his dramatic picture of the life of Jewish boys in Brooklyn (COMMENTARY, May 1947), with its grand but unchangeable *zedas* and their keen little grandsons—the little Jewish boy is harder to keep to the Talmud. The living organism takes as nourishment whatever is available.

TO ME as a *goy* it seems a pity that the Jewish boys I teach at Yale for the most part know the Jewish traditions as little as the *goyim* know their own. I am far from believing that all Jews should eat kosher, or that all Gentiles should take communion: but it seems too bad that both should grow up in ignorance of what meant so much in the past. Perhaps we are now going through a necessary stage wherein old traditions must be rejected to free us from their tyranny and allow us later to return to them with detached minds to recover what in them has permanent value. Perhaps too, when that happens, a truly Jewish-Christian

culture will emerge, not in the sense in which the term is now being misused, to conceal the mutual antagonism of Judaism and Christianity through two millennia, but in the sense that Jews and Christians will each fertilize the other anew and consciously. This cannot be done if Jews either build up their walls of separation, or try to deny the long centuries of Talmudic dominance, "the pleasure and joy of Jewish living." Jews cannot, in other words, reduce their tradition to the religion of the prophets, that is, essentially, to liberal Christianity. Jews today are so amazingly interested in cultural things, they "both as creators and audience swarm the concert halls, the theaters, the publishing houses, the movies, in numbers far beyond any decent populational proportion," not because of Amos or Hosea, but because the craving for scholarship and ideas was instilled into every Jewish boy.

That Jews in America can return to the life of the *zedas* is unthinkable, and, at least from the point of view of a *goy*, entirely undesirable. There are enough walls between us without rebuilding the "fence" which those old men constructed "around their heads." But the alternatives are clear: the Jews are so disproportionately interested in literature, scholarship, and the arts (and, I should add, the sciences) because they are "racially" different, or because something in their own culture of the past centuries had unique conditioning values. I see no possible third explanation, and I agree with the general trend in rejecting the "racial" distinctiveness as nonsense. Accordingly, as an old-line American, I want to see put into our melting pot as much as we can get of the values of that old rabbinic conditioning.

Just now the Jews are doing this by contributing their disproportional stint to our productivity in all fields, and by supporting what good appears from anywhere; but they are coasting on the impetus of the past. To make Jewish-Christian civilization permanent and real, Jews in the inner circles must devote themselves wholeheartedly to try to find the matrix of Jewish life through the ages, and to make it an integral part of all our lives by first making it an integral part of their own. I suspect that they will find that the basic attitude of Judaism is correct: it is not doctrine or ideas which are most important but a disciplined way of life.

DIRTY RALPHY

A Story

LESLIE A. FIEDLER

IT IS easy for me to remember Dirty Ralph. Like the dog that bit me, the falling tree that knocked me down, the first radishes I ever grew, I do not dream of him; he belongs to the daylight level of recollection. One remembers in the same way a stone stoop detached from street or house; a child's poem about a Chinaman and a knife; one view of a certain statue, the flowers dying around its base. I remember hitting him and his two teeth falling out, and I feel continuous with the boy who struck that blow; I have no trouble with the "I" of that memory. Yes, I was there, weeping, sweating—and the exultation of the first successful punch, the knowledge that I could harm what I hated has never died from me.

Usually, I recall that final blow, isolated, its only context the act of remembering, but as I try now I can see a mean alley between wooden houses, a crack running irregularly across the pavement and Ralph's body arched over it as he had half-fallen, half-knelt to look at his lost teeth. His face is dark, indistinct—and his foul smell returns to me. But it is my father who pats my shoulder approvingly: the thick blunt hand that had dragged me back to fight. "God damn it, no son of mine will grow up a coward!" he must have said when I ran to him, tear-stained, frightened. I cannot really remember the words, but I know how he must have spoken.

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By the time I was dragged struggling to where Ralph had taunted me, my mouth was full of snot and tears, and even now a child's "No! No! No!" (for I kept screaming all the way that simple-minded refusal) will bring back the salt viscous taste—and I struck blindly, my eyes tight closed, as my father shoved me hard toward my ragged enemy. At the moment of contact, I knew that I had willed it, dreamed that instant of power for all my tears of denial. For a long time I would pretend to myself that I had aimed at and precisely hit the half-opened mouth, but I can feel now how I stumbled under my father's hand so that the whole weight of my impotent malice was driven against Ralph. My father, for what must have seemed to him good psychological reasons, fostered the lie: "Good," he said, "you've got a real punch, when you try!"

RALPHY at least must have believed it, for ever afterwards he avoided me, the provocation of my laundered shirts, though I would see him sometimes, filthy as we were convinced it was a sin to be, crawling about in some lonely game amid the garbage and old boxes that surrounded his sagging grey house. He did not live like other children fronting a street, but along an alley, flanked on all sides by the turned backs of proper houses. Often I would listen fascinated at the end of the alley to the foulness he shouted at his mother or his numerous pale sisters but I never dared repeat it.

I would watch him, unseen, for half an hour at a time on my way home from school, learning the stigmata of poverty—and yielding myself up to the secret allure of disease and disorder and dirt. I would feel shamed when I had returned to my own clean kitchen, always undergoing yet another un-

needed cleaning, to the whiteness of my afternoon milk in its shining glass, at my treacherous longing for that darkness; and when my mother would question me: "What do you do? What always takes you so long?" I would blush and say I had just been playing.

"What makes them like that?" I would sometimes ask about Ralph's family, and my father would answer, "They're no damn good," mumbling on until my mother hushed him; but if he really knew, I could not understand him.

I was glad really, despite my momentary betrayals of faith in order, that my father worked hard and did not drink, that my mother mended and scrubbed for us, that we ate and went to bed at regular times—and above all, that we were Jews who could never be dirty or wanton or drunk, and who even washed our hands each time after going to the toilet. "Goyim," my grandfather would say, "they'll walk right out from the bathroom," and would go on to explain to me how the laws of Moses had anticipated all modern hygiene. Of his inherited beliefs, he clung only to one: that we were a people chosen to be sober and successful; and even my father, who scarcely believed so much, still felt that at least we ate decent food (not pale bread and head-cheese three times a day) and did not run up large charge accounts that we could never pay.

I do not know exactly how, but Dirty Ralph became for me (even more than George who lived upstairs and would beat his wife, cursing her until my father had to thump the ceiling with the handle of a broom) the extreme revelation of what awaited those who, outside our Law and election, began by not washing their hands, and plunged through extravagance, poor diet, and dirtiness toward final depravity.

We were almost alone in that small town, one of the three families of Jews, and it must be forgiven me if I imposed on a grimy addled boy the burden of symbolizing, at the level of contempt, the community

that excluded us. When I walked past the cropped lawns, the white Gentile houses from which I had been taught to expect hostility, I had to believe (or I should have faltered under our obligation of righteousness) that behind their ostensible peace and security lay the real horror betrayed by Dirty Ralph.

Later, when poverty came to seem to me not a symptom but a cause of disease, and I had been convinced that we others, not poor, were dying of it too, I felt remorse for my contempt of Ralph, and could only believe him a victim, our hostility a disguise for social guilt, an uneasy hatred of what nurtured and defined our comfort. I would yield to reveries sometimes in which I protected Ralph from packs of well-fed over-dressed kids chasing him with stones into the blind trap of his alley, and he would turn in gratitude to embrace me.

BUT no dream was deep enough to protect me, at the instant his imagined arms closed about me, from the sudden recall of his sour breath, the half-mad insolence and pointless joy of his eye. From what unspeakable ecstasy of his father or mother he had inherited that cast of moronic triumph, I do not know, but it fixed in terrible legibility what lurked in me too, under my rehearsed values and responses: a voluptuousness of abandonment, a hunger for filth and debasement; and I could not help knowing that there was complicity, a choice, a moral flaw beyond the plea of social fate in his plight. If sympathy failed at last, it was because, just a little, I envied and envying knew him; only love could square with such knowledge, and that, taunting me, Ralph had made impossible.

I kept returning over and over to the unpardonable name he had called me before I was dragged back to fight. "Dirty Jew," Ralph had yelled, sensing his one point of vantage, "dirty Jew," actualizing the fear that was between us and our neighbors always, the unspoken threat of alienation, a mutual reproach.

"You killed our Christ! Dirty Jew!" He

had called after me the incomprehensible accusation, the shame I could not sever from my birth and body. It was that imprecation and not his dirtiness or his exclusion that made me will to strike him even while I still feared to do it. Though in detesting him, I seemed one with the pack, I felt no kinship. Mine was a deeper difference than poverty or filth, and in naming it, he had tipped the balance of shame and guilt in my favor. Outcast and fetid though he was, before my exile and blame *he* was the oppressor.

THIS I had always believed until that night when, long grown up, I returned home for one of my infrequent visits. My mother and I began to recall the years in which I had known Ralph. Our affection flourished in the past, and we liked to evoke its thin scarcely decipherable gossip.

"Dirty Ralph," I asked. "Do you remember him?"

"Yes," said my mother, "he used to live right behind—" and she recalled in detail several families through three generations.

"I knocked out two of his teeth once," I said when she had paused.

"Who? Whose teeth?"

"Dirty Ralph's, of course."

"You knocked out two of his teeth?"

"Yes."

"I didn't remember." My mother shook her head in self-reproach, vexed at her lapse of memory, which might seem to me, perhaps, an infidelity.

"I'll never forget. 'Dirty Jew,' he called me. I think it must have been the first time anyone ever—"

"'Dirty Jew,' he called you? Who?"

"Aren't you *listening*? Dirty Ralph!"

My mother laughed gently. "You're mixed up."

"What do you mean mixed up? I remember just as—"

"But *he* was a Jew himself."

"Who?"

"Who he asks! Who are we talking about? Ralph Goldenberg, 'Dirty Ralph' you kids called him."

"Dirty Ralph was a Jew? But I remember clearly—he called me 'Dirty Jew' and I fought him. He must have! Momma, he *must* have! Why did I fight him?"

"Who knows? Some boy's foolishness. You're mixing him up with that other boy—the Wilcox boy. What was his name—Arthur."

"I don't even remember *him*. Arthur Wilcox. I don't remember him!" I struck my forehead with the heel of my palm.

My mother winced a little, but she was used to my exaggerated responses. "Don't worry. What's so terrible? That Ralph was a little *meshugga*, and to begin with—illegitimate. His mother, may she rest in peace, poor woman, was a good Jewish girl—"

"But," I cried, "are you *sure*? I remember he kept teasing me, calling over and over, 'Dirty Jew! Dirty Jew! You killed our Christ!'"

"Not Ralph," my mother said firmly, "that was Arthur—Arthur Wilcox. His father was the Tax Commissioner—they had a good few dollars. Every day you would come home from school crying. 'Did we *really* kill him, momma?' you would ask."

I COULD not remember. "And did I—did I do anything? Fight him—that Arthur, I mean?"

"Fight?" she smiled reminiscently. "My little pacifist, you hated to fight."

"But what *happened*?" I cried.

"Happened? Nothing. Later he moved away."

What could I say?

My mother endured the silence as long as she was able. "You look tired," she said at last, with a deprecatory laugh, lest her anxiety offend me. "You're not working too hard?"

"Momma—" I began, "momma—" but I let it go, as that smell, sour and sunless and unforgotten, the smell of the injured, assailed me in that quiet room. Once more my blow fell, once more and forever to the mocking applause of a faceless Arthur, and bleeding over his teeth, as if bowed before me, crouched the Jew, Ralph.

TAFT-HARTLEY AND LABOR'S PERSPECTIVE

Where is the Unions' Constructive Program?

A. H. RASKIN

AMONG the songs that enjoyed a great vogue a year ago was a sprightly little number called "Accentuate the Positive." So unremittingly was it repeated by radio and juke-box that people had to stuff cotton in their ears to elude it. Probably the best job of ear-stuffing was done by the leaders of the American labor movement. They rejected not only the song, but its basic idea as well.

It is a commonplace in our democratic society that we know what we are against but we do not know what we are for. Nowhere is that negative spirit more evident than in the ranks of labor, and nowhere is it more tragically insufficient. To those who feel that much of the vitality of our democracy stems from the vigor of our unions, this lack of affirmative goals is particularly dispiriting at a time when the worldwide survival of free institutions appears to depend almost as much on the luminosity of our political example and morale as on the abundance of our material aid.

Labor's primary emphasis at the moment is on the building of political organizations in preparation for the 1948 national elections. The American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the independent railroad brotherhoods are all determined to put forth the most

strenuous political drives in their histories. Unfortunately, however, the unifying element in these separate drives is not the achievement of any constructive program. It is the elimination from Congress of the men who voted for the Taft-Hartley law.

Political forecasting at a year's distance is a chancy business, but it seems reasonably safe to predict that the rank and file of labor will not react to the Taft-Hartley issue with the vehemence of its leaders. Only two things might alter this forecast. One would be a major depression before next November. The other would be a sudden outburst of union-busting by employers.

I leave it to others to speculate on the likelihood of a recession in the next twelve months. In so far as the attitude of employers is concerned, the best judgment that can be made after four months of experience with the new labor law is that most business men appear determined not to give labor any provocation, at least until after the crucial election next year.

INDEED, employers have been so apathetic about invoking the weapons put in their hands by the law as to leave some of the law's Republican sponsors sputtering indignantly at their ingratitude. Representative Hartley, in particular, has stumped the country demanding that the leaders of industry stop "conspiring" with labor to find ways of by-passing the law. To their credit, most industrialists have shown little disposition to respond to this goading.

There are four possible explanations for the conciliatory attitude displayed by employers in the early weeks of the Taft-Hartley law. The first, and perhaps the most cogent, is that opportunities for profit-mak-

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ing are so great at the present time that few industrialists are willing to risk any interruption or slowdown in production as a result of labor discord.

A second factor is a desire on the part of many large employers to avoid any test of economic strength until after the 1948 elections for fear that a showdown now would jeopardize the Republican chances of carrying the country next year.

Still a third element in the current calm is the uncertainty that clouds many features of the law. Most business men, especially those with big plants, prefer to have others bring the court tests that will decide whether controverted sections are valid and what they mean. Few want to pick a fight and then find the legal ground shot out from under them by an adverse court decision.

The fourth factor, and the only one that offers real hope for long-term stability in labor relations, is a growing conviction in some sections of industry that the welfare of both management and labor depends on wholehearted acceptance of the principles of collective bargaining. That means something more than sitting down and talking to one another. It means a real sense of partnership between employer and union, and a translation of that partnership into increased industrial democracy and productivity.

Only to the extent that this spirit becomes universal in labor and in industry can we expect the present lull in hostilities to lengthen into a full-fledged peace, punctuated only by the occasional spats that are inevitable in the relations between men and nations even when they have learned to respect one another and to recognize their interdependence. How good are the prospects for maintaining a solid floor of cooperation under future labor-management relations?

WITHOUT questioning the validity of the argument that the Taft-Hartley Law obstructs, rather than helps, in the spread of such cooperative relationships, one looks in vain for signs that the campaign for its repeal is likely to bring forth any construc-

tive labor proposals for substitute legislation to promote industrial harmony and safeguard the public against abuses of power by unions or employers.

During the months that preceded enactment of the Taft-Hartley Law, labor's friends in Congress entreated Philip Murray and William Green to advance plans of their own for modification of the Wagner Act as a means of staving off more drastic measures. Both took the pious view that there could be no compromise with reaction. The net effect was to leave the field in possession of their enemies.

Now that the law is on the books, labor seeks to blow it off with the blanket condemnation that it is a "slave" law incompatible with America's protestations of concern for the principles of freedom and democracy. There is no doubt that the "slave" label has big appeal at union conventions. Delegates unfailingly and unanimously resolve to raise funds and ring doorbells to see that the rascals responsible for perpetrating this atrocity are driven out of public life. Millions of dollars and millions of votes are thrown into the battle (conversationally). The workers are depicted as more irate than ever before, and more determined to translate their resentment into devastating political action.

But are they? Most observers think not. The law simply does not seem that important to the average worker. He may disapprove of the law—I am sure most workers do. But it is not a burning issue in most areas, and it is questionable that any amount of oratory will make it so. The crushing defeat sustained by the labor forces in the Eighth Pennsylvania District, where the Taft-Hartley Act was made the cardinal issue, indicated the gulf between the threats of union leaders and their ability to deliver.

Even more discouraging from the standpoint of those who talk so glibly of a Congressional purge were the findings of a survey made by the Opinion Research Corporation for *Look* Magazine. This survey disclosed that many workers who opposed the new law were nevertheless in favor of

all or most of its basic provisions. In this poll, heavy votes of approval were given by workers to clauses requiring unions to account for their funds, barring Communist officers, establishing a sixty-day cooling-off period before strikes, making union-shop agreements dependent upon majority vote of the employees, and granting more freedom of speech to employers. If these findings constitute a trustworthy guide, opposition to the statute may diminish, rather than increase, as workers learn more about it.

A PART from the Taft-Hartley law, labor has little around which to build a political campaign. That is not to say there is a dearth of issues. With prices and profits at record highs and with the retreat from the New Deal in full swing, there are plenty of issues. But there is no agreement between the AFL and the CIO as to how these problems should be met. What is worse, there is not even agreement within the AFL or within the CIO.

A good deal of the difficulty grows out of the fact that 1948 is a presidential election year. Now it is obviously impossible to whip up a tremendous groundswell of political interest in a presidential year unless there is a candidate for president whose personality and program excite the enthusiasm of the voters. It is regrettably true that President Truman is not the kind of man to fire anyone's imagination. With the exception of General Eisenhower, there is no one on the Republican side with magnetism enough to dissipate the distrust that most workers have learned to feel for that party.

It is not unnatural, therefore, that labor leaders talk exclusively in terms of Congressional and local candidates for next year and shun references to the presidency. It is more than possible that the AFL will not throw off this ambivalent position even after the rival presidential candidates have been nominated. The Federation's high command is so split between Democrats and Republicans that any attempt to force through a presidential endorsement might torpedo the whole political action movement within the

AFL. On the other hand, if the Democrats adopt a national platform committing their party to repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, any AFL failure to back President Truman would undercut efforts to drum up votes for Taft-Hartley foes on a local basis.

Philip Murray and his top associates in the CIO have pretty much made up their minds that they will have to support Truman. However, they are not enthusiastic and doubt that they can persuade their members that the President is the dynamic champion they need to get rid of repressive legislation and bring prices down.

Moreover, the Communist elements in the CIO are dedicating all their energies to tearing down the Truman administration as a tool of "Wall Street monopolies." With a fervor that sometimes obscures the illogic of their arguments, the pro-Moscow group is peddling the notion that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are instruments in a big business plot to put across a Taft-Hartley act for the whole world.

It is not true, as has so often been charged, that Communists control the CIO Political Action Committee. But it is true that they have supplied most of the motive force for the field work of PAC. They have no equals when it comes to distributing leaflets, visiting voters, setting up precinct organizations, and doing all the other thankless jobs that are essential to arousing the electorate. If, in the forthcoming campaign, they back CIO domestic policies and sabotage CIO foreign policies, PAC will suffer a first-class attack of schizophrenia.

The curious blend of ardor and apathy with which labor views the 1948 elections focuses fresh attention on the infantile state of political development in the union movement. Samuel Gompers' doctrine of "reward your friends and punish your enemies" still defines labor's political philosophy, just as "more pay for less work" defines its economic aspirations.

To be sure, there exist within the PAC and the new political education league planned by the AFL potentialities for raising this level of political thinking. But in

all candor, it cannot be said that these potentialities have manifested themselves in any positive form up to now.

NONETHELESS, the recent conventions of the AFL and the CIO must be credited with having improved the outlook for such thinking by reducing the obstructive power of extremists on the Right and Left—to be more specific, of John L. Lewis in the Federation and the Communists in the CIO. When and if labor gets around to defining its political direction in terms of concrete goals, the only contribution Lewis and the Communists can be expected to make lies in demagogic confusion. To the extent that both have lost influence, hope for a progressive political program has increased.

Ironically, Mr. Lewis' humiliation at the San Francisco AFL convention grew out of his endeavor to use the Taft-Hartley issue as a stepping-stone to the one real ambition of his life—the presidency of a combined labor movement. The specific issue seized upon by the domineering leader of the United Mine Workers was the law's requirement that union officers swear they were not Communists in order that their organizations might make use of the services of the National Labor Relations Board.

Robert N. Denham, the NLRB's general counsel, interpreted this as meaning that all top officers of the AFL had to sign non-Communist affidavits before any AFL local union could ask the board to conduct an election or hear an unfair labor practice charge. Mr. Lewis, as an AFL vice-president, could thus force a boycott policy on the Federation's entire membership, even though all his colleagues in the executive council were eager to sign.

With characteristic arrogance, Lewis leaped at the opportunity to thwart the will of the majority. Not only did he refuse to sign in his own right; he berated his associates as craven, cringing "belly-crawlers" who were signing the death warrant of organized labor with each attestation that they were not Communists.

The NLRB took some of the heat out of

the issue by overruling its counsel's interpretation, but the status of the so-called federal locals, which function directly under the AFL executive council, left Lewis in a position to deprive some 300,000 workers outside his own union of NLRB protection.

When he rose at San Francisco to speak in support of his stand, he was making his supreme bid for power. Nearing sixty-eight, his hair silvered and his frame weakened by ill health and sadness over the death of his wife, the UMW chief was still a man to strike terror into the breasts of those who crossed his will. Since his return to the Federation less than two years ago, he had established himself as its most influential single leader. In meetings of the executive council, he was so overbearing that more than one of his fellows wished he had never been invited back. Yet none dared speak out against him.

His words at San Francisco were directed not alone to the AFL delegates. He was talking across 3,000 miles to the convention of the CIO in Boston. Well aware of Philip Murray's implacable resolve that Lewis should never again gain domination over the unions now in the CIO, the mine leader was carrying forward his attempt to woo away the rank and file of strategic CIO unions and enlist them under his banner.

The results were devastating—for Mr. Lewis. The AFL delegates listened politely but with mounting fury to his tirade, then smote him down in an avalanche of hostile votes. This in the face of a warning that he would feel compelled to withdraw from the executive council—and perhaps, he hinted darkly, from the Federation as well. As encouraging as the vote was the readiness of such Federation leaders as George Meany, Daniel J. Tobin, and David Dubinsky to take the floor in open denunciation of the UMW overlord.

AT BOSTON the deflation of Mr. Lewis had less apparent but equally salutary repercussions. Probably the chief of these was in Mr. Murray's attitude on the Communist problem in the CIO. Communism is person-

ally abhorrent to the CIO president. Moreover, he has been under intense pressure from his own union, the United Steel Workers, to do something about curbing Communist influence in the CIO.

Nevertheless, Mr. Murray has felt that his primary responsibility was to prevent the CIO from being torn apart by wrangling over the Communist issue. In this understandable desire to maintain unity, he has, in the opinion of many anti-Communists, helped to strengthen the hold of left-wingers on a number of key unions and has often permitted them to use the CIO as a vehicle for the pursuit of party-line objectives. On issues important to the Communists, notably foreign policy, the right-wing forces have consistently found themselves thwarted in efforts to uphold American positions or to criticize the actions of the Soviet Union.

At the outset of the Boston convention there was little to indicate any departure from this policy of cautious neutrality. A middle-of-the-road resolution on foreign policy was formulated in accordance with instructions from Murray. Designed to win unanimous acceptance, it was one of those pallid documents from which neither side could derive encouragement or offense.

But it became apparent early in the proceedings that the Boston gathering was to be no joy ride for the leftists. Their first setback came with the announcement that Murray had invited Secretary of State Marshall to speak. This was followed by a whole series of Murray rebuffs to the "party-line" followers, all leading up to the tumultuous ovation given General Marshall and Murray's declaration that he interpreted the meaningless resolution on foreign policy as an all-out endorsement of the Marshall Plan. To top things off, the CIO president heckled one left-wing speaker with a jeering reference to free speech for the "heroes of Stalingrad," helped engineer a demonstration of greeting for Joseph Curran on his arrival in Boston after a narrow and hard-won victory over the Communists in the National Maritime Union, and gave the signal for removal of R. J. Thomas as a vice-

president in favor of O. A. Knight, right-wing head of the Oil Workers.

The chances that Murray will maintain a consistent anti-Communist position in the future are greatly enhanced by the diminished stature of John L. Lewis. So long as the specter of a Lewis-dominated unification of the labor movement loomed over Murray, his primary interest was in preventing any disaffection within the CIO. Now that Lewis is out of the AFL executive council, Murray is less dependent on the continued fealty of the pro-Communist wing.

EVEN if Lewis and the Communists renew the alliance that existed between them from 1935 until Hitler's termination of the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1941, they cannot exert a decisive influence in the affairs of American labor. Despite the bitter things Lewis and the leftists have said about one another in recent years, it would be far from surprising if the old entente cordiale were resumed.

Lewis is not the man to rest content with control of the mine workers. He needs a broader stage for his talents. The Communists, well entrenched in a dozen CIO unions and skilled in the arts of propaganda and disruption, might serve as useful foils in his attempt to rehabilitate his shattered fortunes and avenge himself on his enemies in both labor camps.

That Lewis, in his turn, could be of benefit to the Communists in their present low state of public esteem is even clearer. On foreign policy, his isolationism would be a real asset at a time when the party's main interest is in convincing the United States that it should mind its own business and not assume its proper and necessary role of leadership in world affairs.

On the Taft-Hartley law, the Communists have a more direct stake than any other group in Mr. Lewis' fight to kill the affidavit requirement. It is well enough to say that Communists are schooled in deception and experience no moral qualms in swearing they are not what they are. But more than moral qualms are involved in submitting a false affidavit under the new

labor law. The perjurer is subject to ten years in jail. And the FBI has remarkably detailed information on Communists in union ranks.

Personal security is by no means the only consideration that makes the boycott policy attractive in Communist eyes. It represents a form of political strike against the government and, as such, a precious aid in the perennial Communist effort to persuade the workers that their salvation lies in direct mass action and not in constitutional processes.

Most non-Communist unions have realized from the start that such a policy would deprive them of all the protective features of the act without in any way mitigating its destructive features. Few have been willing to risk the losses involved in the dubious hope that the Taft-Hartley law would follow the Volstead Act into oblivion through disuse. Many felt that the chances of getting rid of the law would be far better if the NLRB collapsed through inability to keep up with the flood of work that would descend upon it if all unions utilized its facilities.

Actually, of all the things wrong with the Taft-Hartley law, the worst is that it threatens to tie up labor relations in a morass of litigation and red-tape. The law is a hodge-podge that will remain obscure in many of its provisions until Congress repeals them or the courts clarify or invalidate them. Even its authors, Taft and Hartley, cannot agree on the meaning of some sections.

THE Republican leadership has made it clear that it will resist any changes at the forthcoming session of Congress. What will happen after that will depend on the outcome of the 1948 election and the character of the new president. I have already indicated my doubts about the effectiveness of labor's congressional purge campaign. These doubts are strengthened by the probability of renewed jurisdictional warfare in the next few months between AFL and CIO unions, with Lewis adding his mite of confusion by warring on both with his catch-all

District 50, which literally organizes everyone from baby-nipple makers to grave diggers.

This writer's own regret at the probable failure of efforts to modify the law proceeds primarily from the feeling that there is little hope for any serious labor cooperation in meeting fundamental economic problems so long as labor feels itself under indictment by Congress and the public.

Preoccupied by considerations of elementary security, harassed by repressive legislation, labor finds it easy to shirk long-range problems of social utility and economic stabilization. Even the boldest thinkers in the union movement—men like Walter Reuther of the Auto Workers, and George Baldanzi of the Textile Workers—are obliged to put aside their concern for industrial reorganization and planning and for a more equitable balance of production responsibility between management and labor. Similarly, imaginative programs for governmental action on both the national and international level are placed in cold storage while labor fights a defensive battle.

All of which brings me back to the point I tried to make in COMMENTARY last February, four months before the Taft-Hartley law was passed: the underlying cause of labor discord is not that labor is too strong, but that it is strong without feeling secure. The handicap that the law puts in the way of new organization and the multiplicity of new weapons it makes available to employers for hacking away at the strength of established unions, contributes to this sense of insecurity, with a consequent lessening in labor's readiness to take its necessary place as a vital civic-minded force in our society, instead of a special interest group.

What is needed—and what, unhappily, does not seem to be in the cards at the moment at all—is a sincere, joint effort by management, labor, and the public, as represented by government, to work out a program that will provide a reasonably firm security for all three groups. Neither the Taft-Hartley law nor demagogic campaigns for its repeal can serve as a substitute.

THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE'S JEWS

The National Crisis Threatens Their Security

SHERRY MANGAN

PARIS

TO A sympathetic onlooker, it had seemed the nightmare was over. Patient, molecular, generous effort was reincorporating the Jewish victims of Hitler's terror into normal life—or as normal a life as abnormal contemporary France provides. And then, in the newspaper office mail one morning, an anonymous circular: "Will the Jews go on eating our bread while Frenchmen have not enough?" And some days later, at a movie—not a Champs-Élysées palace, but, far more dangerously, a modest cinema in a popular quarter—a newsreel of the opening of the new Munich synagogue met with ironic laughter, whistling, and coarse jokes. And one felt suddenly, as it were, a cold draft on the short hair of the neck.

IN THE middle of the 18th century, Voltaire was taught that there were two kinds of Jews in France: those of Bordeaux and those of Alsace. They were wrenched apart by 1870, and even the Dreyfus Affair could not reunite them. It took Hitler to prove them all sons of the same people and victims of the same persecution.

On the eve of the war, three strata of French Jews lived utterly different lives.

SHERRY MANGAN went to France soon after his graduation from Harvard, class of 1925, and remained to become Paris correspondent for *Time*. Settling on the Left Bank, he published experimental poetry and criticism in numerous little magazines, and ultimately edited his own little review, *Pagany*, which attracted wide attention in the early 1930's. Serving more than a decade in his *Time* post, he left only when expelled by the Nazis from German-occupied Europe as a "hostile journalist." Subsequently *Time* sent him to South America, and then, after the liberation, back to France, which has again become his permanent residence.

The *Français d'origine* of Paris and a few large provincial cities had social positions established for decades, and even centuries, as doctors, top functionaries, lawyers, financiers, officers, professors, scientists. The *Français d'Alsace*, concentrated in Strasbourg but having their roots in hundreds of small towns and villages, constituted a community apart, with its own social structure and its own relations with the French peasant community. Lastly, the *immigrés*, though formally "recently nationalized," were considered half-foreigners even by their co-religionists, the *Français d'origine*. They constituted, largely in the Paris region, the bulk of artisans in the fur and clothing trades, the shopkeepers, and the small businessmen, as well as the poor mass, which grew rapidly after 1933. Little enough solidarity linked these diverse strata, save on the plane of charity. A prudent self-effacement was the rule among the *Français d'origine*, and typical of them was the severity with which they condemned Léon Blum when he accepted the premiership for the second time in 1938 "when his first premiership had accentuated so disquietingly the anti-Semitic sentiments of certain milieux of the population."

Relations between French Jews and non-Jews had formerly a special character unlike that in any other European country. Old-fashioned anti-Semitism—of the 19th century sort running back to well before Voltaire—was aimed against that mysterious and legendary type figure, "the Jewish financier." It received a new fillip during the Second Empire because of the preponderant role then played by certain Paris bankers (Rothschild, Pereire, the Lazard brothers), to reach its pitch at the beginning of the Third Republic. This anti-Semitism was

limited to Paris and, even there, to two social groups that might individually have had "unfortunate experiences" with Jews: the members of the top aristocracy, whose financial wings had been clipped (and especially their sulky sons in the universities, the army, and the administration); and lawyers and other professional men of routine habits or pedestrian abilities who saw themselves outdistanced by brilliant and energetic Jewish "competition." The Dreyfus Affair, of course, spread anti-Semitism into the provinces and much broader milieux: since the "defense of the Jew" threatened "the authority of the army," all who undertook to defend the latter became enemies of the Jews—often without having met a single one in their lives. But with the lessening of social tensions in following years, militant anti-Semitism left the scene to take refuge in a few raucous students' meetings and the editorial rooms of the paranoiac *Action Française*.

Anti-Semitism in France has always met with great resistance from the national temperament. The live-and-let-live philosophy of the *Français moyen*—which causes him not even to look up from his apéritif if an American redskin in full war-paint and heel-length feather bonnet walks past his café terrace table, and which makes him regard Negroes not with distrust but with fascination—has given him no taste for separating himself from and hating Jews. Yet anyone who attributed anti-Semitism to national temperament alone and counted on the French never to manifest it dangerously would be leaning on a weak reed indeed. Anti-Semitism is the bastard child of economic crisis.

Thus, when the world depression was finally felt in this privileged country, *le juif* became again a scapegoat and object of hostility. And it was Paris again that, on the eve of the war, became the locus of anti-Semitism, this time based on a broad layer of impoverished and discontented petty-bourgeoisie. The most infamous sort of anti-Semitic publications filled the air with the miasmas of slander, hatred, and appeals

to direct violence. Big manufacturers like Coty, novelists like Céline, journalists like the crew at *Je Suis Partout*, pamphleteers like Rebatet—not to mention the hordes of apprentice-Führers—this whole gang of climbers and leather-breeched armchair revolutionaries agreed on but one point: down with *juiverie*. With the war and the collapse of France came characteristic incidents and explosions: Jewish officers attacked by soldiers, demonstrations against the Jewish ministers and deputies who sailed on the *Massiglia*, and a fairly widespread public opinion that tried to take out its own sense of humiliation on the still more humble and humiliated.

UNDER the occupation 125,000 Jews were deported from France, and an even higher number were interned, imprisoned, or driven into a tracked and hunted life. Those who succeeded in saving their lives did so at the cost of their homes, fortunes, and social positions, and rarely were able to keep their families intact. The fate of the Alsatian Jews was particularly tragic.

But as a result of the specific form of French anti-Semitism, and the fact that it never succeeded in penetrating deeply outside Paris, developments in France were different from elsewhere. While the Parisian populace stood by more or less passively during the monstrous Gestapo raids in 1942 and 1943—in contrast, for example, with the magnificent solidarity of the non-Jewish population of Amsterdam—the work of passing Jews over into clandestinity and saving Jewish children succeeded far better in France than in Belgium or Holland, owing to the active help of the provincial population and the fact that the defense of the Jews was completely blended with the French Resistance itself. French solidarity was—and this is in striking contrast with the usual demonstrations of French popular character—much less spectacular and noisy but much more *efficient* than elsewhere.

Yet the main credit for saving French Jews goes to the Jewish organizations themselves, which worked under the most diffi-

cult conditions. The clandestine activity of *le Joint* (the American Joint Distribution Committee), which uninterruptedly sent millions of dollars to various organizations; the heroic efforts of self-defense and fusion with the French *maquis* carried out by the *Eclaireurs Israélites de France* (Jewish Boy Scouts of France), the *Mouvement des Jeunesses Sionistes*, the *Organisation Juive de Combat*, etc.; the completely disinterested and boundless devotion of such social-aid work as that of the *Comité d'Assistance aux Réfugiés*, the *HICEM*, (*HIAS-ICA-Emigration Association*), the *ORT*; most efficient of all, the work of aiding and succoring the children; and lastly the work of organization and protest of the Central Consistory, the *Fédération des Sociétés Juives de France*, and the so-called *Rue Amelot* committee—all this furious and stubborn concentration of all the living forces of the Jewish people on self-preservation deserves a broader account than is suitable here.

Naturally the majority of these organizations, far from ceasing activity at the moment of the liberation, plunged with redoubled energy into the constructive task of rebuilding the Jewish community of France on more solid foundations than before the war. The problems of reconstruction were manifold: to restore the health of those who escaped from the Nazi camps; to rediscover the thousands of Jewish children hastily hidden in all sorts of places; to enable thousands of households to set up family life again by furnishing them with clothing, household goods, and funds; to prepare the re-entry into productive activity of those whose businesses or sources of revenue had been destroyed; and finally, to see that the years lost by the young and the under-grounders were compensated for by an effective education or retraining to enable them to get into productive life.

These problems were tackled with such energy and common sense that it can be said without exaggeration that "Jewish reconstruction" in France far out-distanced French reconstruction itself. Of course the problems were of a different scope, and Ameri-

can aid was far more generous between Jewish communities than between sovereign states. It is nonetheless rigorously exact to say that the astonishing vitality with which the Jewish population plunged back to work was in sharp contrast with the scepticism and lack of confidence that in most fields characterized the French recovery effort and gave it from the beginning a character of jerky and often interrupted improvisation.*

It is only logical that the Jews of France, who owe their salvation in large part to generous aid from foreign co-religionists (mainly transatlantic), should turn, though scarcely emerged from their own severe tests, to help those even more severely tried. For over a year now, between 1,500 and 2,000 Jews a month have been reaching France, survivors of the Nazi camps or the destroyed communities of Poland, Hungary, and Ru-

* Organizations like the *OSE* (*Oeuvre de Secours à l'Enfance*), *OPEJ* (*Oeuvre de Protection des Enfants Juifs*), and *UJRE* (*Union Juive de Résistance et d'Entre-Aide*), assured the continuity of the community. Of the 3,000 children hidden in non-Jewish hands, all were found save a few hundred—still actively sought. Many of them were orphans, and therefore the number of *Maisons d'Enfants* was raised from a pre-war eight to sixty, subsidized by *le Joint* and administered by the above-mentioned organizations. It was also necessary to provide for the ill and aged and the "salvaged" persons who needed rest and readaptation before taking up again their professional occupations. The *COJASOR* (*Comité Juif d'Action Sociale et de Reconstruction*) began by taking charge of over 18,000 persons. The number has now dropped to 11,000 and will be increasingly cut in 1947 and 1948.

Loan services aimed at reconstituting the capital funds of professional men, artisans, and shopkeepers were provided by the *Caisse Israélite de Prêts*, the *Fonds de Démarrage* of the *Fédération des Sociétés Juives de Résistance et d'Entre-Aide*. In all, some 4,500 families were aided, and, thereby, 20,000 people rendered independent. Return of loans has been regular, percentage of loss minimal, and those aided are enabled by their regained success to aid in their turn refugees from the East. Professional readaptation is mainly carried out by the *ORT* (*Organisation de Reclassement par le Travail*), long in existence, which concentrates largely on the training of youth, and by the *HEFUD* (whose very French full name would take three lines), which undertakes the speeded-up professional readaptation of adults, and plays a particularly important role for new immigrants.

mania. The majority do not wish to stay but only to prepare to go overseas. Without means, they must be lodged, fed, clothed; and their departure must be prepared. The COJASOR first undertook the most immediate task, and set up a technical documentation service to guide them toward the different possibilities of emigration.

The efforts in this field have been as admirable as in the others. Fifteen *Centres d'Hébergement* were created—a real tour de force with the present lack of manpower. There were added ten special canteens, where, besides meals, medical care is given. Those who leave after a rest of ten to fifteen days are materially re-equipped for the new life overseas. Those who are in “bad quotas” and must thus remain a long time, are given the chance to become productive workers and earn their living, if they wish and are able to do so. Special employment offices seek work for those who already have a trade. The ORT and HEFUD undertake to teach trades to those who do not.

The blows struck by the Nazi occupation against the Jewish community of France are still, despite the passage of time, of a terrifying character. The French Jewish population lost 35 per cent of its numbers. Even graver is the qualitative loss of so many leaders, in the political, cultural, religious, and organizational fields. A Benjamin Crémieux, a Victor Basch, a Georges Mandel, a Grand Rabbi René Hirschler—these are not so soon replaced. The destruction of the Jews was the only promise Hitler ever kept. But it is now clear that he was incapable of destroying any of the community's moral roots: the effort of reconstruction shows that the Jews of France have decided to live, despite the worst convulsions, and that nothing has permanently shaken their optimism.

BUT NOT even the undeniable *élan vital* demonstrated by the efforts of reconstruction has succeeded in making the Jewish community in France look to the future with feelings of full confidence. There is a pervasive feeling of “Let us work and live while we can in this little day between two nights.”

At first there was greater hope, a deeper sense of security: during the occupation the “anti-Semitism of the anti-France” soldered, with an appearance of durability, the ranks of the Jews and their patriotic neighbors. But this solidarity did not last in its full form very long after the liberation. While the Fourth Republic began under better auspices than the Third, and the authorities did nothing to place obstacles in the way of complete and integral re-establishment of the pre-war Jewish communities, the benevolent neutrality of the bulk of the French population was slowly transformed, first into a cool neutrality and then into a movement of latent hostility.

The manifestations of this hostility, particularly in the Paris region, were numerous. The return of the survivors of the Nazi camps sharply posed the problem of their former apartments. Similarly, camp survivors and those emerging from underground hiding wished to get back their goods, businesses, shops, professional offices, etc., requisitioned under the occupation and often transferred to “Aryan” businessmen, doctors, lawyers, etc. Since Paris has perhaps the world's worst housing crisis outside Germany and the Soviet Union, and since some of the *remplaçants* had put two years of industrious effort into the businesses or practices they had taken over, it was inevitable that the return of the rightful owners should cause discontent. From 1945 until well into 1946 there were repeated and violent anti-Jewish demonstrations. To those who have studied without prejudice the Jewish situation under the Nazi occupation and seen that the best allies the persecuted Jew has are the industrial workingmen, what was most disturbing was the fact that these demonstrations reached even such completely working-class quarters as the 20th arrondissement.

At the beginning of the occupation, when the principle of the thing was in the forefront of everyone's mind, only the most openly anti-Semitic were willing to occupy premises from which the Jewish owners had been sent to deportation and perhaps death;

but as the housing crisis grew increasingly acute, more and more people of good faith accepted the fait accompli and sought apartments of no matter what antecedents. Fascist elements, who in September 1944 had scurried to their rat-holes, had sufficiently regained courage by mid-1945 so that they dared seize on this awkward situation and organize groups such as the *Fédération des Locataires de Bonne Foi*, and the *Union des Commerçants, Industriels, et Artisans Français*, which they led to such overtly fascist and anti-Semitic ends that the de Gaulle government was forced to declare them illegal.

Demonstrations at cinemas and anonymous leaflets are, alas, not isolated phenomena. Everywhere one senses that the attitude of many strata and groupings of the Paris population toward Jews is at best that of a somewhat ironic apathy. As the economic crisis deepens, that apathy tends here and there to become hostility.

IF ANTI-SEMITISM is still relatively inoffensive, it is not the fault of the clandestine fascist movements which do now exist in France—and to which not enough attention is being paid. They publish various underground organs, the principal one being the notorious *Le Combattant Européen*. Needless to say, such publications are of a violently anti-Semitic character. The Fourth Republic is accused of being "the Jewish Republic," and such politicians of Jewish origin as René Mayer, Daniel Mayer, Jules Moch, and even Léon Blum are heavily attacked. (It is noteworthy, however, that even the extreme Right hesitates a little in attacking Léon Blum as sharply as it does others. Blum was once the main target of their hatred, but his courageous attitude during the occupation and his generally recognized moral authority have by now "imposed themselves" on all groups of the French population.)

These hold-overs of the mob of anti-Semitic paranoiacs may cause most serious harm when economic conditions in France favor their work. The increasingly hopeless situa-

tion of the French economy and above all the continuing and incurable bread crisis are giving their agitation a wider and more fertile field among those whose instincts of simplistic self-preservation amid the growing French disaster render them hysterical and incapable of thinking with any clarity. Not three weeks ago the walls of entire quarters where Jewish families live broke out in a rash of *papillons*, tiny gummed stickers, which accused Jews of being responsible for the whole bread crisis.

To evaluate the possibilities of a sudden and grave growth of anti-Semitism in France, it is necessary to begin by making no mistake about its causes. Anti-Semitism is in my opinion not a racial or a religious phenomenon; it occurs when the middle class, driven hysterical by its own increasing pauperization and incapable of seeing the real causes thereof, turns wildly to seek a scapegoat. Growth of anti-Semitism is therefore in direct proportion to the deepening of the French economic crisis. A stabilization, even of a temporary and relative sort, would make these new symptoms of anti-Semitism appear as mere vestiges of the great wave of barbarism that shook the morale of the French people during the war and which, inevitably, left certain traces among the more backward elements of the population. But a continuation or sharpening of the current crisis—and this is the more probable perspective—will bring on a new wave of anti-Semitism in France.

In a concrete, and above all a short-term view, there are grounds for considerable optimism. The reactionary movement that is preparing to replace the democracy of the Fourth Republic if the latter fails to solve any of the present problems which currently plague it, is grouped so far almost exclusively around General de Gaulle. This ex-monarchist had certain sympathies for anti-Semitism in his youth, as all people of his kidney have; and in his entourage can be found plenty of troublesome persons. For instance, the High Court of Justice's disgraceful action in quashing the indictment against one of the Vichy government's

Commissaires aux Questions Juives, Paty de Clam (by a bitter irony the direct descendant of one of the higher officers implicated in the skullduggery of the Dreyfus case) seems to have been due to the pressure of men around de Gaulle. Still, it seems excluded that anti-Semitism will be utilized or even tolerated by the Rassemblement du Peuple Français, de Gaulle's new political movement, in which indeed numerous Jews are participating. It should not be forgotten that the Gaullist movement is now characterized especially by its pro-Americanism (making present use of anti-Semitic propaganda awkward) and its anti-Communism; and, quite the contrary of the case in Eastern and Central Europe, there is in France no identification of anti-Communism with anti-Semitism. Jews have never played a preponderant role in the French Communist Party, and not a single top leader is a Jew. The greater importance of Jews in the SFIO (French Socialist Party) and the UDSR (Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance), two movements openly courted by de Gaulle's RPF, render unlikely in the more or less immediate future an anti-Semitic policy on the part of a *coup d'état* or anti-republican government in France. (It is curious to note in passing that the obscure "folk" character of anti-Semitic feeling has to a certain extent seduced the French Communist party, which utilizes it with its usual opportunism, not of course in open propaganda, but by insinuations. Thus Pierre Hervé, the celebrated polemicist of *l'Humanité*, recently wrote, "It is not by accident that three-quarters of the Trotskyist leaders are Jews." It must be remembered in this connection that the political line of the French Communist party is violently nationalistic, to the extreme of open xenophobia, and that this also brings water to the mill of latent anti-Semitism.)

Another favorable factor is the attitude of French intellectuals. If the war and the Nazi occupation, unifying the French people and the Jewish community in a single struggle against the invader and persecutor, did not succeed in destroying the very roots of anti-

Semitism, on the other hand it was able to change radically the orientation of the main body of the French intelligentsia, once the motor force in anti-Jewish ideology. The integration of almost the totality of this intelligentsia into the Resistance movement and its resultant appearance on the current political scene in a place similar to the one occupied in the Resistance, suggests that at present and in the immediate future no political anti-Semitic movement in France could officially threaten the Jewish community.

This fundamental turn made by the French intelligentsia forms part of its whole rearrangement of values. Yesterday's chauvinists become today the furious partisans of international collaboration, confronted with a Stalinism dressed up in the faded feathers of isolationist nationalism. The blasé romanticism of the gilded youth of the 20's has given away to a realism slightly tintured with cynicism, which, taking after its American model, considers ideology only as a means to a chosen end. This neo-pragmatism of the university and well-to-do youth is complemented by its parallel movement, Existentialism, which, while setting out from fundamentally different premises, arrives at closely related conclusions. The penetrating short book by Sartre, *Réflexions sur la Question Juive*, appears as a sort of liquidation, by an important part of the intelligentsia, of its own past, and the expression of a desire to keep away from racial prejudices. In this respect, the future is nowise somber.

BUT a sense of insecurity will remain among Jews as long as ironic laughs spurt up out of movie audiences when the newsreel shows a synagogue. French Judaism had unquestionably been the most assimilationist Judaism, with the possible exception of the small Italian community, of all the countries of Europe. The wave of immigration of the post-Hitler years, however, profoundly changed its social composition and its numbers, rendering difficult the assimilationist solution under the present social regime and provoking the increase of anti-Semitic tendencies in Paris and certain other

large centers. The cementing of Jewish self-defense with the general French Resistance movements during the occupation helped to prevent a total liquidation of French Jewry. And its robust and confident optimism once more found a refuge and outlet and escape from crowding fears in a furious effort at reconstruction and rehabilitation. But those who are haunted by historical prognostications cannot but remain worried.

For Zionists, insecurity will continue only as long as the Jewish state is not established. But for others the solution is less simple. They have observed that anti-Semitism is not a religious but a social phenomenon. France today is plunging ever deeper into crisis, and her middle class is swinging nervously right and left. While international war seems

to be postponed at least a few years, social struggle is on the order of the day.

It may be displeasing to conservative minds, but the cold fact is that the main grounds for hope that anti-Semitism will not grow to power in France is the fact that the Left, which threatens Jews—as Jews—with nothing graver than egalitarianism, has yet to make its real bid. For recent history shows that it is only after the Left has made its bid and failed that fascism sweeps in on the counter-wave. Thus until the Left has tried, French Jews may feel some temporary security—which the Left's victory would render permanent. But if the Left makes its bid for power and fails, the frantic French middle classes will be ripe for fascism, and the night of a new barbarism may begin to fall over France.

HARSHBER THE COAL HEAVER

MOSHE LEIB HALPERIN

AND Harshber the coal heaver spread his
two black heavy hands and to the pale young
knight who stood opposite him bowing
said
that he was tired and could on no account
come to the wedding.
But when the pale young knight repeated
again and again:
Didn't he know what the king would say?
And didn't he know the king would be angry?
And didn't he know the wedding would be no wedding
without him
the most honored guest of all?
And the princess bride? Did she deserve
so cruel a blow? And she would cry, piteously cry. . . .
—It was all true all true—Harshber the coal heaver
agreed, but—(and here he spread again
his two black heavy hands)—he could not!
First he simply wasn't in the mood.
And then the king surely knew quite well
how hard he worked and how
tired he was.

Bowing once again, the pale young knight,
seven times running in fact, and with a
wave of his hand seen only among such folk,

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and a smile bright as the light of seven suns,
informed the coal heaver
Harshber that an equipage was outside
waiting for him with four pairs of horses,
the king's own, and his very body servant.

Then Harshber the coal heaver, seeing
how closely this concerned the king,
could not shame him, and was left
standing with lowered head considering
to himself whether to go or whether
not to go.

First, when he felt his eyes sticking,
it seemed he ought not to go.
But when he remembered how the princess
bride would cry, it seemed he ought to go.
Still, when he remembered that tomorrow was
another day, when he must climb
to his feet before the cock would crow,
it seemed certain he ought not to go.
Yet when he thought about the equipage
waiting for him and with the king's
very body servant, he perceived,
come thunder or lightning he could not
escape this wedding.

So he lifted his head, and
sighing straight into the pale young knight's
face, with both black heavy hands
folded on the jerkin on his chest,
promised he would come—he was just
going to change.

And with heavy careful steps, as was his way
at night when Harshber the coal heaver
was tired, he dragged himself away
to the dark corner where his few rags
lay upon the ground, and even before
he had pulled the second shoe off his foot,
he was lying
with both black heavy hands underneath
his head, beard pointing up,
and sleeping
as heartily and loudly as though
he had never in his life
promised the king.

The fiftieth anniversary of the death of MOSHE LEIB HALPERIN is being celebrated this year. One of the earliest Yiddish poets in America, Halperin lived in poverty, working in the needle industry in New York City. The present poem was translated from the Yiddish by JACOB SLOAN.

JOURNEY TO AMERICA

Improvisations on Themes from My Life

ARTUR SCHNABEL

IT WAS in 1921, just before Christmas, that I first came to the United States. My arrival in New York was rather sensational, at least for me. Before I was off the ship, around 5 PM, I got many welcoming telegrams, and many people were at the dock to meet me.

Before I left Europe some of my colleagues who were very popular and famous over here had warned me about certain things. One, for instance, told me never to be ironical in the United States. He told me not to discuss Communism. He also told me not to play certain works. He said, "You can't play all twenty-four Chopin preludes in the United States. The most that would be possible there is eight—a selection of eight." Some years later, I saw that he himself played all twenty-four. Another colleague told me that I could not play Beethoven's *C Minor Variations* because Mr. Hale, who was then apparently "the Voice" in musical circles, had related a story that Beethoven once heard a friend's daughter play the piano and, rather bewildered by what he heard, inquired, "What's that you're playing?"

IN THIS third and final selection from the autobiographical reminiscences of the distinguished pianist and composer, ARTUR SCHNABEL, Mr. Schnabel relates his musical experience and political contacts between the two World Wars. The first two chapters, "My Beginnings," and "Berlin Days," were published in the September and October COMMENTARY. These selections are edited by Mr. Schnabel's niece, HERTHA PAULI, and were taken from the stenographic notes of a series of lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in 1945. Miss Pauli's latest book, on the Statue of Liberty, is soon to be published. Mr. Schnabel was born in Lipnik, Austria, in 1882. He came to this country to stay in 1939.

"Why, Mr. Beethoven—your *C Minor Variations*."

To which Beethoven—always according to Mr. Hale—replied, "What an ass I was to write them!"

I don't believe the story—I absolutely think the whole thing is fiction—but if Beethoven did say that it obviously was one of his jokes. He was fond of them. Yet Mr. Hale flatly declared that Beethoven had disavowed the piece, and so my colleague said, "You must not play it in the United States."

Another piece of advice I got was where to stay in New York. I went to the recommended hotel, and immediately felt that I was not rich enough to stay at such a cheap place. Besides, there were thirty or forty musicians living there already, and the noise reminded me of a zoo. I decided to move to another hotel the next day, and then, within two hours, I was whisked off to a concert in Carnegie Hall. It was a benefit for Moritz Moszkowski (who, by the way, was not at all in want of money) and at least fourteen pianists were due to perform—simultaneously, in some pieces. Surely you will admit that this was sensational.

My debut concert came a few days after my arrival in New York. I won't say that it was a great success; the press was not bad, but a number of people immediately tried to give me a prescription on how to change from the type of a musician I consider myself—and am—into some allegedly more popular kind. I remember my manager telling me, "Now listen, Mr. Schnabel, you have to be sensible. When you come here, you have, let us say, ten qualities. It will be enough to use only five of them and we'll make a lot of money. We'll store the other

five qualities, and when you go back you can take out those and use ten again."

I took these things very seriously at the time; so I said, "You're mistaken. If I really have ten qualities, as you say, the only tasks which attract me are those requiring fifteen qualities." But he only looked blank.

THEN I remember an editorial in the *Musical Courier*—which I have not read since, but did then; it was headlined, "Salesmanship," and said: "Now you're a very good artist and musician, Mr. Schnabel. Be sensible. Why do you insist on playing this repertoire? You could make plenty of money if only you had a little more flexibility and elasticity. You came here to sell your wares, and if you want to sell your wares, you have to consider the demands of the market."

I thought the man was absolutely right, and I asked a mutual friend to tell him that I agreed with his editorial. "Only," I said, "he is erring in one respect. It is true that I came here to sell my wares, but he confuses me with a warehouse."

Then I started touring. I came to several small cities in the Middle West; at first they looked so identical to me that sometimes I had to go back to the station to remember the name of the town I was playing in. I was also interviewed everywhere. In Europe interviews had not yet come into fashion—over there, perhaps, people thought more of views than of interviews—and so, unaccustomed to the practice, I probably said the wrong things. To questionnaires, which after the war had become more and more popular even in Europe, I would give answers which I thought would be unusual and unexpected. When I was asked, "How do you spend your weekends?" I said, "An artist's lot is like a lover's—he knows no weekdays, only holidays. So I can't answer that." Then it amused me to read how some others had said they would jump into their Cadillacs and go to the seashore, or, "How can I have a weekend with my amount of work?" etc.

A question which I tremendously enjoyed

answering was, "Who was your best pupil?" It gave me a chance to use a single word in German, for I replied, "*Jeder*," which means, "each one," and of course it looked very interesting between the other elaborate answers. A third question which I recall was what I thought of politics. Politics is hard; I don't remember exactly what I said to that—probably that the best politics is that aiming at the eventual abolition of politics.

IN 1924 I first went to Soviet Russia. I had been invited by the government, as were all foreign artists who went there; and a special reason for inviting me may have been that in Germany I had acquired the reputation of being something of a Bolshevik. I acquired this reputation by showing my disgust with the noisy, ostentatious, and rather repulsive behavior of the German war profiteers, and I got many anonymous threatening letters on account of it. Artists, I am convinced, are half aristocrats and half anarchists, and whenever they meet an extreme of either of these two, they will react by turning to the other. In Germany the behavior of the war profiteers had brought out the anarchist in me; but when I came to Russia where they expected to embrace me with open arms, as a *tovarisch*, I still failed apparently to act as I should have, because then my aristocratic side came out.

Of course this new Russia, though still inhabited by the same Russians, differed strikingly in appearance from the one I had known under the Czar, ten years before. In Czarist Russia, the wealthy classes had been amiable, gay, very elegant and attractive. Now you no longer saw anyone who was elegant. In Czarist times I had seen only samples of misery in the lower classes; now these classes seemed much happier and better off, while my friends who had belonged to the upper strata lived in comparative misery.

The Russians had delegated a man to keep me company and to serve as master of ceremonies. He told me that my first concert would be held, not at the date set for it,

but four days later. This was in Moscow, so I said, "What about my concert Saturday in Leningrad?"

"Oh, we'll fix all that."

You see, it was all organized from one place, by one central management. I had four days to wait, and I spent them leisurely; and each day, though I did not understand one word of Russian, I sat for hours in the office of the man in charge of musical affairs. He had previously been a dental worker and apparently did not know the exact difference between the piano and other instruments, but he was a very nice man. My presence in his office was not noticed by anyone. I would sit on a sofa in the corner and watch these happy people, perhaps thirty of them, who were smoking, eating, talking vivaciously and without interruption, and being particularly happy about using telephones, these being instruments that until recent times had only been used by their masters. I enjoyed it immensely. It was a real, vital, child-like joy.

Evenings I spent at the theater. It was a most fascinating theater—not because of what happened on the stage but because of what happened in the audience. They were acting, too. They had never been to a theater before, and participated so fully in the events on the stage that merely watching the audience was exciting enough. By the way, it was there that I first saw all the modernistic innovations in production and stage technique. In the operas, if necessary, all plots were changed and turned into some kind of propaganda.

Finally I gave my recital in a big theater seating five thousand people. It was packed. I played five Beethoven sonatas. People were silent. The last chord of *Opus 111* had not yet faded away when some youngsters shouted from the gallery, "*La Campanella! La Campanella! La Campanella!*"

I thought it was rather strange. Afterwards I got an explanation. The only foreign pianist to come there before me had played that piece after the last item of every program—so they thought it was an essential part of any concert.

On the morning after my recital somebody translated the review to me from the leading newspaper. By then it had become clear to them that I was not the Bolshevik they had expected, so the reviewer said that my interpretations might have been successful in the bourgeois world, but there was no doubt that the October Revolution had not had the slightest influence on my conception of Beethoven.

Two days later I played the same program in Leningrad, where the news of my failure to be the expected Bolshevik had not yet spread, and there a reviewer called my rhythm "expressive of the battalions of labor marching against the bulwark of capitalism."

WHEN I returned to Germany there was inflation. You don't really know what that means. It was the maddest episode I have experienced in all my life.

Berlin after the First World War had not always been pleasant. The sense of relief after the Kaiser's abdication did not last and soon gave way to a terrible irritability, with friendships split up by political differences and everybody afraid of the germ of Communism. (This reminds me of another story: one night Mr. Rathenau gave me a private lecture at some friends' house, and with pencil and paper and very many figures proved to me that Bolshevism must be the economic and spiritual ruin of human society. On the next day I left for Vienna, and there, at a luncheon, a Hungarian noblewoman asked me a great many questions about Berlin, among others, "What's that Bolshevik Rathenau doing now?")

Now this post-war German disunity vanished completely, and the inflation established a perfect unity. Everybody was in the best of spirits, gay and alert. Nobody had anything else in mind than how to get rid of his money as quickly as possible for whatever he could get. People went round with briefcases full of bills, and eventually a bus ride cost a trillion marks. I got my fees in packages of bills, and I remember that once, when I played with the Berlin Philharmonic, I had to hire a

man to help me carry my fee home. On the way we passed a delicatessen, and to take the burden off his hands I paid my whole fee for one sausage. Next morning, however, I had a good laugh when I read in the paper that sausage prices had dropped considerably.

It was really amazing. Everyone was rushing to the countryside to buy whatever the farmers would sell, at any price—because half an hour later the prices would be still higher. The farmers sold all the beautiful things they had traditionally made for centuries—furniture and textiles and jewelry—and then went to town and into a department store and bought the cheapest pianos, bicycles, sewing machines, or whatever else they could get. Then foreigners came, and for very little real money bought large apartment houses. That, of course, was not so clever, because soon these people had to pay the heaviest taxes in the newly stabilized currency, and if they could not they had to re-sell their houses at a loss.

Well, music during this period went on absolutely undisturbed, animated and stimulated as never before. In Berlin, I think, three and sometimes four opera houses ran at the same time, and the operas performed, in addition to the classical and romantic repertoire, were by Strauss, Pfitzner, Milhaud, Stravinsky, Schoenberg, Alban Berg, Hindemith, Schreker, de Falla, Rathaus, etc.—to mention only a few names. (The bulk of these works have never been heard in this country because here you do not have many opera houses—as to why not, that is something for you to think about.)

On the other hand, public life in post-war, republican Germany changed very noticeably with technology, collectivism, and mass production as the new driving forces. In fact, it had been changing ever since 1910, when a conspicuous revolution in desires affected the wedding gifts to girls in bourgeois families. For a century, a girl who married had received a piano. Now she got, or wanted at least, an automobile. The automobile also sounded the death knell of the choral societies; for in the 19th century

and in the pre-automobile part of the 20th social prestige had required the upper classes in every city to join a choral society—just to belong to it, and to rehearse all winter for a work to be performed in spring. But all that passed quickly, until you could hardly round up a choral society any more even by paying the singers.

IN 1925 a sonata of mine was performed in Venice, at the festival of the International Society of Contemporary Music. With most of the audience it was not a great success, and two musicians in particular were so annoyed that finally, when the piece seemed to be going on and on to them, one shouted very loudly, "*Allora basta!* That's enough!" But the pianist continued.

Signor Toscanini also attended this concert, and in 1935 he asked me, "Are you really that same Schnabel who wrote this horrible music I heard ten years ago in Venice?" I had to assure him that I was the man. He still seemed to suffer remembering.

In 1930 Dr. Koussevitzky invited me to come and play at the Boston Brahms Festival. In American books of reference I always find this festival listed as having taken place in 1933, the year of Brahms' hundredth anniversary, but it was in 1930. It doesn't matter, of course; the dates make no difference. I played with the Boston Symphony eight times and was quite fascinated. I also had a very good time. It was in May, and I almost became a Boston social lion. Unfortunately, that did not last long. Maybe the role does not suit me. I have never received any fan mail in my life, for instance. I won't say I missed it, but I never got it, you see.

In reviews, I have often been referred to as "an artist for men." I never knew whether this was meant to be a compliment to me, or a compliment to women. Of course, it is nonsense anyway, but it brings me to the subject of press relations during my whole career. From my youthful years on, whenever I first played in a city I would read in the next day's paper that this young

man, Mr. Schnabel, was "a serious artist." This never ceased to startle and surprise me, for I still am convinced that all performers are serious artists. I would say, for instance, that for my taste Mr. Jack Hilton or Mr. André Kostelanetz are much too serious—almost deadly serious. They are the prototypes, the most typical representatives of what I would call "highbrows," because Mr. Kostelanetz, for one, makes the greatest effort to conceal simplicity under sophistication—which is exactly my definition of a highbrow: a man making the greatest effort at sophistication, to conceal simplicity. Strangely, however, it is always those who struggle all their lives for simplicity who are called highbrows.

Also all my life, with few exceptions, I have been called "austere," "professorial," "scholarly," "ponderous," "German," and so on. Sometimes I was called "the tipsy Gipsy," or "Wagnerian neo-romantic, bombastic, hyper-expressive," or just "an amateur." The last-mentioned bouquet was presented to me in this country.

But what fascinated me most of all on my short visit to the United States in 1930, apart from the Boston Symphony and Boston society, was Prohibition. The speak-easies and bootleggers impressed me enormously; I thought it was very demoralizing, but I never saw anything like it anywhere else in the world.

FROM 1930 until 1933 I played very little in Germany. I was touring a lot; I went to Spain, to Greece, to Turkey, to Palestine; I played in Italy. I gathered new experiences, especially in Palestine—where I'll never forget my first shock after I arrived in Jerusalem, when I went to the Church of Christ's Tomb. I was startled to see more than a dozen chapels—I don't know the exact number—around this tomb, and I asked my friend who took me there, "Why so many chapels?"

He said, "To keep the people apart who come here to worship. Otherwise these different types of Christians would quarrel."

That, I remember, was very depressing.

And I later heard while Palestine was under Turkish rule it really happened often at Easter time that these worshippers had to be separated with a whip by a Moslem, a Turkish gendarme.

Also, of course, I was much impressed by the scenery in Palestine, by domestic scenes which apparently had not changed in two thousand years, particularly among the Arabs and Bedouins, and by the marvelous accomplishments of the young Jewish settlers, especially in agriculture. My concerts, I have to admit, were not too popular. They were not just to their taste and did not arouse much enthusiasm. But I remember that when I played in various towns the stagehands or employees used to feel somewhat embarrassed because I was not received as enthusiastically as some violin virtuoso who had preceded me, and they sought to comfort me in a most charming way. They came and said "Mr. Schnabel, you must know the piano is not a Jewish instrument. The real Jewish instrument is the fiddle."

Now I think that all primitive people have this idea, and that it does not hold for Jews alone that the fiddle is the more popular instrument. A little more sophisticated, however, was a young man whom I suspected of not having been in Palestine much longer than myself; he came to me and said, "Mr. Schnabel—I cannot express the thanks we owe you for bringing Beethoven to us. Two thousand years we have been waiting for him."

FROM 1933 on I came to this country every year, and in 1936 I played the thirty-two Beethoven sonatas. I have done this only four times in my life; before the New York series I had once played them in London and twice in Berlin—the last time in the 1932-1933 season, starting in November and ending April 28th.

It was during that season that the National Socialists came to power, and while I was never notified directly, I heard that the last three of these concerts, from February on, were not broadcast by the state-controlled German Broadcasting Company as the ear-

lier ones had been. However, they fulfilled all their obligations towards me and never said a word. In fact, when I left Germany on the morning after the last concert, the two heads of the music department of this broadcasting station came to say goodbye in a rather sentimental and embarrassed manner. They never mentioned their failure to broadcast my last concerts and I appreciated their discretion very much.

In the previous fall the city of Berlin had prepared a Brahms festival for the 1933 Brahms centennial, and a very charming man on the city council, a Social Democrat, I think, was in charge of arrangements. He came to me to discuss the festival, and we agreed to perform all of Brahms' chamber music works with piano, with Messrs. Huberman, Piatigorsky, Hindemith, and myself taking part. Now when Hitler came to power, we knew that the Brahms festival would certainly not be held with these performers. The Social Democrat, of course, was discharged at once, and on the last morning of my presence in Germany he called me and said, "Mr. Schnabel, I have to tell you that I am no longer in charge of the festival and that plans have been changed. If you want to negotiate with the new head of this department, it is—"

So I interrupted him to say, "I was expecting that." And these, I think, were almost the last words I spoke in Germany—"Don't worry about me, though; if I'm not pure-blooded, I am at least cold-blooded. Good luck to you." Then I left.

I had decided to leave Germany as soon as the new regime was inaugurated in Berlin, even though I had always been a foreigner there. During the year before, in 1932, my wife and I had visited some friends who lived on Lake Como in Italy, and we had been so fascinated by nature and the way of existence there that we asked our friends to look for a house where we might spend the next summer. They had found one for us, and when we decided to leave Germany we planned to spend every summer in this house in Italy and every winter in London. As I told you, I left Berlin after

finishing my series of concerts in April, and my family followed in May. We had just bought a car and my sons were learning to drive. The first practice they got was in taking their mother to Italy over the highest mountain passes, which were still full of snow. It took them a long time, but somehow they managed to get there.

THEN, each summer, I had a class on Lake Como and my wife taught too. Mostly, I had some fifteen or sixteen pianists there, young pianists; and the tourists passing through this little village must have been rather surprised to hear from almost every house some good performance of the best works of piano literature. We made a big noise at that place. But everybody seemed to have a good time, despite the early morning classes. The one unpleasant feature seems to have been the two hundred steps that the pupils had to climb up to my place.

Our winters were spent in England, and my younger son, who had just finished dramatic school in Berlin, came with us and joined the Old Vic, the famous repertory theater in London. He was there for four years, starting as a kind of apprentice—but at the Old Vic these students participated in every performance, first as stagehands or extras and then in minor parts. I think this training was invaluable to him, and it's a pity that what he learned is occasionally out of place in soap operas.

In the summer of 1933 we had the Brahms festival in Vienna. As I have said, the Berlin festival had been cancelled, at least as far as my participation was concerned, but Vienna at that time was still independent of Germany. We played the three trios and three quartets—Mr. Huberman, Mr. Casals, Mr. Hindemith, and I—and I also played the *B-flat Major Concerto*, with Mr. Furtwaengler conducting. Mr. Schuschnigg, of whom you have probably heard and who was Austrian Vice-Chancellor at the time, made a speech to welcome the guests, especially those from abroad—and I remember his address in particular because three times he said "Bruckner" in-

stead of "Brahms," which was very revealing. It was not that he was musically ignorant; he simply liked Bruckner much better. But I remember that when it happened the second time and the third, Hindemith and I, who were sitting next to each other, got rather nervous, for after all we had come to the Brahms festival.

After one of the concerts—I mention this because it is not only interesting but instructive—we went to a popular restaurant in the basement of a hotel. There were some forty or fifty people, including Huberman and myself, and around midnight Furtwaengler came with two ladies and before these fifty or more people asked Mr. Huberman and me whether we would not change our minds and come back to Berlin next winter to play with him. We had been asked before and naturally refused, for reasons which you can guess. So Huberman asked me to answer first, and I said very simply that if all the musicians dismissed for being liberal or Jewish were reinstated in their old jobs, I would accept—otherwise I'd have to stick to my refusal. Mr. Furtwaengler, to my amazement, replied that I was mixing art with politics. And that was that.

IN 1935 I went to Russia again. Having been there every year from 1924 to 1927, I had stopped going; I thought it was not for guests to watch developments there. Some of our friends were suffering so much that I thought it tactless to witness their troubles—also, I naturally felt uneasy. Now, in 1935, I was very much surprised by the enormous changes that had taken place in the eight years since my last visit. I heard what I was told was the first performance ever given in Russia of Bach's *Passion According to St. John*, with the full Gospel text sung by a Russian choir. The performance was not perfect in a musical and artistic sense, but the ecstasy and devotion with which these Russians sang the parts seemed eventually to transfigure them all into angels. It was a marvelous thing to see, especially in people who now are so often regarded as devils—politically, I mean.

I promised to come back to Russia and accepted an invitation for 1937. I later cancelled this tour because a wave of antagonism to foreigners had risen in the meantime. All foreign conductors, who for years had led Russian orchestras from Tiflis to Odessa and Moscow, had to leave the country. Some got offers to stay on condition they became Russian citizens, but to my knowledge hardly anyone accepted this offer. Most of these men were artists who had lost their jobs in Germany because of the new regime, and had been welcomed to Russia. Now they were fired there, too. I thought I would not like to go under these conditions.

I cancelled in good time, but the Russians kept sending me telegrams and phoning me. I don't know how they managed to locate me in so many places. First, I think, I cancelled from the United States, where I was that winter. Then one night they phoned me all the way from Moscow to Tremezzo, in Italy, which almost killed the postmaster there—it's a small village, you see. I had my secretary tell them I couldn't come—I simply couldn't come.

Then, in connection with this planned Russian tour, I had arranged to play in Warsaw and Prague and also to visit my mother in Vienna. It was the last time that I saw her. So I went to Vienna, and to my astonishment I had not been in my hotel for an hour before the operator called to say that Moscow was on the phone. So I said, "Just say I'm not here."

Still later, I received a telegram at my hotel in Warsaw. How they found out my itinerary I don't know. It was rather mysterious, but it seems they have good service.

IN 1938 I was back in the United States, and on March 8 I played in St. Louis. When I came down into the hotel lobby, to go to the concert, someone handed me an extra that informed me of the invasion of Austria by Germany. In other words, I learned that I had lost my country—which, as you know, had already been crippled anyway after the First World War. Now even this Austria had ceased to exist.

I was not in the best of spirits that night in St. Louis, and I really don't know how I performed, because my mind was only on this event. On my return to New York, I immediately took steps to arrange for my family's immigration to this country. My sons, I have to add, had been here since 1937; this was where they had a chance, and where they wanted to live. As for me, I was advised to go to Havana on the first of May and return under the quota.

I held an Austrian passport, but having been born in a place awarded to Poland after the First World War, I came under the Polish quota. My wife and sons, who also held Austrian passports, had been born in Germany and came under the German quota. But at that time all these things went quickly and easily. When I came to Havana, the US consul very kindly told me that he was sorry but he only had the quotas for the month of June—as for the quota for May, something in Warsaw had not worked out—and he suggested that it was very pleasant in Havana and I should just wait a month. However, having some engagements to fill in Europe, I asked him whether these documents could not be transferred there, and he said they could.

They were transferred to Milan. When I saw the American consul there, he said, "I'm awfully sorry, but Naples is the only consulate in Italy competent in immigration matters."

"All right," I said. "If you'll be kind enough to transfer my case to Naples, I'll arrange to be there." I also found that the June quota would have obliged me to immigrate here by September, while I already had so disposed of my time that I could not immigrate until February. So I asked whether they might not give my June quota to someone else who would be happy to get it, and give me the December quota. This also was done in a very friendly way, and I arranged to give a recital in Naples on December 21 and to go to the American consulate on the 22nd, to be examined and to get my documents.


However, by the end of October the

Italian government had been persuaded by the German government to start an Jewish discrimination. So, of course, I did not want to bother the Italians any longer, and I immediately cancelled my concert in Naples and asked the American consul there whether my documents could be transferred to London. By now it sounds rather amusing—this Havana-Milan-Naples-London shift necessitated by the rapid changes in Europe.

WE FINALLY arrived in London amid some confusion, in an Italian car, with Austrian passports, and some German documents—we were a complicated case. But it worked out smoothly in the end, and we exchanged our Austrian passports for English certificates of identity on which we immigrated here early in 1939. However, since I had agreed to tour Australia in the summer—or rather winter, down there—I no sooner entered this country as an immigrant, in New York, than I had to apply for a "permit to re-enter" and leave again, from Los Angeles, for Australia. This was a very happy summer; all those paradisaical islands—Hawaii and Samoa and the Fijis and then New Zealand, and Australia herself, with no sign of trouble or dissatisfaction or feuds or rifts—all seemed happy and beautiful.

I had my return passage booked via Suez. But by the end of July the situation in the Old World seemed so threatening that I changed the reservation, so as not to be stranded in Calcutta or Bombay. Besides, I had received a cable in Australia informing me that my younger son had married an American girl whom I had never seen and was curious to meet. So I returned by the same route, through all those lovely islands, to California, and gave up the voyage to England—but I used the tickets for it later, in 1946.

When I reached Honolulu, the Second World War had begun. It was the 2nd of September, 1939. I continued on to Los Angeles and for seven years remained in the United States, where in the meantime all of us have become American citizens and tried to behave as well as we can.



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THE MONTH IN HISTORY

Town Meeting of the World

IT WAS not far from the meeting-place of the United Nations Assembly at Lake Success to the atomic experimentation station at Brookhaven, Long Island. The recent debates of the Assembly did not help to make the distance greater.

The verbal assault on the Western powers, initiated by Andrei Vishinsky of the Soviet Union, was carried on by Kuzma Kisselev of White Russia, Ales Bebler of Yugoslavia, Oscar Lange of Poland (and the University of Chicago) and various lesser lights of the Soviet firmament. (Dr. Lange distinguished himself from some of his colleagues on the Soviet team by speaking in the language and tones of diplomacy.) Even more indicative of the trend of events than these attacks or the replies of such spokesmen of the West as John Foster Dulles were, however, the debates and votes on particular issues. For here the tendency to the formation of blocs, voting in solid array whatever the question at issue, became ever more evident.

True, the Assembly was not merely divided into an Eastern and a Western bloc. Though this division existed, and tended to polarize all other divisions, it did not fully override the various regional and interest groupings. The Soviet Union could count, under all circumstances, on the votes of the other Slavic states. But these formed only a tiny minority in the Assembly. Yet on some questions, the Soviet position actually had

a majority, despite the opposition of the major Western powers; on others, it had enough support to block the two-thirds vote which was required for action.

The Latin-American nations, though obviously under the influence of the United States, were quite capable of appearing on the opposite side on major political issues. The states of the Arab League were fully conscious of the utility of their votes for bargaining purposes, at some times allying themselves with the Soviet Union, at others with the United States and Britain, at still others ostentatiously abstaining. The other colonial and semi-colonial nations—and particularly the two great Asiatic states of India and China—showed a keen realization of the possibility of using the rivalry of the great powers to assist them in obtaining a hearing, and perhaps even some satisfaction, for their grievances. On the other hand, the states of the British Commonwealth were not always at one; and even the United States and Great Britain, despite their close community of interest, sometimes appeared on opposite sides.

The Guardians of the Peace

Sometimes the results of bloc maneuvers were strange to behold. This was notably the case in the elections for membership in the Security Council. Here, in a touching demonstration of Great Power unity, the United States and the Soviet Union joined to secure for Peron's Argentina the place vacated by Brazil. The United States, at least officially, was merely following an established policy of supporting the decisions of the majority of the Latin American nations in matters affecting them. The Soviet Union had, however, expressed opinions in regard to the Argentine government which led to some surprise at its willingness to make that government one of the guardians of the peace and security of the world. But the reason became clear when voting for

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the last open place on the Security Council began.

Here, the vacant seat was the one previously occupied by Poland. It had been expected by most observers that it would go to another member of the Slav bloc. But the United States was unwilling to support any candidate from this group except Czechoslovakia, and the Czechs refused to run, discretion perhaps being the better part of valor. The Soviet Union advanced the candidacy of the Ukraine—a nation whose membership in the UN, secured as a result of one of the secret agreements concluded at Yalta, had not yet succeeded in convincing anyone that it had a foreign policy apart from that of the USSR to which it belonged.

At the same time, the substitution of Canada for Australia left the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean unrepresented. On this basis India became a candidate, with the support of the United States, the Moslem countries, and Britain. If the Latin American states had followed the lead of the United States, India would have been elected without question. But it developed that Soviet support for Argentina had been purchased by a promise of Latin American support for the Ukraine. As a two-thirds vote was required for election, this resulted in a deadlock, and on ballot after ballot the lines on both sides held firm. It was perhaps not an altogether edifying spectacle, but at least it demonstrated that there was a certain difference between the relation of the United States to the countries south of it, and that of the Soviet Union to its neighbors.

Again, there was near unanimity on the admission of Pakistan (only Afghanistan, who had a quarrel of its own with that state, opposing), and unanimity on the admission of Yemen. None of the great powers felt inclined to risk antagonizing the Moslem bloc by opposing the addition of these two states to its number. This contrasted sharply with the prolonged deadlock between the Soviet Union and the West over the admission of other states.

On some issues the Russian bloc stood almost alone. Neither on the question of a Commission to watch the Greek border, nor on the suggested "Little Assembly" did it seem able to find any significant support

outside its own ranks. Hence it appeared that, despite bitter Soviet opposition, both these United States proposals to increase the scope and effectiveness of UN action would be adopted. But it was doubtful whether, in the face of a threatened Soviet boycott, they would really succeed in doing anything except further mobilizing Western public opinion against the Soviet Union.

The Colonial Peoples

But if sentiment in the West was rapidly crystallizing on an anti-Soviet basis, it was by no means clear that this was also happening in other parts of the world. For the Soviet Union had shrewdly seized every opportunity to champion the cause of the colonial peoples and the non-white races before the UN. It had done this on the question of Indonesia, on India's complaint against the treatment of her nationals by South Africa, on the latter country's attempt to annex Southwest Africa, and on numerous lesser questions before the Trusteeship Committee of the Assembly. On these questions, Russia found allies in all the semi-colonial countries. On the other hand, the states of Western Europe were generally to be found united in defense of the imperial prerogative. This was easy enough to understand in the case of the Dutch and Belgians, whose national wealth derived largely from the exploitation of colonial areas many times larger and more populous than their own homelands. Nor was it surprising that France, whose policies in North Africa and Indo-China were not generally considered beyond reproach, was extremely hesitant about permitting stones to be thrown at anyone else's imperial activities. Somewhat less natural was the position of the British Labor government, which had given freedom to India and Burma, and yet failed to support in the UN the principles which its own acts had exemplified. And most difficult of all to comprehend was the position of the United States, traditionally the champion of subject peoples, but now usually to be found either lined up with their oppressors, or advancing "compromise" solutions more acceptable to the empires than to the colonies. Some wondered whether Britain and the United States, seeking to strengthen the nations of Western Europe and consolidate them into a "Western" bloc, were not in

this case doing so at the expense of facilitating Soviet penetration in Asia and Africa.

But it was also possible that racist tendencies, so strong in the domestic mores of the American people and not by any means absent from those of the British, played at least a part in the positions of the two countries on colonial questions. This was not to say that either country's representatives at the UN were themselves afflicted with the disease of racism. Yet neither the imperial conception of non-white peoples as "lesser breeds without the law," nor the American pattern of discrimination, seemed to have been altogether without influence on the habits of thought even of those British and American leaders who rejected them utterly. The danger that this might be the case was pointed up by the action of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in submitting to the United Nations a brief detailing the discriminations to which Negroes were subjected in the United States. In the struggle for the world, Jim Crow was one of Communism's more potent allies.

The Palestine Debate

On one issue, however, the Soviet Union parted company with the colonial peoples and—at least at first glance—made common cause with the United States. At first, it appeared that both the United States and the Soviet Union were seeking to avoid a showdown on the Unscop report, in the hope of gaining or the fear of losing some strategic advantage in their struggle with one another.

As one lesser nation after another took the floor, the tension rose. Sometimes, the spokesmen for the smaller states frankly placed the decision in the lap of the great powers. Thus, Karel Lisicky of Czechoslovakia stated that Britain's announced unwillingness to implement any solution requiring force left the question up to the other major powers. Rickard Sandler of Sweden said that the enforcement of a solution must be the task of the Security Council, and that hence any decision arrived at must be one acceptable to all the permanent members of that body.

Some states were watched for the possible indication they might give as to the action of the great powers. Thus, when Poland and Czechoslovakia both declared for partition,

even though with certain reservations, there seemed good reason to regard them as straws which indicated the probable direction of the Soviet wind. When El Salvador proposed that a conference be held between representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee, in an effort to reach an agreed solution, some observers thought that this might be a delaying action on the part of the United States. This was regarded as particularly probable in view of the known fact that most of the Near Eastern specialists in the State Department were opposed to any commitment in favor of partition.

Others, however, regarded Panama as a more dependable barometer of the American climate. And the delegate of that state plumped wholeheartedly for partition, declaring that it had been successfully applied in the cases of Ireland and India. (Many of his auditors—notably the Irishmen and Indians among them—felt that his case was not strengthened by the examples he had chosen.)

There had never been any doubt, of course, that the states of the Arab League would oppose partition. Nor was there much that they could add to what they had already said in every previous debate on Palestine. One unexpected move from this quarter, however, was Syria's proposal that Palestine be placed under a United Nations trusteeship. Otherwise, the greater part of the Arab contribution to the debate consisted of a restatement of old arguments, and an attack on the motivation of those states which now supported partition. (Thus, Camille Chamoun of Lebanon replied to Poland's statement by pointing out that the problem of displaced Jews was largely a result of Polish anti-Semitism, and several Arab spokesmen mentioned the necessity of rooting out anti-Semitism in Europe so that Jews could continue to live there instead of coming to Palestine. And there were also references to the failure of nations other than Palestine to admit any substantial number of displaced persons.)

Nor was anyone particularly surprised when the delegate from Pakistan, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, threw his support to the Arabs. What did surprise many Zionists, however, was the skill with which he presented the Arab case. Another recruit to

the Arab standard who was not altogether unexpected was Iran, one of the signers of the Unscop minority report. The Iranian delegate declared that, since that report seemed to have won little acceptance, he saw no alternative but to call for immediate independence for Palestine, leaving its form of government for its inhabitants to decide.

Some of the other declarations against partition, however, came from states for whose support many Zionists had hoped. Thus, Argentina's stand against partition was particularly surprising in view of that country's apparent pro-Zionism in the Assembly's special session on Palestine. Some wondered whether it was a *quid pro quo* for Arab support of the Argentine candidacy for membership on the Security Council. Cuba, too, might be numbered among those lost to the Zionist cause. There were also Zionists who—not being acquainted with the numerous anti-Zionist pronouncements of the Indian National Congress—were unpleasantly surprised when Mrs. Vijaya Laskshmi Pandit of India urged “the immediate establishment of an independent Arab state in which the Jews, in areas where they are in a majority, will enjoy wide powers of autonomy.” Mrs. Pandit went on to warn—perhaps with an unspoken thought about the effect of partition on her own country—that any other solution than the one she urged might lead to “the reenactment in Palestine of the Greek tragedy on a larger scale.”

The Major Powers

But few doubted that the final decision would depend primarily on Britain, the United States, and Russia. The first of these had led off the debate with the announcement of her intended withdrawal—a declaration which Zionists and Arabs alike publicly welcomed, but did not believe, and privately believed, but did not welcome. The United States and Russia sought to outwait each other, and it was only after much hesitation that, at successive sessions, both declared in favor of the majority report in principle.

Zionists throughout the world hailed the agreement of the two powers as a major victory. They were particularly pleased with the fact that the United States statement called for a decision at the current session of the Assembly. On the face of it, they appeared to be justified in their elation. Cer-

tainly a solution which had the support of the United States and the Soviet Union seemed likely to be adopted. But this initial reaction soon gave way to the realization that the agreement in principle which had been reached by the two superpowers did not of itself assure a decision on the Palestine problems at this—or any future—session of the Assembly.

In the first place, it was by no means certain that even Russian and American support would guarantee a two-thirds vote in favor of the principle of partition. This was particularly true in view of the fact that the question was not one in which either power had vital enough interests to cause it to exert pressure on the smaller states whom they were able to influence. In the second place, the agreement was still only on a general principle, and it was quite possible that the details would offer the powers ample room for dissension and maneuver.

Most important, the question of implementation was still unsettled, and fraught with potential trouble.

Both the United States and Soviet statements indicated reservations as to the boundaries proposed in the majority report. The former proposed in particular that the almost purely Arab city of Jaffa, assigned by the Unscop majority to the Jewish state because it would otherwise form an isolated enclave, be added to the Arab state. The Soviet spokesman criticized as unsatisfactory “the partition of Palestine into a number of separate regions connected at certain points by narrow corridors,” and urged that the Unscop undertake “further work on a concrete plan for the elimination of frontiers and on national separation of Palestine.” In view of this, it did not seem likely that the Soviet Union would look with favor on the creation of an additional frontier at Jaffa.

The Problem of Policing

Under the Charter, it seemed obvious to most observers that the duty of enforcing any decision of the United Nations lay with the Security Council. This was the position that Sweden advanced in the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee. But although this procedure might be prescribed by the Charter, it seemed to be barred by certain realities.

For the Security Council had no forces at

its disposal, showed no promise of acquiring any in the near future, and gave every indication of being unable to use them if it did. The Military Staffs Committee had sat for a year and a half, working on plans for supplying the Security Council with armed forces to execute its decisions; so far, its outstanding achievement was that its discussions, if futile, were still more or less amicable. Of the five permanent members of the Security Council who would have to agree before the Council could use force, Britain had already indicated her reluctance to participate in the enforcement of any solution not agreed to by the interested parties. Another member, China, was definitely opposed to partition, and could hardly be expected to approve the employment of force to impose it. The United States was known to have no intention of sending troops. France, extended beyond her resources by colonial wars in Indo-China and Madagascar, and living in constant fear of uprisings in North Africa, was hardly likely to undertake an altruistic expedition to Palestine. And while Russia might conceivably be willing to send an army to Palestine, it was improbable that any of the other powers would welcome this, even for the sake of settling the question once and for all.

It was presumably with these considerations in mind that the United States advanced the proposal of a volunteer constabulary to maintain internal order in Palestine during the transition period. But it soon became evident that this suggestion was neither universally acceptable, nor without problems of its own. Thus, the Polish Foreign Minister, Zygmunt Modzelewski, indicated that his country was definitely opposed to the idea. Others asked who would organize and command the force—for here again, the logical body to act seemed the Security Council, but its ability to do so seemed at least doubtful. The composition of the force raised obvious difficulties. Certainly it would not be difficult to secure adequate volunteers. Haganah was ready to supply some; so, undoubtedly, were the Arab countries. Many of the Poles who had fought under Anders and the Yugoslavs who had followed Michailovitch would be ready to place their services at the disposal of an international constabulary. Yet it was doubtful if a force drawn from any of these sources

would really serve to guarantee the internal peace of Palestine.

The Role of Haganah

Some Zionists, such as Bartley Crum, contented themselves with urging that the task of preserving order in the Jewish State be turned over to Haganah, and they used figures such as eighty or a hundred thousand in describing the strength of that force. But this involved a disregard of the essential nature of Haganah. With the exception of the settlement police and those few others who composed the striking force of Palmach, Haganah was a civilian militia. Its members were the same individuals on whose full-time efforts the economic life of Jewish Palestine depended. Any activation of even a large part of Haganah would mean economic stagnation—unless, indeed, it was planned to leave the work of the country entirely to its Arab inhabitants. And yet such a mobilization could be necessitated by the mere threat of large-scale disorder, whether internal or external in origin. (Thus, maneuvers of the Arab armies near the Palestine border would not, of themselves, constitute a violation of the Charter, such as the United States declaration assumed would not occur. Yet they would impose on the Jewish state the necessity of large-scale mobilization. Likewise, Arab general strikes such as the very effective one in protest against the Unscop report were not merely damaging to the country's economy, but created a threat of large-scale disorder against which provision would have to be made.)

It was perhaps because, unlike many American Zionists, he understood the limitations of Haganah, that David Remez, President of the Jewish National Council of Palestine, called on Jewish youths in the United States and elsewhere to enlist in the international constabulary when it was formed. He further expressed the hope that the creation of this force would make possible Russian participation. To those who had watched the Russians develop the technique of "non-intervention" in other countries, it seemed altogether likely that this wish of Mr. Remez might be realized. But there was some doubt as to whether its realization would bring unmixed joy in Washington.

Actually, there seemed little likelihood that, if an international constabulary were

formed, it would be drawn either from the ranks of Haganah or from those of world Jewry. Such proposals were likely to find little support outside of Zionist ranks. What was far more likely was that Jews would be barred from membership altogether, as the Unscop majority had proposed in connection with the international police force for the city of Jerusalem.

Perhaps somewhat more practicable than the idea of a volunteer constabulary was that, advanced by Sumner Welles and Richard H. S. Crossman, of a force organized by the Security Council from contingents furnished by small powers which might be presumed not to have any special selfish interests in Palestine. The League of Nations had, from time to time, organized such forces for particular purposes, such as the Saar plebiscite. The UN, however, had never done so; neither the general nor the specific obstacles to action by the Security Council, which appeared to have motivated the volunteer proposal, seemed to be met by this plan; nor, in the present state of international relations, was it at all certain that the United States and the Soviet Union would find themselves able to agree on either the control or the composition of any international force.

The number of states which the two powers were ready to regard as neutral between themselves was rapidly approaching the vanishing point; whether any of these could also be regarded as neutral between Zionists and Arabs seemed even more questionable. And none of the small states mentioned as possible participants in such a force had as yet shown any notable enthusiasm for the idea.

Problems of the Jewish State

If the adoption of the principle of partition was still uncertain, and its effectuation even more so, the Jewish Agency was nevertheless faced with the necessity of planning for the problems which a Jewish state would have to face. One of the first and most pressing would be financial. Despite unprecedented contributions from the Jews of other countries, and particularly of the United States, the Agency was operating under an annual deficit of \$15,000,000. This had made it impossible to house even the relatively small number of immigrants now en-

tering Palestine. At the same time, the economist Robert Nathan estimated that the settlement of 150,000 immigrants in the course of the next two years, as recommended by the Unscop majority, would require an expenditure of approximately \$400,000,000. If this were to be raised by voluntary contributions, it would mean that the United Jewish Appeal would have to set itself a goal almost double its present one. Yet its last two campaigns had required the full employment of every resource of the fundraiser's art; and beyond this there were the demands of numerous other national organizations and all the local institutions comprising Jewish communal life. David Remez might call on Jews throughout the world for "all-out financial support to secure a Jewish state against attack and to meet pressing economic problems." But it was far from certain that the contributions from this source could be increased much further.

It was, of course, possible that the United States government would make some contribution to the solution of the financial problem. Something of the sort was included in the American statement at the UN; it had also been suggested by Washington, in a general way, every time someone had brought up the question of using American troops to maintain order. But no figure had ever been mentioned officially, and the Zionists had carefully refrained from mentioning the subject when urging American politicians to support their cause. Those who knew the temper of Congress were not too sanguine about the possibility of getting the United States government to assume the major portion of the financial burden—particularly since for a long time to come it would have to continue caring for large numbers of Jewish displaced persons in Europe.

The Question of Immigration

The creation of a Jewish state, and the admission of 150,000 immigrants to Palestine in the next two years, would not in themselves solve the problem of the Jews in displaced persons camps. Indeed, they might conceivably even intensify it. The Jewish inhabitants of the camps were at present estimated at 250,000; hence the proposed plan would still leave, at the end of the two years, almost as many Jewish DP's as there had been when Truman made his initial

plea in 1945—assuming that there was no further influx from Eastern Europe.

Actually, however, it seemed likely that the establishment of a Jewish state would encourage hundreds of thousands of Eastern European Jews to believe that they could enter it in the near future, and that they would consequently stream westward in even greater numbers than heretofore. The pressure for immigration to Palestine beyond the permitted figure might thus become, at least temporarily, even greater than at present. Obviously, however, Haganah would not organize or encourage illegal immigration to a Jewish state which had set its quotas in terms of its absorptive capacity. But no such scruples would be likely to bind Irgun. Conceivably, then, the latter might secure the adherence of large numbers of European Jews who could not hope to win admittance to a Jewish state legally for many years.

Only if the pressure were relieved, either by opening the doors of other countries or by making Eastern and Central Europe more livable for Jews—and others—would a Jewish state be free from problems of this nature. Hence it appeared that, even from a Zionist point of view, it was important that the International Refugee Organization begin functioning effectively in the resettlement of displaced Jews in countries other than Palestine. And it was equally important that Europe's Jews be reintegrated, so far as possible, into the life of their own countries.

Of interest in this connection was the report of William Bein, Joint Distribution Committee director for Poland, on the reintegration of that country's Jews into its economic life. He reported that this had made great progress, and that some 33,000 of the 100,000 Jews in Poland were now engaged in gainful pursuits—mostly in co-operative workshops financed by the JDC. He also said that many of those employed required supplementary assistance, while large segments of the population were still altogether dependent on relief from the JDC. Progress though this was, it was clear that no actual reintegration of Poland's Jews into Polish economic life had as yet taken place, and until that was achieved, any stabilization of the Jewish population of Poland seemed likely to be purely temporary in nature. From Rumania and Hungary, too, most reports indicated that Jewish economic

life was still of a marginal nature, and largely dependent on JDC subsidies.

In Germany, however, integration of the small remaining Jewish population—exclusive of the DP's—seemed well under way, if not already accomplished. Jewish doctors, lawyers, and teachers were again engaged in their professions; among the leaders of the Social Democratic party several were of Jewish origin; and Jewish communities were gradually being rebuilt in Western Germany. Antagonism between Germans and Jewish DP's undoubtedly existed, and would remain as long as the DP's continued as an extraneous element in the midst of the German economy. Many Germans resented the higher rations, better clothing, and relatively more adequate housing of the DP's. But many Germans realized that the presence of the DP's was the result of events for which they themselves were not without responsibility. Thus, the newspaper *Wiesbadener Kurier* initiated a fund for the benefit of the Exodus refugees, offering to match all contributions. Within a short time it received 34,000 marks from its readers. Moreover, the state government of Hesse (controlled by the Social Democratic party) officially donated an additional 25,000 marks.

Europe's Jews—and Europe

There could be little question that the status of European Jewry would depend largely on whether that continent could again be restored to political and economic health. The signs were still not favorable. The Marshall Plan had produced great hopes. Unfortunately, neither in Europe nor in the United States had the response to its requirements been adequate, as yet, to make these hopes seem well-grounded. True, sixteen European nations had sent delegates to Paris, and they had produced what was called a plan for European reconstruction. Unfortunately, it was something far short of that. It provided neither for the removal of barriers to trade, nor for the concentration of American aid on those sectors of European economy where it could produce the greatest effect in the shortest time, nor for the integration of European resources—natural, human, and mechanical—without regard to national boundaries. Rather, it was a mere summary of the individual desires of individual nations.

Some of the blame for this belonged, it was thought, to the refusal of the United States to take an active part in the drafting of the Paris proposals. Without some impartial umpire, none of the states there represented cared to take the lead in subordinating its national interests to those of Europe as a whole. It had been the desire of the United States to avoid even the appearance of dictating to the participating countries. But unfortunately, unless it was to accept the estimates presented to it without question, the United States was forced to reserve to itself the final decision on what aid would be given, and to whom. And there were many who thought that this could have been done more intelligently, as well as less conspicuously, had the United States played a more active part at Paris instead of waiting till the returns were in before exercising its veto.

But if there was some excuse for the failure of the United States to offer any real assistance in the formulation of a plan, there was little to be said for its failure to initiate the immediate measures that were necessary to prevent further deterioration in the situation. While France and Italy exhausted their dollar credits, and Britain's reserves dwindled, the President scraped pennies together in the hope of keeping up a trickle of aid sufficient to avert the twin disasters of European collapse and a special session of Congress. In the face of a catastrophic decline in the world production of cereals, the government called for a voluntary ration-

ing program almost farcical in its superficiality, and refused to take any steps toward the allocation of grain so that it might be available for the peoples of the world instead of the pigs of Kansas.

The New Comintern

Perhaps it was because Joseph Stalin had faith in the unwillingness of the United States to act sufficiently and in time, that he chose this moment to announce the revival of the Communist International. If European collapse and American depression were not averted—and only incorrigible optimists felt that they would be without far bolder and more thoroughgoing measures than Washington seemed ready to undertake—the time was a propitious one. Already, a polarization was taking place in the countries of Western Europe which augured ill for democracy. And unless the cycle of economic deterioration and political discontent—each feeding the other—could be arrested soon, it did not seem likely to be arrested at all.

The American Communist party had not been officially represented at the meeting where the new Comintern had been announced. But there were those—perhaps Stalin was among them—who felt that the interests of world communism were better served in the United States by those who blocked the provision of adequate relief for Europe and Asia, than they had ever been by the Communist party itself.

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM

FROM THE AMERICAN SCENE

NEW HAVEN: THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

A Portrait Sketch

CHARLES REZNIKOFF

CAPTAIN Nichols was right, perhaps, when in answer to Ezra Stiles' question he said, in 1762, that there were no Jews in New Haven, although the Pintos had then been living there for at least three years. And so, perhaps, was Dr. Hubbard of New Haven when in 1763 he wrote Ezra Stiles, his son-in-law, that five "Papists" but no Jews lived there.

For the first Jews to settle in New Haven were—when we first hear of them from the Reverend Dr. Ezra Stiles in 1772—no longer Jews: at least, to use the words of Dr. Stiles in his itinerary of a journey to New Haven, the "two Jew Brothers Pinto" had "renounced Judaism and all Religion." Ralph Isaacs, a member of the Church of England, who had settled in New Haven in 1763 as a merchant and was afterwards unfavorably known as a Tory, was certainly no Jew. (His father, although "of Jewish extraction," was one of the founders of the Episcopal church in Norwalk and had married a Rumsey of Fairfield. Isaacs' daughter, Grace, was described as "a tall handsome

woman and very dressy"; she and her sister as "the handsomest ladies I ever saw." His sister, Esther, had been, perhaps, just as handsome. She married a Woolsey and her daughter married Timothy Dwight, president of Yale College from 1795 to 1817.)

Certainly Ezra Stiles, doctor of divinity (president of Yale College from 1778 until his death in 1795)—an ardent "Hebrician" who had begun the earnest study of Hebrew at the age of forty, ashamed that a doctor of divinity should not know the sacred language—did not think of "real" Jews except as believers in Judaism. And he welcomed a visiting rabbi or frequented the synagogue in Newport (when he was pastor of the Second Congregational Church) to learn all he could of Hebrew and Aramaic and the books of the Jews—commentaries and books of mysticism—to find in these and in the Bible and in Jewish ritual what corroboration he could of his own Christianity. Of this interest in ritual, George Alexander Kohut in his book, *Ezra Stiles and the Jews* (1902), has an example from Stiles' diary. At the synagogue in Newport, Ezra Stiles had asked "a little Jew Boy" the use of "the strings" at the corners of "the white Surplice" worn by the Jews at prayer; told "the strings" were kissed three times at the repetition of "the great" *Shema* or "Hear o Israel the Ld our God is one Lord," Stiles asked himself: "Did this originally denote acknowlegit of Trinity in Unity?"

Well then, when the Reverend Dr. Stiles was in New Haven on that visit in 1772 (he had been made a doctor of divinity in 1765 by the University of Edinburgh upon Benjamin Franklin's recommendation), he noted

CHARLES REZNIKOFF, poet, novelist, and student of American history, has long wished to try his hand at developing a method for recording Jewish experience in the United States through portraits of some typical Jewish communities. This represents a kind of trial flight. Mr. Reznikoff's books of poetry include *Five Groups of Verse*, *Nine Plays*, *Jerusalem the Golden*, *In Memoriam*: 1933, *Separate Way*, and *Going To and Fro and Walking Up and Down*. His novels are *By the Waters of Manhattan*, *Testimony*, *Early History of the Sewing Machine-Operator* (written with his father, Nathan Reznikoff), and *The Lionhearted*.

in his diary that a family of Jews had settled there the "Summer past," "the first real Jews" in New Haven, to use his own words. They had come from Venice by way of the West Indies: three brothers, grown men, and their old mother, together with a widow and her children, and six or eight Negroes to serve them. They kept the Sabbath, Stiles notes, "worshipg by themselves in a Room in which were Lights" and "a suspended Lamp." Dr. Stiles does not tell us the name of that family and we do not hear of them again. They went away, no doubt—to Newport, perhaps, or perhaps to New York: wandering Jews. But the Pintos stayed.

A proud name—Pinto. Portuguese originally, but afterwards the name of rabbis in Syria, of a captain in Surinam, of rich men and lawyers in Holland, and of American patriots in Connecticut. The names of Jacob and Solomon Pinto are found among a list of inhabitants of New Haven in 1759. Jacob's name is also in the court records: Benjamin Douglas and Timothy Jones have chosen him and another to appraise some land; in 1768 he begins a proceeding to get back a warehouse "on the west side the long wharf" which he had conveyed as security to Michael Todd when Todd became a bondsman for Jacob and Solomon Pinto "to sundry persons in New York." Mary Bellamy lists Jacob Pinto among her creditors (1772). And in 1775 he is a member of a committee of patriots to enforce compliance with the measures of the Continental Congress. In 1776 he joins in a petition to the Council of Safety for the removal of certain Tories.

BY THIS time there were probably other Jews in New Haven. (Few today—Jews as well as Nazis—will limit "Jew," as Dr. Stiles did, to believers in Judaism. But no Jew will call a convert to Christianity "a Jew.") John Warner Barber, for example, in his *Connecticut Historical Collections* (New Haven, 1856) reprints an advertisement from the *Connecticut Journal* by a firm of distillers in New Haven who offer to distill the juice of cornstalks into rum: dated 1777 and signed Jacobs and Israel. As early as 1772 Dr. Stiles, in his reference to the Pintos and the family of "real Jews," had also written: "Besides these there is a few in Town that belong to none of these Meetings but are Separates & associate with

others scattered in the neighboring parishes."

However, business and study in the little town of New Haven (population ten years later less than 5000) was to be interrupted. About two o'clock in the morning of July 5th, 1779, two British men-of-war from British-held New York, with tenders and transports, anchored off West Haven and at dawn 1500 troops, British and Hessian, landed. A handful of militia and a few plain citizens tried to stop them. (The Reverend Dr. Naphtali Daggett, who had been president *pro tempore* of Yale College, shoots at the British with his musket, is captured, and soundly beaten.) By noon, the British and Hessians, with a Tory to guide them, are in New Haven, helping themselves to provisions and clothing, featherbeds and silver plate, taking money, watches, shoe-buckles, and knee-buckles from the men, snatching earrings from the women, ripping up the featherbeds they did not carry away and breaking looking-glasses. But the West Indian rum that the traders have in their cellars proves a worthy ally of the Americans, and some of the English have to be carried back to the boats in wheelbarrows. It was a hot sunny day. General Tryon, a short stocky man, opened his umbrella—so it is reported—and carried it above his head as he went through New Haven. The English suffered twenty-seven dead and nineteen wounded. The Americans had twenty-three dead and seventeen were wounded.

Jacob Pinto's sons, Solomon, Abraham, and William, were among those who fought the British and Hessians. Solomon, a friend of Ebenezer Daggett, youngest son of Dr. Daggett, had been graduated from Yale College in 1777. In that year he became an ensign in Captain Baldwin's company, Second Regiment of the Connecticut Line. He was made a prisoner at New Haven and taken, with thirty or forty others, to New York. But the next year he was back in New Haven and an ensign in the Seventh Regiment of the Connecticut Line. A year later, he was in the expedition that captured Fort Slongo, Long Island. He served until the end of the Revolution and became a member of the Society of the Cincinnati.

William Pinto was graduated from Yale College in the same year as Solomon (1777). William had become known for his pen-

manship and made a copy of the Declaration of Independence for Dr. Daggett and another for Governor Trumbull. After graduation, William taught for a while at Groton. When Abraham Pinto was wounded defending New Haven (he had enlisted in 1775 in the Tenth Company of the Seventh Regiment of the Connecticut Line), it was his brother William who carried him from the field—and the bayonets of the British. (Some of the American wounded, it was said, were killed when captured. Certainly the dead in this engagement, strangely enough, outnumbered the wounded. And Brigadier-General Garth, in command of the landing force, is reported to have said to one of the prisoners that he was sorry his men had not killed him, instead of taking him, and that he would not have his men give quarter to one militiaman taken in arms.) Later, William Pinto was stationed at Fort Trumbull, New London, and when Benedict Arnold landed in 1781, William was sent to Governor Trumbull with the news. William, like Solomon, too, served until the end of the war. He became a merchant in the West Indian trade and died in New Orleans, an old man (1847).

II

BUT if there was a Jewish community at all in New Haven, religious or irreligious, when Dr. Stiles visited there in 1772, dissolution was in store for it. We hear nothing of Jews in New Haven for many years after the War of Independence, except for the application for a pension under the Act of 1818 by Solomon Pinto. Perhaps other Jews—if any—went to New York. Jews must have been among the students of Yale College. (Its seal has the Hebrew words *urim* and *thummim* in Hebrew characters across an open book in the very center. Meaning literally "lights" and "perfections," or "doctrine and truth" as Wyclif translated, or whatever the *urim* and *thummim* meant on the breastplate of the high-priest to show the will of God.) We know of one Jewish student who left Yale College without a degree in 1827 to become a good lawyer and secretary of state of the Confederacy—Judah Benjamin.

New Haven, "the City of Elms" (officially a city since 1784), and Yale College grew in numbers and in buildings. The popula-

tion of the "city" in 1787 with 466 dwelling places is given as 3,540, including the 176 students at Yale College. In that year the first elm saplings were planted. By 1790 the population of New Haven had become 4,448; in 1840, 15,820. Yale College had added brick building after brick building, four stories in height. The three churches on the Green—Center Church, Trinity Church built of stone brought from West Rock, the brick North Church (with its beautiful windows) now known as United Church—were built during the War of 1812.

By this time, Ezra Stiles, short, thin, with his bright eyes and long pointed nose, like Chaucer's clerk that would gladly learn and gladly teach, had long been dead. In 1815 there was an epidemic of dysentery among the children of New Haven. The summer of 1816 was cold—not a month without frost. General Lafayette in his tour of a grateful country visited New Haven in 1824. In 1825 the Eagle Bank of New Haven stopped payment. In 1832 twenty-six died in New Haven of the cholera. The winter of 1835 was bitterly cold—the harbor frozen for six weeks. In 1837, that year of panic, all the banks in New Haven but one stopped payment in specie. Most of the houses in the city were now two stories high, of wood, "in a neat, handsome, but not expensive style." Many new houses were of stone or brick. It was now a long time since the Indians caught round clams in the harbor with their feet. (The last sachem had been found frozen to death a century before about a mile from the Congregational Church in East Haven.) In 1839 the cars of the New Haven and Hartford Railroad began running to Meriden, and the next year to Hartford.

IN 1840—hardly more than a century ago—the present Jewish community of New Haven had its beginning. A few Bavarian Jews, at least two it is supposed, had settled in New Haven a year or so before. Other Jews came, almost all from Bavaria: friends, acquaintances, kinsmen, younger brothers, cousins, and second cousins, and in a year or two there was certainly a *minyan*—the ten Jews necessary for a congregation. Talk, too, of the need for a cemetery if—God forbid!—a death among them, and in 1843 an acre and a quarter was bought out in West-

ville for fifty dollars. That year the statutes of Connecticut were amended to permit Jews to join in a religious society just like any Christians.

Congregation Mishkan Israel (literally "the dwelling," but rather "the tabernacle," of Israel), if informally organized and nameless before, now had a legal status. About twenty families, some say only fifteen, most of them, if not all, from Bavaria, met for worship: the second congregation of Jews in New England (Newport's Jeshuat Israel was the first), and the fourteenth Jewish congregation in the United States. They worshiped, among other places, in Todd's Hall. But in three years, debate as to ritual divided the congregation as it was dividing all German Jewry. Some of the members for "reform" left to form their own congregation under the leadership of young Leopold Wassermann—or Waterman as he now called himself.

Isaac M. Wise, who had landed that year (1846) in New York with his wife and child and was making but a poor living by tutoring until he could find a post as rabbi, came to New Haven to dedicate a hall for the new congregation. So small a place, he felt "childish" preaching there. He also preached to the old congregation and was complimented by a peddler from Albany who said he had heard no better German preacher in Poland. But the trip was profitable for the rabbi, too: Leopold Waterman became a dear friend and gave him \$60 for his services.

This Leopold Waterman was the son of a well-to-do family of Bavaria. He had come to the United States only two years before (1844), as his elder brother had in 1841, not for bread, but "Freiheit." The elder brother, Sigmund, was soon an instructor in German at Yale College (1844-47); turning to the study of medicine, he had his degree from Yale in 1848 and went to New York. (Here he lived the rest of his long and useful life: police surgeon during the Draft Riots of 1863, Professor of Urology in Eclectic Medical College, physician at the Hebrew Orphan Asylum. He died in 1899 at the age of eighty-one.) But Leopold stayed in New Haven. In ten years he was the head of a profitable business on Chapel Street, had his own house on Orange Street—other real estate, too—and left on a trip to

England, France, and Germany to buy merchandise. (A visitor looking about on Chapel Street then would see many small wooden buildings—two stories and an attic, with roofs, for the most part, sloping towards the street; hitching-posts along the gutters; and, in front of Leopold's store, probably, posts and beams for the awning that covered all the sidewalk in summer.) Only thirty-two, Leopold Waterman, on his way home, was lost at sea when the steamer he was on sank after a collision off Newfoundland.

Before that, when his congregation had rejoined Mishkan Israel, as it soon did, he became the president (now it was the Orthodox who were going to leave), and on the chief holidays delivered an address. In 1851 he had been on the committee of citizens that welcomed Louis Kossuth to New Haven. And, like his elder brother, he wrote verse in German. Some of it may be read in early numbers of Isaac M. Wise's *Die Deborah* or in Guido Kisch's article on the two brothers (*Historia Judaica*, Vol. IV, No. 1). Leopold's picture hangs—in an oval frame—in the office of Mishkan Israel. A young man with blue eyes and soft brown hair, a fringe of soft brown whiskers around his face—in the fashion of those days—wearing a good brown coat and a blue waistcoat, he eyes the visitor steadily, a slight smile on his lips, sure of himself and satisfied with what he has managed to do in America—"where," as he had written home on his arrival, "one first learns to know the true dignity of man and in the free use of his own strength can become the creator of his own happiness."

AMONG the many bequests of Judah Touro (1775-1854, merchant of New Orleans)—to Jewish and Christian causes and institutions—Mishkan Israel received \$5000. The congregation used it to buy the Third Congregational Church on Court Street for a synagogue. The building, with six Ionic columns, of wood no doubt and painted white, was—except for the steeple—like a Greek temple. A minister was hired. No longer lay-readers. And the congregation now had about fifty families. In a few years there was a religious school with confirmation for boys and girls; in a decade, an organ and a choir; in 1873 Isaac M. Wise's "Minhag America" was adopted as the

ritual; a new minister, in 1878, began to deliver weekly sermons in German; and in 1893, with another minister, the sermons and much of the service were in English (Edgar E. Siskin and Rollin G. Osterweis, *The Centennial Volume of Congregation Mishkan Israel*, 1940). The congregation was now rich enough to move to a larger synagogue and a better neighborhood.

The Orthodox members of Mishkan Israel had left the congregation long before. In 1857 they organized B'nai Sholem or, as the name is found in some histories of New Haven, Beni Shulem. Not so long ago the congregation went out of existence; the scrolls of the Law and the furnishings were given to the Jewish Home for the Aged, and of this congregation of Orthodox German Jews only their cemetery is left.

But Mishkan Israel prospered. The temple, now at Orange and Audubon Streets, was dedicated in 1897. It still looks a massive building: reddish brick ornamented with carved stone; two square towers on each corner of the front of the building with a cupola on each tower, Byzantine perhaps, in any event "Eastern." There is a plaque inside to the memory of two who lost their lives in the First World War, and another plaque to Judah Touro, "a benefactor of this congregation." The names in the memorial windows, and those in bronze along the wall in back of the auditorium, are also family names of many who still sit at the services. And are glanced at no doubt, often and fondly, by the children of the dead and their children's children.

By 1885 New Haven had more than sixty thousand inhabitants. At least three or four of Congregation Mishkan Israel—Maier Zunder, Max Adler, Lewis Osterweis, Bernard Shoninger—were distinguished among their fellow citizens. Maier Zunder had become head of the New Haven Board of Education in 1881; at his death, twenty years later, a public school on George Street was named for him; it is today abandoned as a school and the windows broken.

Max Adler, son of an umbrella-maker, was a partner in a corset factory that had 1000, and sometimes as many as 1500, hands. He had been an errand-boy, cash-boy, cashier, bookkeeper, and then manager of a dry-goods store. Now (1885), only forty-five, he was a stout handsome man

with a Roman nose and he wore his mustache and an imperial like Napoleon the Third. When he signed his name, there was a twirl before the "M" and another before the "A" and the final "r" had a long upward curve to it—like a sickle. He was secretary of the Hebrew Benevolent Society of New Haven and of the Corset Makers' Association of the United States. Before his death, he became president of the New Haven Chamber of Commerce.

Lewis Osterweis was a few years older than Max Adler. And much balder. He had heavy eyebrows, a long straight nose. He shaved his cheeks but his mustache was heavy and long; his beard was longer and much fuller than Adler's and was beginning to turn gray. He had Adler's shrewd earnest look. Osterweis had learnt the trade of cigar-maker in New York and had been manufacturing cigars in New Haven for twenty-five years (1885). He was now established in a two-story brick building on Church Street. A modest man, to judge by his small neat signature.

Bernard Shoninger, although born like Adler and Osterweis in Bavaria, looked more like a Polish rabbi, with his long full beard, high forehead, long flat nose, and scowl. He was the oldest of the three—fifty-seven in 1885 and had seven children and about ten grandchildren. He had begun to manufacture organs and pianos in 1850. The five-story brick building of his factory is still standing and his name is in heavy stone letters above the door. But the large painted sign on the side of the building is fading and the building itself is occupied by other firms. The cigar business of Lewis Osterweis and the corset business of Max Adler are still in New Haven—in solid buildings several stories high; but Max Adler is in his vault in a modest tomb on the neat grounds of Mishkan Israel's cemetery, and near him is Lewis Osterweis under a heavy stone and Bernard Shoninger under a column.

III

THE first Russian massacre of Jews at the end of the last century took place at Elizavetgrad (afterwards Zinovievsk and now Kirovo) in 1881. Pogroms and oppressive laws sent Jews streaming to America from Poland, the Ukraine, and Rumania.

Jews of New Haven had pledged them-

selves to help the refugees and work was found for some of them at shoveling snow and cleaning streets. They were also given the rags and waste paper at the Strouse-Adler Company's corset factory. Almost all penniless at first, the Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe made their homes in the center of the city—near lower Congress Avenue—in one of the poorest neighborhoods. In 1877 the Jewish community had numbered about a thousand; in 1887 it was said to number 850 families. (When my mother, in 1893, went to New Haven to look for a job at Strouse-Adler's, she found several families from her native city—Elizavetgrad. The most prosperous among them was a tailor who had—or was soon to have—a "misfit parlor," in which he sold clothing not good enough for other shops.)

They lived, these Jews from eastern Europe, in a close community along Oak Street—no more than three blocks of it. Half a block away on Factory Street was the synagogue of Bikur Cholim B'nai Abraham, built in 1889, five years after the congregation was organized; half a block in the other direction on Rose Street was the larger synagogue of B'nai Israel, built in 1894, two years after the congregation was organized. (B'nai Jacob, older than either and organized in 1883, had its synagogue on Temple Street, two blocks from Chapel Street—just outside the Jewish quarter.) Along Oak Street were the stores: merchandise out in front in boxes and barrels or just heaped on the sidewalk. Somewhere along the street in winter would be found a man peddling hot sweet potatoes and, in summer, in front of every grocery was a can of "hot corn" (a penny each until the First World War).

Here was the meat market of Max Wax, whose specialty was *Warschauer wurst* (still for sale within fifty feet of the original store and sent all over the world). Here, too, was Zeiderman's delicatessen; and here were fish stores and grocery stores and, in one block, the three bakeries of Pinya *der baeker*, Tanna *der baeker*, and Sorah *di baekerka*—two brothers and a sister-in-law competing with each other. Here lived Yaffe *der shohet* (butcher according to Jewish ritual), Davis *der fisher*, Labe *der milchman*, Shimmin *der shuster*, and Chaim *der shmied*, Tamara *die baederka* (the bathhouse woman who ran the *mikveh*, the ritual bath for

women), Channa *die vartshfru*—or *vartsfroi* (for all who know Yiddish know how the pronunciation differs in each country of Eastern Europe), Mrs. Barach, the midwife, and the lesser workmen in the life of the spirit: Yaffe *der melammed*, Frankfort *der melammed*, Wilensky, who wrote the Hebrew passages on slips of parchment for *tefillin* and *mezuzahs*, and Lifshitz *der shammas*.

Max Sachs, called Saechsel *der kleiner* (little Sachs the little fellow) to distinguish him from Sachs *der shohet* and Sachs *der secretaer* (who made his living as the secretary of synagogue and lodge), sold prayer books and prayer shawls, phylacteries and *mezuzahs*, Yiddish newspapers and magazines, and books in Yiddish; at New Year's the cards to wish "a good year"; candles for the feast of Hanukah, and memorial lights for the dead. Saechsel *der kleiner* was about five feet, two inches in height. He had a shock of black curly hair; his short pointed beard, however, was reddish and so was his mustache. (In 1892 he was twenty-six years old.) In his store the writings of Yiddish poets and journalists were judged; socialism, as well as points of Talmudic law, argued; here the members of a congregation might weigh the merits of a cantor to be hired for the holidays or of candidates for office in the synagogue; here, too, a branch of the Workmen's Circle was organized and a lodge of immigrants from a city or district in Poland or the Ukraine. In 1889 or 1890 Max Sachs himself had organized the first Yiddish theater in New Haven. The plays were given in a theater where the Bijou Theater is now. And about 1900, "Old Man" Taks, a shoemaker mad about the stage, gave plays in Yiddish in Germania Hall with the help of his three daughters.

SOME of the Jews of Oak Street were tailors; there were also shoemakers, blacksmiths, and carpenters among them. Some were peddlers: pushcart peddlers who sold fruit and vegetables from a wagon, and "customer peddlers" who carried a pack of dry goods from door to door. Others were dealers in old clothes, rags, and junk. (Two brothers, buying some machinery in 1910 or 1911 to break up, decided one item in the lot might still be sold as a machine instead of as metal: this was the beginning of the

machinery business of Harris and Hyman Botwinik.)

Some of the young men of that first generation of immigrants from Eastern Europe worked for the O. B. North Company, manufacturers of hardware for carriages and wagons—now out of business—and many of the young women worked as sewing-machine operators at corsets in Strouse-Adler's. And here and there, minding store or in one of the little rooms, a young fellow might be leaning over a page of the Talmud, or, more likely, with the help and blessing of his parents or an older brother, reading to become a lawyer or doctor in the world beyond Oak Street.

A WEDDING in those days was seldom a private occasion on Oak Street. About 1900, and afterwards, it was usually held in Court Street—in Music Hall on the very site of Mishkan Israel's first synagogue. There might be as many as three or four hundred guests, and the dishes for the feast were rented from *Saechsel der kleiner*. Oak Street, you may be sure, was not remiss in the celebration of the Jewish holidays. Simchas Torah (the day for public "rejoicing in the Law"), the Jews of the congregation Bikur Cholim, for example, marched in procession from the synagogue to the home of Rabbi Frommer on York Street—three blocks away.

And on Friday night the noise of Oak Street was hushed and its bustle ended; the passer-by, particularly in the summer when all the windows were open, would hear families at their meal singing the old *zmilos*—songs to welcome in the Sabbath.

In 1895 the horsecars were still running but so were the first trolley cars. About 1900, the Jews of Oak Street began to move from their narrow quarter: at first southwest, then west along Oak Street, and, after the First World War, northwest towards Westville. About a third of the Jewish population of New Haven is still in the center of the city. It may be noted here that in spite of poverty and poor housing, important factors in juvenile delinquency, the Jews of New Haven have had far fewer delinquents than other groups in proportion to their number.

The Jewish community of New Haven has hardly grown since the beginning of the

First World War, which put a stop to emigration from Eastern Europe; and in 1924 the present draconic restriction of immigration into the United States began. However, New Haven as a distributing center for motion-picture films has brought some Jewish families to the city and others came after 1919 when, for a few years, small "open" shops making dresses, blouses, shirts, and the like were established by manufacturers who had been running union shops in New York. (The New Haven shops are now, for the most part, unionized.)

AS FOR the number of Jews in New Haven, a reader of the Bible who may remember incredible figures will not be completely surprised to learn that this number too is, strictly speaking, a guess. The United States census makes no inquiry as to religion. There is a census of religious bodies, but synagogue membership is not conclusive of the number of Jews in a community. Nor, for that matter, is the absence of children from school on the first day of the Jewish New Year or on the Day of Atonement. In 1905, after the pogrom of Kishinev (1903), the Jewish community of New Haven was supposed to number about 5,500 (population of New Haven 108,027, census of 1900); in 1907, about 8,000; in 1910, about 10,500 who spoke Yiddish; and in 1912 about 20,000 in all. In the late 30's the Jewish community was numbered by one study at 19,000, by another at 24,700.

The community is now supposed to be about 23,000 according to some; others would place the number at about 18,000, and still others at 25,000; the total population of New Haven is around 160,000. (According to the records of the Jewish Center of New Haven, around 2,500 Jewish men and women of "Greater New Haven" were in service during the Second World War—eight "silver stars" among their many decorations, and fifty-seven young men lost their lives.)

Incidentally, it was noted that in 1920 two-thirds of the persons engaged in business in New Haven were either wholly or in part of foreign blood; in her *History of New Haven County* (1930), Mary Hewitt Mitchell concludes that the city owes much to the immigrant.

IV

MISHKAN Israel, today the only Reform congregation in New Haven, has 395 members: about three out of four of these—some say four out of five—are the children of Jews from Eastern Europe. Many joined, perhaps, to send their children to Mishkan Israel's excellent Sunday school. Hebrew is among the subjects taught. (But, then, Ezra Stiles believed that even a good Christian should know Hebrew—to understand the psalms the angels are singing in Heaven.) The rabbi, Edgar E. Siskin, is also an anthropologist—just appointed a lecturer in anthropology in the graduate school at Yale—who has lived among the Washo Indians of the Far West and whose thesis for his doctorate was on the peyote cult. (The members of this cult eat a certain cactus, peyote, as a result of which they see visions in color.)

The congregation of Mishkan Israel is becoming less "Reform." Perhaps this is because of the new membership of Jews who may remember the ceremonies of the Orthodox, or because the rabbi—a chaplain in the Marine Corps during the Second World War—had officiated at services that were meant to please the Orthodox as well as Reform Jews; most likely because Reform Judaism, since Hitler, is becoming more "Jewish" and finding the pageantry and symbolism of a discarded ritual not utterly useless.

So, although the rabbi of Mishkan Israel does not wear a skull cap and prayer shawl as he did when he was a chaplain—one or two Reform rabbis do, though the prayer shawl is called a "stole" instead of a "*tallis*"—the service for the Sabbath now includes the lighting of candles on the altar and the recital of the *Kiddush*. On Purim the Book of Esther is read aloud. (Reform Jews had given up the observance of Purim altogether because—in the liberalism of the last century—it seemed foolish to think there would ever be another Haman.) Some of the fourth generation German Jews who organized the congregation and ran it for many years do not like these changes and, indeed, are bitter about them.

The first congregation organized by the immigrants from Eastern Europe (1883), B'nai Jacob, with its present synagogue on George Street built in 1912, became "Con-

servative" instead of Orthodox in 1923. B'nai Jacob is said now to be the wealthiest of the Jewish congregations of New Haven; certainly, many of the largest contributors to the Jewish Welfare Fund are among its members. Louis Greenberg, rabbi of B'nai Jacob at his death in 1946, was writing a history of the Jews in Russia; the first volume, dealing with the struggle for emancipation, had been published by the Yale University Press (1944). Stanley Rabinowitz is the rabbi now.

The Orthodox synagogues of New Haven are eleven in all. A visitor on his way to the synagogue of B'nai Jacob may see a small synagogue on Broad Street that was once a wooden house but is now covered with pink stucco and the tin trim painted a bright green. A little farther on, on George Street itself in a sort of court, he will see a small red brick building that was once a church but is a synagogue now.

Still another Orthodox synagogue, Beth Hamedrosh Hagodol ("the large house of study"), is a sprawling building of red brick, built as a Methodist church and bought for the congregation in 1931. The rabbi is the son of Judah Levenberg (died 1938), who was head of the Orthodox congregations of New Haven for seventeen years. Rabbi Levenberg does not wear a beard. Thirty-two and born in the United States, he studied at the yeshivas of Grodno and Mir and also in the graduate school of Yale.

BUT the Jews of New Haven—as in other communities—are united not only in religious organizations, but also as members of, or donors to, charitable organizations, and some, as Jews, belong or give only to these. When the Jews from Eastern Europe began emigrating to the United States in numbers after the Russian pogroms of 1881, the German Jews of New Haven organized the Hebrew Benevolent Society to help them. The new immigrants themselves organized the Hebrew Charity Society in 1885. The Sisterhood of Congregation Mishkan Israel, as a body, began to devote itself to charity in 1910: in 1913 they had an office for the purpose. The charitable work of the three organizations overlapped, however, and in 1919, after the First World War, it was merged in the functions of a new organization—the United Jewish Charities. The

municipal Department of Charities now takes care of all who are in want. Jews among these have been very few. (Less than twenty families had to have charity to live, according to a community study of New Haven prepared for the National Conference of Jewish Social Welfare in 1943.) But in 1939 the New Haven Jewish Family Service was organized to be of help where more than money might be needed: finding homes for children, for example, or aid to refugees.

In 1928 the New Haven Jewish Community Council was organized with Hyman Jacobs as its first president, and, from 1936 to 1939, when it became more than a paper organization, Isidor E. Offenbach, secretary. This was the first Jewish community council, it is said, in the United States, and it is now the chief Jewish agency of New Haven (Louis Sachs, son of Saechsel *der kleiner*, president, and Norman B. Dockman, secretary). Any Jewish organization of Greater New Haven may belong to it and more than sixty do—religious, charitable, fraternal, or ideological. Each organization, according to size, has one or more delegates in the Council, and these elect an executive committee of thirty and also the officers and board of directors of the Jewish Welfare Fund. A committee of the Council on community relations will protest against any act of local anti-Semitism and cooperates with other local groups in teaching the principles of democracy.

The Jews of New Haven as a community, then, speak and act through the Council instead of, as in the past or in other communities, through one or two men of wealth or other importance. Non-Jewish agencies, such as the Community Chest, call on it for cooperation—if needed. But the Council has not affected the autonomy of the organizations represented in it. This may not be altogether a virtue, for there is as yet in New Haven no federation of Jewish social agencies, no common budget and no joint planning. Each of the social agencies has its own contributors and appeals to a community fund only in case of a deficit.

The Jewish Welfare Fund—Bernard P. Kopkind, who is vice-chairman of the National Community Relations Advisory Council, was campaign director—had, in 1946, 4,505 Jewish contributors and 358 non-Jew-

ish contributors. It raised the sum of \$761,000 (goal \$736,000), of which about \$20,000 was from non-Jews. This sum of more than three-quarters of a million dollars is about as much as the entire city of New Haven raised last year for the Community Chest. To that, of course, Jews also contributed. Eighty-six per cent of the money raised by the Jewish Welfare Fund was allocated to the relief of Jews overseas. It may be noted here, with respect to Jewish contributions to the New Haven Community Chest—certain Jewish agencies are members but no distinction made, of course, between contributions from Jews and non-Jews—that the first president of the Chest was a Jew—Isaac M. Ullman. Five Jews are now on the board of the Chest. (In 1940 Richard M. Thalheimer was president of the Council of Social Agencies, in which all the social agencies of the city are represented, and Max Livingston is president now—since 1945.)

IN 1945 the New Haven Bureau of Jewish Education was organized by the Jewish Community Council. The bureau (Joseph I. Sachs, another son of Saechsel *der kleiner*, chairman), in addition to supervising the work of the religious schools, has succeeded in forming a number of groups for adults. Many study Hebrew and some Yiddish. (About a thousand families still buy a Yiddish newspaper from a local dealer, and some, no doubt, are subscribers.)

As in the case of the number of Jews in the community, an estimate of the number of children receiving instruction in Hebrew and Judaism is only a guess. For example, about 700 children of elementary-school age were enrolled in the week-day schools and Sunday schools of the synagogues in 1944; 940 were so enrolled from 1945 to 1946; and about a thousand are enrolled today. But many, no doubt, received instruction at home from an old man with an untrimmed beard and a cane with all its varnish rubbed from the handle—the *rebbe*.

There is now an organized attempt in New Haven by the Committee for Jewish Education of the Jewish Community Council, and its Bureau of Jewish Education, to require attendance at a religious school and a certain minimum of instruction in Hebrew before permitting a Bar Mitzvah (the rite

by which a Jewish boy of thirteen becomes "a man"). Certain congregations, B'nai Jacob for example, have additional requirements: attendance at services and, in addition, participation in the services upon the platform four Friday nights before Bar Mitzvah.

Among the seven Jewish religious schools of New Haven is one that has "an English department"—an "all day" school. In the corridor, the visitor may find a little boy with pink cheeks walking up and down; intoning to himself, as he waits for his class to begin or playmates to come out, the ancient melody of a prayer.

The three leading Jewish institutions of New Haven—other than religious institutions—are a home for the aged, a home for children, and the Jewish Center. The home for the aged, completed in 1923, is a five-story brick building with a solarium on the roof, caring for ninety-three (capacity ninety-four). The Jewish home for children, built in 1924, has cared for forty-seven during this last year; it is a two-story red-brick building with wide grounds: playgrounds, flower beds, and a rock garden. The Jewish Center of New Haven was originally the Young Men's and the Young Women's Hebrew Associations; they united with the Hebrew Institute in 1938 to form the Jewish Center for Jewish—and other—studies as well as for gymnastics. The Center is to have a new building for which half a million dollars was raised in 1946.

Among the charitable societies of New Haven are the Women's Assembly (primarily a self-educational group at the Jewish Center), active in various community projects and in helping the "displaced persons" of the camps in Europe, and the Women's American Ort (Organization for Rehabilitation and Training), organized to help Jews abroad seeking to learn a trade. There are also certain societies based on a common origin in Europe, such as the Independent Vilner Lodge and the Warshaver Relief Society. B'nai B'rith has a local organization—Horeb Lodge. The Workmen's Circle (*Arbeiter Ring*) has now seven branches in New Haven and about 900 members (the first branch, Number 17, was organized in 1901); and the Jewish National Workers' Alliance of America, a Labor Zionist as well as a fraternal organization,

also has a branch (about eighty members) in New Haven and a club for women. The Zionist organizations have many members: more than 3,500, including the membership of the Zionist District, Hadassah (about 2,100 in the senior organization and, in the junior, about 250), and the Labor Zionists. Jews opposed to Zionism are not without representation, too: a branch of the American Council for Judaism has just been organized in New Haven with about 135 members, men and women.

ONE of the chief industries of New Haven was the manufacture of carriages. In 1840 the leading industry was tanning leather, but by 1890 the manufacture of carriages and with it the manufacture of hardware for carriages and wagons, as well as the shipping of oysters, were the three chief industries of New Haven. Of these, only the manufacture of hardware remains.

Of the "ethnic" groups into which the city may be divided, about a third of New Haven is Italian and a little more than a fifth Irish; the Jews outnumber all others as owners, or managers, of stores. One of the banks in New Haven, though, to be sure, not one of the large banks, is owned by Jews, and of the four department stores Jews own two. They own many of the furniture stores and women's wear or men's wear shops. Many Jews are in the jewelry business and in the laundry business and in the following trades: textiles, paper and waste paper, machine tools, and scrap metal.

The Jewish immigrant from Eastern Europe, like the Jewish immigrant from Central Europe before him (with few exceptions), had to turn at once to the work of his own hands, or the sale of merchandise, to make a living. But a number of the immigrants, as soon as they could, as well as some of their children or grandchildren, turned to the professions: more so than the non-Jews. According to Samuel Koenig's study, about 22 per cent of the physicians of New Haven are Jewish (but, it is also said by others, no more than 15 per cent); 24 per cent of the dentists; of the lawyers, 33 per cent; of accountants, 28 per cent; and of architects, 10 per cent.

Jews of New Haven have also been, and are, officials of the city or state. (Few

Jews, according to Koenig, are in the civil service except as teachers: about one in ten of these, he estimates, is Jewish.)

Among the Bavarian Jews who settled in New Haven before 1850 were Morris Ullman and his wife Minnie. A Morris Ullman is listed in Benham's New Haven directory for 1860 as a coachman. In 1875 or so his son Isaac, twelve years old, left high school to help support his mother—then a widow with five small children—and became an office boy for the corset company of which Max Adler was to become president. Fifteen years later, Isaac Ullman was superintendent of the factory. He married Max Adler's daughter and, after the death of his father-in-law, was president of the company. On the staff of one governor of Connecticut with the rank of colonel and of another as quartermaster-general, Colonel Ullman, like his father-in-law, became president of the New Haven Chamber of Commerce (1909); he was also a member of the New Haven Board of Education, and chairman of the board of the New Haven Hospital. Until his death in 1930 he was treasurer of the American Jewish Committee.

A leader in the Republican Party and a close friend of William Howard Taft, Colonel Ullman joined him and other distinguished gentlemen (seven had served as presidents of the American Bar Association) in opposing the appointment of Louis D. Brandeis to the bench of the Supreme Court in 1916. There is a somewhat faded picture of Colonel Ullman in the outer office of the Jewish Family Service of New Haven, and the visitor, after a hurried glance, may remember vaguely a plump face with a mustache.

Many have spoken of Isaac Morris Ullman—not without the spice of malice, perhaps—as a "political boss." No doubt he was. But in this connection it may be noted that George Dudley Seymour, a public-spirited citizen, dedicated his book *New Haven* (1942) to the memory of Ullman as one of three "men of vision." (The colonel had then been dead for twelve years and, it may be supposed, no longer had any political influence.) In the preface Seymour praises him for his generosity "in advancing city planning and harbor improvements"; and he quotes Colonel Ullman's speech on "the true function of a Chamber

of Commerce": to secure new industries, Ullman said, the city should be made attractive—not only to manufacturers, but to all—by the beauty of its streets, by its school system, its health, and a rate of taxation not inconsistent with the needs of the community.

Colonel Ullman's brother, Louis, was married to the daughter of Lewis Osterweis. Louis M. Ullman was a major on the staff of three governors of Connecticut and, like the colonel, not without influence in the Republican party. Another brother, Jacob B. Ullman (married to the daughter of Morris Steinert who gave Yale the Steinert collection of old musical instruments) was a judge of the Court of Common Pleas.

ISAAC WOLFE was a justice of the Superior Court. He was also a member of the legislature of the state. Jacob Klein and Jacob Caplan, once judge of the City Court, were likewise elected to the legislature. Charles Henchel (Democrat) was a member of the legislature and minority leader of the lower house at the last session. Harold Alprovis is one of the four state senators from New Haven. Abraham Ullman is state's attorney for New Haven country. Samuel Campner was acting mayor of New Haven (1917-18). Samuel A. Persky was corporation counsel and Mrs. Frances L. Roth assistant city attorney in charge of domestic relations. Silas Greenberg is city treasurer. Joseph Linde has been health commissioner for a number of years under Democratic and Republican administrations and is still in office. Charles Kleiner, for many years corporation counsel of New Haven, was workmen's compensation commissioner for the third congressional district and Louis Sachs, president of the New Haven Jewish Community Council, is commissioner now.

From among the Jews of New Haven have come: Sam Schwartz, the champion heavyweight wrestler of the National Amateur Athletic Union in 1916; Lilyan Tashman, the motion-picture actress; band leaders "Artie" Shaw and "Charley" Spivak; a singer of popular songs, Barry Wood; and, just to show that the old enthusiasms are not quite dead, Israel Knox, teacher, among his other subjects, of Yiddish and—in Yiddish—of philosophy and letters, today a member of the department of philosophy at

Ohio University. To the Jews of New Haven has come as a resident, Abraham S. Yahuda, born in Jerusalem, once a professor in the university of Madrid of the Hebrew of the Jews in Spain and now teaching Arabic and in charge of the Center for the Near East at the New School for Social Research in New York.

MOST Jews find New Haven "a nice place" in which to live. A few of those who have grown gray in the city may feel, indeed, that it is becoming too large—too many strangers, but that is true of every growing community. Certainly, there is little overt anti-Semitism in New Haven. Of course, young men and women have left New Haven for New York, but most stay.

Like Jews everywhere in the United States, some Jews of New Haven are concerned about Jewish problems; perhaps, in view of the contributions of the Jews of New Haven to Jewish causes, it would only be fair to say *many*; others are more or less indifferent, smug and comfortable. Some feel their Jewishness a burden and a handicap and would like to shuffle it off; others glory in it. According to Raymond Kennedy, professor of sociology at Yale, who has made a study of the city records from 1870 on, only 6 per cent of the marriages of Jew or Jewess were outside the "ethnic" group, and this percentage has varied only a fraction of one per cent from that year to this.

There has been—and increasingly so—intermarriage between Jews of German Jewish descent and those of Eastern European descent. But Jews of German Jewish descent, whose ancestors in New Haven were also peddlers or plain workingmen, perhaps, are still inclined to look down upon the descendants of Jews from Eastern Europe. The descendants of Jews from Eastern Europe, however, now control the affairs of the Jewish community: Louis Sachs, for example, is president of the Jewish Community Council; Samuel Botwinik is chairman of the Jewish Welfare Fund.

It has also been said that the Jews of New Haven have a certain gentility of speech and manners because of the influence of Yale University. That is an explanation not generally upheld by the Jews of New Haven themselves. Perhaps this gentility of speech and manners—for it exists—is no

more peculiar to the Jews of New Haven than to many Jews everywhere.

To the visitor from New York who has caught up his brief case and hurried to New Haven by express, the quiet streets (except those with the large department stores), the easy-going politeness of waitress, stenographer, and clerk, the assurance and courtesy of workingmen in leather or khaki jackets, of the conductor on the street-car or the driver of the bus, Italian, Irishman, or Jew—all this is pleasant. The visitor may try to remember lines he has read in Walt Whitman and say to himself this self-respect and respect for others is American and very good.

A UNIVERSITY is chiefly its own community, and few of Yale's students, and perhaps not all of the faculty, expect to spend the rest of their days in New Haven, as most of the other residents do. Still, Yale University, like any other American university, is certainly not without influence upon the life of the community about it.

There are a number of Jewish professors on the faculty of Yale University: chiefly in the law school and as clinical professors in the medical school. Harry Shulman has held the Sterling professorship of law since 1940. He has long worked for peace between labor and management by arbitration of their differences, and among his other posts, is that of umpire between the Ford Motor Company and the United Automobile Workers (CIO). Milton Charles Winternitz, professor of pathology, was dean of the medical school (1920-35). Eugen Kahn, Sterling professor of psychiatry and mental hygiene, has been head of the department of psychiatry for many years. An early worker in the science of nutrition who did much for the study of vitamins, Lafayette B. Mendel (died 1935), was Sterling professor of physical chemistry.

But the undergraduate faculty of Yale had no Jew on it for a long time. (Meyer Wolodarsky taught Russian about 1902 or 1903 and so did Max Mandel twenty or so years later.) At present Paul Weiss is professor of philosophy. Rollin G. Osterweis (of the old New Haven family), a fellow of Jonathan Edwards College, author of *Judah P. Benjamin, Statesman of the Lost Cause* (1933), is in the history department with the

rank of instructor. (He was commissioned this year by the New Haven Colony Historical Society to write the history of New Haven.)

EDWARD SAPIR, who died in his fifty-sixth year, was at his death Sterling professor of anthropology and linguistics and head of the anthropology department (1931-39). His father had been a *shohet* as well as a cantor and rabbi of Orthodox Jewish synagogues in New York City. As a child Edward Sapir hated the regulations and restrictions of his father's Judaism but afterwards he included among his many interests—for he was a pianist and poet, too—the study of Yiddish and Hebrew. He had also come to think and argue that the problem of each Jew did not call for the same answer but, depending on local circumstances, economic and cultural, life in Palestine might well be the answer for many—among several answers—*assimilation* for others. Leonard Bloomfield has been Sterling professor of linguistics since 1940.

An unofficial, but not unimportant, adjunct to Yale has been the Rosenbaum Tutoring School—"Rosie's": a "cram" school that, by engaging brilliant graduate students (most of them qualified by talent, though, perhaps, not by "race," for teaching in universities), has taught as well as "crammed." It was directed by Abel Cugell and some say he was perhaps the best known and best liked of New Haveners by the students of Yale for three decades.

Jews, too, have been coaches in athletics at Yale: "Izzy" Winters, many years the wrestling coach, for example, and "Mosey" King, instructor in boxing. (As for Jewish athletes, Al Hessberg was half-back on the football team in 1935—among his rewards, the only Jew ever elected to Skull and Bones. Arthur J. Loeb, the hammer-thrower, was captain of the track team in 1936. Dick Marcus was baseball captain in 1938. Basketball may be played in a gymnasium and Jews, generally the residents of cities, are good at it: Eddie Horowitz was a captain of the Yale basketball team and so, in 1924, when Yale won the

championship of the Eastern Collegiate League, was Sammie Pite.)

It has been estimated that 9 or 10 per cent of the students at Yale are Jewish, but these are from all parts of the country. (According to the "study" of the Jewish Welfare Board in 1926, the Jewish students of the university numbered that year 372—10 per cent of the enrollment; 146 were graduate students, and about 60 per cent from out-of-town. In 1946-47, with a much larger enrollment, the Jewish students—upon an incomplete tabulation made only from cards showing religious affiliation—numbered 625 students: 157 graduate students and 468 undergraduates; a later, and still incomplete, roster showed 725 students.) Yale University Hillel Foundation (Rabbi Samuel Sandmel, director) of the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations had about 130 members this year but about half of the Jewish undergraduates—almost all from out-of-town—took part in the activities some way or other.

SOME Jews of New Haven have had to go far to study—particularly medicine: a few have gone to Scotland and one or two to Switzerland. Many Jews of New Haven now go to the University of Connecticut at Storrs—formerly the Connecticut Agricultural College. Yale College, not to become merely a New Haven institution, has a quota for all residents of the city. It has been said that it has a particular quota for Jews; else why ask for a photograph and ask about an applicant's religion, and the birthplace of his parents, and his mother's maiden name? However, it is also said that this quota is generous. And unusual ability is readily helped, if need be by scholarships.

Reuben Moulthrop's painting of Ezra Stiles shows him with his right hand lifted. Of this painting, President Angell of Yale (1921-37) told George Dudley Seymour (as reported in Seymour's book *New Haven*) that President Hadley (1899-1921) had told him that President Stiles was saying: "Shut the door!" A Jew would be inclined to mull over this and conclude, on the basis of what is known of Doctor Stiles, that the hand was raised in welcome.

CEDARS OF LEBANON

THE LADDER FROM MAN TO GOD

Sayings of the Hasidim

MARTIN BUBER

THE sayings and aphorisms published here are selected from Martin Buber's *Ten Rungs*, which is to be published late this month by Schocken Books. They appear here by permission of the publisher. The following is Martin Buber's introduction to the book:

THEY asked the "holy Yehudi": "Why is it written: 'Justice, justice, shalt thou follow' [Deut. 16:20]? Why is the word 'justice' repeated?"

He answered: "We ought to follow justice with justice, and not with unrighteousness." That means: The use of unrighteousness as a means to a righteous end makes the end itself unrighteous; injustice as a means to justice renders justice unjust.

What knowledge could be of greater importance to the men of our age, and to the various communities of our time? The saying sounds as if it were derived from the experiences of contemporaries. And yet it stems from the Napoleonic era, and was not spoken at the hub of events, but in a Polish ghetto, and by a

zaddik, a "righteous man," who was a leader of Hasidim, those "devout" souls who knew that no one can be really devout in relation to God if he is not devout toward his creation, and that the love of God is unreal unless it is crowned with love for one's fellow-men.

This book contains a small selection of Hasidic sayings of this nature. They all revolve around a single question: How can we fulfill the meaning of our existence on earth? And so, dear reader, these pages are not concerned with the mysteries of heaven, but with your life and mine, in this hour and the next. These sayings were scattered through hundreds of books, in versions largely distorted in the speeches and writings of the disciples who transmitted them. I have selected, reduced to the quintessence of meaning, and arranged them according to major themes, not because they are beautiful and interesting, but because of my belief that, in this selection, arrangement and form, they may serve to show even the reader who is very remote from their origins the way to the true life.

Two Kinds of Faith

WHY do we say: "Our God and the God of our fathers"?

There are two kinds of people who believe in God. One believes because he has taken over the faith of his fathers, and his faith is strong. The other has arrived at faith through thinking and studying. The difference between them is this: The advantage of the first is that, no matter what arguments may be brought against it, his faith cannot be shaken; his faith is firm because it was taken over from his fathers. But there is one

flaw in it: he has faith only in response to the command of man, and he has acquired it without studying and thinking for himself. The advantage of the second is that, because he found God through much thinking, he has arrived at a faith of his own. But here too there is a flaw: it is easy to shake his faith by refuting it through evidence. But he who unites both kinds of faith is invincible. And so we say, "Our God" with reference to our studies, and "God of our fathers" with an eye to tradition.

The same interpretation has been given to

our saying, "God of Abraham, God of Isaac, and God of Jacob," and not "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," for this indicates that Isaac and Jacob did not merely take over the tradition of Abraham; they themselves searched for God.

Everywhere

GOD says to man as he said to Moses: "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet"—put off the habitual which encloses your foot and you will recognize that the place on which you happen to be standing at this moment is holy ground. For there is no rung of being on which we cannot find the holiness of God everywhere and at all times.

A Man on Earth

QUESTION: Why is it written: "In the day that God created *a man* on earth," and not "in the day that God created *man* on earth"?

Answer: You shall serve your Creator as if there were only one man in the world, only you yourself.

It is I

QUESTION: It is written: "I am JHWH, thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt." Why does it not say: "I am JHWH, thy God, who created heaven and earth"?

Answer: "Heaven and earth!" Then man might have said, "Heaven—that's too much for me!" So God said to man: "I am the one who fished you out of the mud. Now you come here and listen to me!"

Exchange of Strength

WHEN a Jew is about to say: "Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the world," and prepares to utter the first word, the word "blessed," he shall do so with all his strength, so that he will have no strength left to say "art thou." And this is the meaning of the verse in the Scriptures: "But they that wait for the Lord shall exchange their strength." What we are really saying is: "Our Father in heaven, I am giving you all the strength that is within me in that very first word; now will you, in exchange, give me an abundance of new strength, so that I can go on with my prayer."

Disturbance From Within

TO COMMUNE with your Maker in solitude and silence, to recite psalms and pray to him

—this it is good to do with your whole heart, until you are overwhelmed with weeping and weep to God as a child weeps to its father. But to weep according to plan in the midst of prayer—that is unworthy! He who does so can no longer say what he says with a whole heart, and the truly great weeping will not overwhelm him. Even thoughts about prayer are like "alien thoughts" which hinder the soul from fixing itself wholly upon God.

Valid Prayer

A PRAYER which is not spoken in the name of all Israel is no prayer at all.

All the Melodies

EVERY people has its own melody, and no people sings the melody of another. But Israel sings all the melodies, in order to bring them to God. So, in the "Section of Praise," all the creatures that live on the earth, and all the birds, utter each his own song. But Israel makes a song out of all of their songs, in order to bring them to God.

Two Worlds

THE other nations, too, believe that there are two worlds. They, too, say, "in the world to come." The difference is this: they think that the two are separate and severed, but Israel professes that the two worlds are essentially one and shall, indeed, become one.

The Ladder

THE souls descended from the realm of heaven to earth, on a long ladder. Then it was taken away. Now, up there, they are calling home the souls. Some do not budge from the spot, for how can one get to heaven without a ladder? Others leap and fall and leap again, and give up. But there are those who know very well that they cannot achieve it, but try and try over and over again until God catches hold of them and pulls them up.

Abraham And His Guests

CONCERNING Abraham, whom angels visited, the Scriptures say: "And he stood over them and they did eat." Why is this said in the Scriptures? It is not customary for the host who does not eat with his guests to stand over them while they eat. Now this is what is meant by these words in the Scriptures:

The angels have their virtues and flaws, and men have their virtues and flaws. The virtue of angels is that they cannot deteriorate, and their flaw is that they cannot improve. Man's flaw is that he can deteriorate, and his virtue that he can improve. But a man who practices hospitality in the true sense of the word acquires the virtues of his guests. Thus Abraham acquired the virtue of angels who never deteriorate. And so he was over and above them.

Joyless Virtue

IF A man has fulfilled all the commandments, he is admitted to the Garden of Eden, even though he has not burned with fervor and has not experienced delight. But since he has felt no delight on earth, he feels none there either. Finally, he even grumbles: "And they make all that to-do about paradise!"

And hardly have the words left his lips, when he is thrown out!

The Nature of Service

THIS is the service man must perform all of his days: to shape matter into form, to refine the flesh, and to let the light penetrate the darkness, until the darkness itself shines and there is no longer any division between the two. As it is written: "And there was evening and there was morning, one day."

One should not make a great to-do about serving God. Does the hand boast when it carries out what the heart wills?

The Patriarchs

QUESTION: Rashi expounds the words of God: "I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob" as meaning "I appeared to the fathers." In what way can this be considered an explanation?

Answer: He who had a father who was righteous and devout is not apt to make a great effort to perfect himself, for he leans on the merits of his father. This is even more true of one whose father and grandfather were both holy men; the mere fact that he is their grandson seems to him like solid ground beneath his feet. But this was not so in the days of the patriarchs: Isaac did not concern himself with the merit his father had acquired, nor Jacob with that of his father and his ancestors, for they did not want to be grandsons, but fathers.

Renewal

IN ORDER to perfect oneself, one must renew oneself day by day.

To Die and To Live

IT is written in the psalm: "I shall not die, but live." In order really to live, man must first give himself to death. But when he has done so, he discovers that he is not to die, that he is to live.

Infinity

INFINITY shall be contained in every deed of man, in his speaking and seeing, listening and walking, standing still and lying down.

Every Day

EVERYONE of Israel is told to think of himself as standing at Mount Sinai to receive the Torah. For man there are past and future events, but not so for God: day in, day out, he gives the Torah.

Dreams

DREAMS are a secretion of our thoughts and through them our thought is purified. All the wisdom in the world is a secretion of the Torah, and through it the Torah is purified. That is why we read: "When the Lord brings back those that returned to Zion, we will be like unto them that dream." For then it will be revealed that wisdom exists only that the Torah may be purified, and exile only that the thought of Israel may be purified, and all will be as a dream.

The Man Who Denies God

WHOEVER says that the words of the Torah are one thing and the words of the world another must be regarded as a man who denies God.

Body and Soul

EVERYONE should have pity upon his body and allow it to share in all that illumines the soul. We must purify the body very greatly so that it may share in everything the soul receives, so that there may be a change in the present state where the soul attains to lofty matters and the body knows nothing about them. But if the body is given a share, it can also be of use to the soul. For, at times, the soul falls from its rung, and then the purified body can help it up again

through the power of the light it has absorbed. That is why Job says: "From out my flesh shall I see God."

Of Modern Inventions

"You can learn from everything," the rabbi of Sadagora once said to his hasidim. "Everything can teach us something, and not only everything God has created. What man has made has also something to teach us."

"What can we learn from a train?" one hasid asked dubiously.

"That because of one second one can miss everything."

"And from the telegraph?"

"That every word is counted and charged."

"And the telephone?"

"That what we say here is heard there."

How To Say Torah

I SHALL teach you the best way to say Torah. You must cease to be aware of yourselves. You must be nothing but an ear that hears what the universe of the word is constantly saying within you. The moment you start hearing what you yourself are saying, you must stop.

Within and Without

MAN is afraid of things that cannot harm him, and he knows it; and he craves things that cannot help him, and he knows it. But actually, it is something within man he is afraid of, and it is something within man that he craves.

Judgment

HE WHO desires to become aware of the hidden light must lift the feeling of fear up to its source. And he can accomplish this if he judges himself and all he does. For then he sheds all fears and lifts fear that has fallen down. But if he does not judge himself, he will be judged from on high, and this judgment will come upon him in the guise of countless things, and all the things in the world will become messengers of God who carry out the judgment on this man.

The Growing Tree

MAN is like a tree. If you stand in front of a tree and watch it incessantly, to see how it grows, and to see how much it has grown, you will see nothing at all. But tend it at all times, prune the runners and keep it free

of beetles and worms, and—all in good time—it will come into its growth. It is the same with man: all that is necessary is for him to overcome his obstacles, and he will thrive and grow. But it is not right to examine him hour after hour to see how much has already been added to his stature.

Letters and Souls

THE myriads of letters in the Torah stand for the myriads of souls in Israel. If one single letter is left out of the Torah, it becomes unfit for use; if one single soul is left out of the union of Israel, the Divine Presence will not rest upon it. Like the letters, so the souls must unite and form a union. But why is it forbidden for one letter in the Torah to touch its neighbor? Because every soul of Israel must have hours when it is alone with its Maker.

Give and Take

THE motto of life is: "Give and Take." Everyone must be both a giver and a receiver. Who is not both is as a barren tree.

In Every Man

IN EVERY man there is something precious, which is in no one else. And so we should honor each for what is hidden within him, for what only he has, and none of his comrades.

The True Love Of God

TO LOVE God truly, one must first love man. And if anyone tells you that he loves God and does not love his fellow-man, you will know that he is lying.

As Yourself

WHAT you must do is love your neighbor as yourself. There is no one who knows your many faults better than you! But you love yourself notwithstanding. And so you must love your neighbor, no matter how many faults you see in him.

When It Is Good

THERE is no quality and there is no power in man that was created to no purpose. And even base and corrupt qualities can be uplifted to serve God. When, for example, self-assurance is uplifted, it changes into proud assurance of the ways of God. But to what end can the denial of God have been

created? It too can be uplifted through deeds of charity. For if someone comes to you and asks your help, you shall not turn him off with pious words, saying: "Have faith and take your troubles to God!" You shall act as though there were no God, as though there were only one person in all the world who could help this man—only yourself.

The Exile of the Divine Presence

THE Divine Presence governs from top to bottom and to the verge of all rungs. That is the secret hidden in the words: "And Thou preservest them all." Even when a man sins, his sin is encompassed by the Presence because without it he would not have the power to move a limb. And that is the exile of the Divine Presence.

The Lowest Rung

IN THE story of the Creation we read: "... and behold, it was very good." But, in the passage where Moses reproves Israel, the verse says: "See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil." Where did the evil come from?

Evil too is good. It is the lowest rung of of perfect goodness. If you do good deeds, even evil will become good; but if you sin, evil will really become evil.

The Alphabet

QUESTION: Why, on the Day of Atonement, is the confession of sins given in alphabetical order?

Answer: If it were otherwise we should not know when to stop beating our breast. For there is no end to sin, and no end to the awareness of sin, but there is an end to the alphabet.

Do Not Weigh

WHEN you talk to people, do not weigh whether or not their thoughts are clinging steadfastly to God. A soul that weighs suffers harm.

The Bees

THEY say that the proud are reborn as bees. For in his heart the proud man says: "I am

a writer, I am a singer, I am a great one at studying." And since what is said of such men is true—that they will not turn to God, not even on the threshold of hell—they are reborn after they die. They are born again as bees that hum and buzz: "I am, I am, I am."

Humility No Commandment

QUESTION: All the commandments are written in the Torah. But humility, which is worth all the other virtues put together, is not stated in the Torah as a commandment. All we read about humility is the words in praise of Moses, saying that he was more humble than all the other people. What is the significance of this silence concerning humility?

Answer: If anyone were humble in order to keep a commandment, he would never attain to true humility. To think humility a commandment is the prompting of Satan. He blows up a man's heart, telling him he is learned and righteous and devout, a master of all good works, and worthy to think himself better than the general run of people, but that thinking so would be proud and impious since the commandment is that he must be humble and put himself on a par with others. And a man who interprets humility as a commandment and keeps it as such only feeds his pride the more.

Delay

EVERYONE of Israel should know and consider the fact that he, in the particular way he is made, is unique in the world, and that no one like him has ever been. For if someone like him had already been, there would be no reason for him to be in this world. Actually, everyone is something new in this world, and here he must perfect his particular being, for because it is still imperfect the coming of the Messiah is delayed!

The Kingdom of God

THOSE who do not walk in loneliness will be bewildered when the Messiah comes and they are called. But we will be as one who has been asleep and whose spirit is quiet and calm.

THE STUDY OF MAN

OPINION POLLING: SCIENCE OR BUSINESS?

A New Profession Begins to Take Stock

ARNOLD ROSE

TODAY public opinion research is accepted as a respected branch of the social sciences. But it is more than that—it is big business, and “spot” news as well. This was amply demonstrated at the Second International Conference on Public Opinion Research at Williamstown, Massachusetts, in September. Full-time reporters covered the conference for the *New York Times*, the *Herald Tribune*, and some other papers, and the *Times* and *Herald Tribune* ran long daily reports on the proceedings. Present were such almost legendary personages as George Gallup (a recent addition to his world chain of public opinion polling enterprises is “Gallup Svenska”), Elmo Roper (of the *Fortune* magazine poll), and Archibald Crossley.

The conference's chief purpose was to set up permanent national and international associations of public opinion researchers. In addition, its agenda found place for the discussion of many of the technical problems facing public opinion research. In attendance were 195 delegates; like other “international” conferences held on American soil, only twelve delegates represented foreign countries, most of them

THE new and growing science of public opinion research carries important implications for the relation of the social scientist to a democratic society—a subject that has preoccupied conscientious social scientists more and more in recent years. ARNOLD ROSE, who here reports on the recent International Conference on Public Opinion Research, is associate professor of sociology at Washington University, St. Louis. He was born in Chicago in 1918 and earned his doctorate at the University of Chicago. He collaborated with Gunnar Myrdal in the writing of *An American Dilemma* (1944).

with expenses paid by the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations. Still, it was truly international in that many of the non-Americans were highly vocal, all the delegates were aware that much of the future of public opinion research lay in the international field, and some of the sharpest cleavages were over international issues.

IT HAS been one of the great commercial discoveries of the last decade or two that the public is fascinated with itself. Previously, public opinion research was nurtured in the universities under the name of attitude research. Having given up the concept of inborn instincts, psychologists and sociologists continued to search for psychological units—the basic elements of the mind—under the guise of drives, interests, wishes, and attitudes. This notion that we can separate our human thinking into basic discrete elements remains in public opinion research to this day. The professors used to give questionnaires to—alas—the most readily available guinea pigs, their students, in order to find out their attitudes on various subjects, and how these attitudes were related to each other, to backgrounds, to exposure to propaganda, etc.

Literally thousands of such studies have been carried out and published in the professional journals. Their findings are often bewilderingly contradictory. For example, of the scores of studies of prejudiced attitudes, two or three show that women are more prejudiced than men and three or four others that men are more prejudiced than women; a couple of studies show that old people are less prejudiced than young people while others show that the old are more prejudiced than the young, and so on.

Most social scientists have realized the weak-

nesses of their studies and have shifted their aim from mere description of attitudes to analysis of methods used and of the meaning of their findings. Today they study the relation between attitudes and personality, the relative value of intensive as against extensive interviewing, the problems of setting up scales to measure attitudes, the elimination of bias from questions and interviewing. Studies on such subjects were among the papers presented at the Conference.

In the meantime, some more practical-minded men have found that you can build a profitable business by asking people, "Do you like Blotz's Tooth Paste?" "Why don't you buy Blotz's Tooth Paste more often?" "Would you use more Blotz's Tooth Paste if . . . ?" Fortunes are being made by quizzing the public with such questions every day. Blotz is glad to pay for the service as the information from his "public" sends his sales up. This business is known as "market research" and is lucrative enough to support several hundred agencies. In some cities interviewing organizations have been set up to service these market research businesses. A variation of this business is radio program polling, where the best known name is C. E. Hooper, whose "Hooper ratings" are the bane of radio artists and the bible of commercial sponsors.

A better-known type of business is that associated with the names of Gallup, Roper, and Crossley. Their organizations ask questions of people throughout the country on matters of general public interest, and the reports are sold as regular news items to newspapers and magazines. They also do surveys for special groups on specific subjects, as well as market research. The National Opinion Research Center, formerly at Denver and now at Chicago, and the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan are non-profit organizations doing very much the same sort of work.

STILL another type of business is that of polling employees in order to find out sources of dissatisfaction and low morale. Some large companies have full-time staffs to do this work; others use consultants or special organizations set up especially to service industry. One such organization has been in this business for well over a decade, but since the war dozens of others have sprung up using a variety of techniques and approaches. It has been asked whether these employee polls are circumventing

unions, by taking away some of their functions. Some of the pollers make efforts to clear their work with the unions, but it is still not clear whether they do not inevitably weaken unions.

It is not only the aims of the businesses conducting public opinion polls that have been questioned; the techniques they use have often raised suspicion. Asking questions is a tricky operation, not nearly as simple as it appears to the reader of the results printed in the daily newspaper. There is the sampling problem, of getting a representative group of people to answer the questions so that not only one kind of person will be interviewed. There is the wording problem, of formulating questions that will be understandable, meaningful, and identical in content for all interviewers. There is the interviewer problem, of securing interviewers who have the ability and the honesty to secure full and uninfluenced answers. There is the coding problem, of how most efficiently to reduce the data to a workable form. There is the analysis problem, of how to interpret the answers. There is the representation problem, of how to summarize the findings to make them readable. These and other problems were debated at the Williamstown Conference, usually without heat and seldom with any new light being shed.

MUCH more significant—and heated—was the discussion over setting minimum standards in public opinion work, so as to eliminate the most obvious and certain sources of error in the techniques used. Many of the market research businesses, focussed as they are on money-making, are not concerned with doing the best scientific job that can be done in polling. Many of them do not use people with the best training and are fearful or resentful of the methodological work carried on by the scientists. At the same time they realize that they need this work if they are to meet competition and sell their work as accurate and scientific.

Their attitude was brought to a head at the business meeting of the Conference, where a permanent association was in the process of being formed. They objected to the creation of a committee on standards, the function of which would be to bring up before the association as a whole, for its consideration, drafts of minimum requirements for adequate public opinion polling. One well-known market researcher, speaking with great sincerity and passion, went so far as to threaten the association with a break-up if standards were imposed on members. But the

scientists present felt they did not wish to be a mere front to provide respectability for business activities unless the businessmen were willing to show concern over professional standards. The committee on standards was created and an eminent sociologist and government administrator, Dr. Philip Hauser, was elected chairman. The market research people did succeed, however, in avoiding a commitment of their businesses to the association by limiting membership to *individuals* rather than to *agencies*.

In this, the major dispute at the conference, it seemed clear that the business people were supporting an untenable position. The public has a vital interest in the standards of groups engaged in public opinion research. Much depends on the scientific accuracy of the polls; they determine what conscientious congressmen learn about public opinion on political issues, which radio performers are put on the air, how various charitable and propaganda agencies frame their work, and—most important—in what light the American public is placed before itself and before the world.

Those who warn against the far-reaching effects that scientific errors in polling may have, have a classic illustration in the case of the *Literary Digest* poll. Before every presidential election, the now defunct *Literary Digest* sent postcards—"straw ballots"—to a very large number of people listed in the telephone directory. Without taking into account the fact that many voters did not have telephones, and that many people did not send back their postcards, they were nevertheless able to predict the election results of 1932 fairly accurately. Before the 1936 election, using the same techniques, they predicted a victory for Landon. This time there were other pollsters in the field—notably Gallup, Roper, and Crossley—who told the *Literary Digest* that their inaccurate sample would throw them way off, and who forecast Roosevelt's victory. The Republican party, banking to some extent on the *Digest* poll, sank huge sums into the Landon campaign. After Roosevelt's victory, the *Digest* rapidly lost prestige and soon went out of business.

What had happened was simple to understand: the people who feel the strongest are the ones who vote in the straw polls. In 1932 these were the anti-Hoover people, and their heavy voting just about balanced the pro-Hoover bias of telephone subscribers. But in 1936, it was the anti-Roosevelt people who felt

strongest, and their heavy voting in the poll was *added to* the anti-Roosevelt bias of the sample.

Their accurate predictions of the results of the 1936 election put Gallup, Roper, and Crossley on the road to fame and fortune. But only the most obvious snags had been ironed out of the sampling problem. Today, for example, we don't know whether the *quota* method used by the pollsters is as satisfactory as the *area* method advocated by many scientists. The *quota* method simply involves getting a sample that has the same proportion of old people, young people, poor people, rich people, men, women, etc., as in the general population. The *area* method relies on a random sampling of certain areas of a city or town that have been picked as representative—in their percentage of different income groups, nationality groups, and so on—of the larger area.

The *area* method requires more technical skill and is probably more expensive, so it is understandable that market researchers do not want to use it. A full-scale test of the relative accuracy of the two methods is now under way, and if it shows that the *quota* method is not as accurate as the *area* method, the committee on standards of the new public opinion association may well recommend that all polling and market research organizations use the *area* method. It is easy to see why the businessmen are worried. But it is also easy to see why the scientists and the general public are concerned with raising standards for this new profession.

The conflict over standards soon became a struggle for control of the new international association. The "business" group was better organized, but the "professors" were more numerous and therefore had more votes, if they all voted the same way. At the beginning of the Conference, there was no inclination on the part of the academic group to vote in concert. But the business group overplayed its hand by organizing a rumor campaign against a leading foreign delegate who was believed to be trying to unify the academic group and so gain a powerful position for himself. A last minute display of unity by the business group prevented his election as president, but most of the other new officers of the organization were representatives of the academic side.

A FEW sessions were devoted to the actual content of various public opinion studies. Dr. Marie Jahoda of the American Jewish Committee gave an impressive report on two studies

sponsored by her organization. One, carried on at the University of California to determine the personality traits of the anti-Semite, found the typical anti-Semite to be a compulsive conformist, exhibiting anxiety at the appearance of social deviation. He appears to be a person with little insight into himself, who projects his own undesired traits onto other people. He has a tendency toward stereotyped thinking and is unimaginative. He tends to have unconscious inferiority feelings centering mainly about the castration complex. He expresses strong parental and religious devotion but unconsciously manifests hatred of parents and little concern with values. He exhibits aversion against emotionality but unconsciously has a feeling of inferiority toward it. He is prone to aggressive fantasies.

The other study was one conducted in New York City by Dr. Jahoda in collaboration with Dr. Nathan Ackerman, a leading psychiatrist. They secured detailed reports on fifty patients who had expressed anti-Semitism while undergoing psychoanalytic treatment, and tried to determine what role anti-Semitism played in their unstable mental make-up, if any. It seemed clear that anti-Semitism was derived from some distortion in personality structure, and fulfilled certain needs. Anxiety and lack of security in group membership is the major and uniform trait of this type. Fearing attacks on their integrity as individuals, these personalities counterattack against Jews, the handiest object. The anti-Semitic personality type in this study, too, has an overwhelming desire to conform, to appear "respectable," and to attach itself to dominant organizations, and is characterized by outward submissiveness and inward aggressiveness.

Dr. Frederick Williams, who carries out polls for the American Military Government in Germany, also had interesting things to report at Williamstown. In his article in the Summer issue of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Dr. Williams had said that German public opinion studies had shown that Germans had a Western orientation, founded, however, on antipathy toward Russia rather than on friendly respect and high regard for Western nations. The German people have not changed their political ideas since Hitler:

"There is no evidence that the anti-democratic elements in the population, casting ballots among a set of Military Government-restricted alternatives, have had a change of heart

or disposition. They do seem willing to humor us as long as we are here [in Germany]. On at least a dozen occasions cross-sections of the German public have been asked to indicate whether National Socialism was a bad idea, or a good idea only badly carried out. The population divides rather evenly on the alternatives. . . . The Nazi appeal is, in Germany, a respectable appeal. . . . A large minority today are persuaded National Socialists, according to any reasonable definition of that term. Others could be pressed to cast a ballot for the cause."

One of the evidences of this is that, at the end of 1946, 40 per cent were anti-Semitic, and many of the remainder were tainted with real traces of prejudice.

WHILE most of the delegates at the Conference were primarily concerned with the problems of method, a score or so were interested in content of this sort. Upon the motion of Professor Theodore Lentz of Washington University in St. Louis, a volunteer committee was formed to examine ways in which public opinion research could be used to promote world peace. Polls frequently show that peoples are more sympathetic to each other and to world organization than their governments are. They also reveal areas of ignorance which may be stumbling blocks to amity between nations. It would seem desirable to encourage more polls on such subjects and—more important—to publicize them and otherwise bring them to the attention of citizens who sincerely want to work for world peace. This is the purpose of the volunteer committee.

While it was mainly the academic people who formed the committee on world peace, one of the most fruitful suggestions came from Mr. Eric Stern, who represents market research businesses in Switzerland, France, and Belgium. He said that his organizations, and probably other market researchers, would be happy to include questions relating to peace and world organization among their questions about Blotz's tooth paste. In Switzerland this was essential, he said, since people did not want to answer questions that would help businessmen, and there had to be some public welfare aspect to a question before they would answer. Commercial questions had to be camouflaged. The American delegates were somewhat amazed. Here the average person seems to be flattered to be asked his opinion about any commercial product.

IN THE field of national political polling the most interesting proposal came from Mr. Elmo Roper, who suggested that the federal government set up a permanent polling organization. (The government did have several polling organizations during the war but the post-war economy drive wiped them out.) A number of private citizens would direct the polls, and would hire the experts to carry out the technical work. Mr. Roper felt that this would be a major asset for democratic political processes; but he was also candid enough to point out how polls might be harmful to the democratic process even when conducted scientifically.

Public opinion on an issue may be half-baked and a poll will influence legislators against their better judgment. Sometimes a good candidate for office will be discouraged from putting up a strong fight because a poll convinces him that he will lose. Polls can give propagandists ideas of how to influence the public mind most effectively. Knowledge of who is leading in an election campaign may lead people to vote for the probable winner regardless of merit—although studies have shown that this “bandwagon effect” is not as important as was once thought. Most important, the polls probably have a tendency to jade the nerves and feelings of the average man. The pre-election polls tend to give people the idea that an election is like a horse race—something that entertains them and excites them, but does not give them a sense of real participation in the political process.

The pollers do not like pre-election polling either, because it provides too crucial a test of methods and yet is subject to uncontrollable factors. After another round in 1948, they may make a real effort to stop straw balloting.

The polls as an asset to democracy did not lack defenders, however, and Dr. George Gallup pointed out some strong arguments in their favor. They secure knowledge about the average man's needs and desires and make this information available to legislators. They provide a check on the claims of interest groups that the “public” is on their side. They probably help to create interest in the public affairs about which opinion is polled. They aid educators and others concerned with public welfare to determine significant gaps in public knowledge.

Only in a democracy, we agree, can public opinion polling take place, and the polling works back, on the whole, to strengthen de-

mocracy. Even the market research business does no one any harm; some say it increases the serviceability of industry to the public, and at worst it only makes advertising more clever. There are also certain uses of attitude research—on race, for example—that really give useful information in taking social action. The issue boils down to a question about the specific purposes of the specific polls. If every pollster accepts the responsibility of avoiding harm to democracy, no harm will result. There is nothing inherent in the polling process itself, or in the reporting of poll results, which is dangerous to a democratic form of government: it is the bias of those who use the instrument that may be dangerous.

THE Williamstown Conference marked the twelfth anniversary of the founding of the large national public opinion polling organizations—although attitude research existed in the universities for at least twenty years before that and in private business for a decade earlier. During these twelve years public opinion research has had such a phenomenal growth—becoming of considerable use to government, business, welfare agencies, propagandists, and so on—that its practitioners have become ready to form an association, set professional standards, and work cooperatively to improve their methods. The Williamstown Conference marked the “coming of age” of public opinion research.

However, it has all its years of maturity ahead. Inevitably—as one could see at the Williamstown Conference—there is a divergence between the interests of those using public opinion research for business ends, and those interested in it as a tool to greater social understanding. As in other fields of social science, the most conscious of the academic people are somewhat uneasy about their close relationship with the world of practical business and practical politics, a relationship forced by the growing effectiveness of their own work.

At the moment, this conflict between the two wings is still obscured and overlaid by large common aims—towards greater technical proficiency, and towards the clarification of certain specific problems that seem to be particularly susceptible to public opinion research. But the conflict has emerged, as at Williamstown, and spotlighted problems of deep concern to the general public.

LETTERS FROM READERS

"Assimilation in Militant Dress"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I feel urged to thank you with all my heart for the magnificent article by Will Herberg, "Assimilation in Militant Dress," which you published in the July issue of COMMENTARY. It expresses in classical words the attitude of traditional, orthodox Judaism towards the nationalistic assimilation raging like an epidemic within the ranks of American Jewry and leading to disastrous consequences for the mind and body of the Jewish people.

Against this spiritual disease, spread by political Zionism, including the Mizrahi wing, the Agudas Israel organization, of which I have the honor to be president, has struggled for the past forty years of Jewish history.

I think that the logical trend of Mr. Herberg's spiritual development should lead him one day from Marxism beyond the "Conservative" half-truth to genuine traditional Judaism.

JACOB ROSENHEIM

Agudas Israel World Organization
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The very interesting but also very misleading article "Assimilation in Militant Dress" by Will Herberg, has persuaded me that his transition "From Marxism to Judaism" is still far from complete. The answer to the subtitle—"Should the Jews be 'Like Unto the Nations?'"—must be an unqualified and emphatic "yes." Both Jews and non-Jews, after untold suffering on the part of the Jewish people for well-nigh two thousand years, should be convinced that the only hope for the Jewish people, from the standpoint of self-respect and survival, lies in an independent national life on its ancient soil in Israel.

Unfortunately, Mr. Herberg, in citing the various instances in which the Jews, either individually or as a group, followed the leadership of such sages as Johanan ben Zakkai, the Pharisaic leaders, and others who sought to emphasize the superiority of the spiritual self of Israel over temporary and useless military endeavor, chose to disregard the nature of the circumstances which caused great Jewish leaders to reject continued opposition to the enemy.

Their attitude certainly did not declare or even imply that Israel was to be in eternal exile away from Israel or in unending submission to the invader and oppressor in Israel. They wanted the Jewish people to remain loyal to the Torah and all that it represents, while they would wait for the time when God, in his wisdom, would see fit to return them to an independent national life on the soil of their forefathers. They certainly would not agree with Mr. Herberg's belief that only the spirit of Judaism, and not the physical and future well-being of the Jewish people, is what really matters.

Jewish thinking and aspiration, as expressed in the prayers in the *siddur* and in the words of the prophets before and during the Babylonian exile, indicate quite unmistakably that the Jewish people never intended to remain forever in exile, nor did it ever look upon this exile as a blessing or something desirable for its spiritual life and well-being.

RABBI NATHAN WISE

Plymouth, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It is not too late, I hope, for an extended comment on Will Herberg's article, "Assimilation in Militant Dress," in which he accused militant political Zionism of being a violation of our religious heritage.

It so happens that I am at present engaged in a study of Rabban Johanan ben Zakkai, of halachic passages where his views are reported or quoted, of haggadic views attributed to him, and of passages where he is remembered, described, praised. While I am still unable neatly to summarize the distinctive originality of his thought, I can say this: it is possible that no one would be as profoundly disturbed by Will Herberg's paper as he, if he were here to read it. What would pain him is not that his conduct in 68 C.E. (if that indeed was the year) has been misunderstood—after all, the flight from Jerusalem almost invited misunderstanding. No, that action he hoped he would later be able to explain satisfactorily to everybody. Apparently he had already done so to his disciples, who surely had their misgivings. They could not have acted as his accomplices otherwise. (Eliezer was a *Shamuti*, sympathetic with

Shammaite views, and Shammaites were not altogether opposed to the war.)

The flight from Jerusalem, Johanan surely knew, would require defense, perhaps in every age. But what would give him pain is that all his subsequent acts should have failed to make it evident that in his view the Land of Israel still belonged to none but Israel, that the occupation of the land by Rome was a *punishment* of Israel for neglecting to live the kind of life such a land required, that as far as it lay in his power he would conserve and retain ceremonies and observances formerly limited to Jerusalem so that Israel would not disintegrate and thus lose some future opportunity to recover the Land completely and enjoy independence.

From Ben Hecht, I suppose, the Sages would have expected little; after all, they knew Ben Batiah. But from the rest of us, to whom terror and violence is not the answer which makes sense, the Sages would have expected a fair estimate.

No careful study of Jewish sources can possibly disguise the facts (a) that the Land of Israel is *not* peripheral to (or, say, a minor theme in) the teachings of Judaism; (b) that Israel is intended by God to occupy that Land and that other powers are there by might; (c) that Israel's destiny is not to be "abnormal."

A very attractive word, that word "abnormal." For Kafka, and for a generation to whom the concept that "there is a goal and no way" is not an insight but a cardinal principle, the word is an incantation. If by abnormal we mean that the prevailing metaphysical double talk (*vide* Auden and all the minor Kierkegaards) is normal, then Judaism and Israel are truly abnormal and abnormality is an ideal furiously to be cultivated. But if I understand the Jewish sources which I study, it is these manifestations which are abnormal, they are perversions and caricatures. Sin, in fact, as Pedersen once acutely observed of the Hebrew religion, "is, properly speaking, no action, but a caricature."

At no time did Israel's Sages make a fetish of abnormality, M. Maritain notwithstanding. What Israel's Sages prayed for was the normalization of this universe so that Israel too might lead a normal life.

To be sure, the categories of Western history do not do justice to Israel, a people older than the Western world with a tradition developed in a different universe of discourse from ours. But whatever the modern equivalent for *umah* or *am*, the elements of what we call nationality are strongly emphasized. George Foote Moore was certainly not blind to the universality of Israel's faith; and he says plainly when speaking of the character of nationality, "This is the corner stone of the religion of Israel both in the

popular apprehension and in the explicit affirmation of the religious leaders in all periods." (The italics are mine, but they are not intended as a denial of an equally emphatic universal character; there is ambivalence enough, as every student knows.) Would Judah Halevi (since he too has been summoned) have undertaken his journey to the Holy Land if he had felt that because Israel is more than a nation therefore it ought not pursue activities which are generally expressions of national life pure and simple? Who called Israel outside the Holy Land *asirayich* (thy slaves) if not the author of the *Kuzari*?

One would have to be ignorant (or Hecht) to deny that Israel's nationality has a purpose transcending mere existence, security, minimum survival, or the elimination of anti-Semitism. Israel is in truth chosen to exemplify and publish the imperatives of the Torah. But is this to say we are not of the "normal" world, only in it? That Israel voluntarily resigns from its historic attachments? There is a whole order of the Mishna, *Zeraim*, to remind us how earthy and earthly these attachments are.

Much too easily, it seems to me, a confusion has developed in certain circles. For the pious man a tension is eternal because, regardless of the measure of his diligence and obedience, he knows how far he is from perfect submission to the will of God. But this tension is not the same as the strain that enters the world in the relations of men to each other because they are unjust and unmerciful to each other. Israel even in the Holy Land is under obligation to live a life which is not exhausted by the boundaries of Dan and Beer Sheba or Hamath and the Brook of Arabah. But this does not mean that therefore efforts to recover that promised locale and to rehabilitate Israel are in opposition to that life. Whatever I recall from Jewish literature cries out to the contrary. We are in danger of becoming a Torah-less people today because Zion is not ours. Do you remember what Schechter said? For all "its nightmares" Zionism was a "most cherished dream" because it redeemed his beloved Catholic Israel from all "the incessantly assailing forces of assimilation."

What does it all come to? That we are still, in the contemporary Western idiom, unable properly to describe the peculiar people Israel, that Israel dare not reduce its nationality or peoplehood (choose what term you will) to political terms only (God forbid to militaristic terms at all!), that the restoration of the Holy Land to the Holy People is as central an insistence of Jewish tradition as is the realization that Israel's uniqueness depends upon the commitment to Torah, that the world as it should

be, this world if you please, is the place where Israel's normalcy is finally to be enacted, that the normalcy of the world will not, from the standpoint of Judaism, be established until the normalcy of Israel is established. Until the world recognizes that the Jew is of this universe even as the Jew has always insisted that the demonstration of our love of God must be in this universe and amongst its inhabitants, abnormality will reign, "Whirl is King."

I write this criticism of Herberg (who is absolutely right in many of his emphases and warnings, and whose profound reflections spring from love for Israel) not because I seek to defend the Sicarii, ancient or modern. Theirs is *not* the way. But their way—for which the nations, now indulging in exclamations of moral indignation, are in good part responsible—must not be equated with the authentic fervor to restore Israel, to recover what is hers, to provide her with the opportunity in concentration and peace to create that light by which all men must see.

RABBI JUDAH GOLDIN

State University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

With regard to "Assimilation in Militant Dress" by Will Herberg. Mr. Herberg speaks of "Johanan ben Zakkai, the Pharisaic *Ab Bet Din* of the Sanhedrin." This statement is untrue, since Johanan ben Zakkai was not an *Ab Bet Din*.

Similarly, in the very same paragraph, the author makes the following inaccurate remark: "Johanan, with his great disciples, Joshua ben Hanania and Eliezer ben Hyrkanos, appeared before the Roman commander. . . ." No source whatsoever exists to indicate that Joshua ben Hanania and Eliezer ben Hyrkanos made such an appearance.

On the same page Mr. Herberg says: "A few months later, the Zealot leader Eleazar ben Jair. . . ." Eleazar ben Jair was not a Zealot but a Sicarii who followed the Fourth Philosophy. There was a vast difference between the principles of the Zealots and those of the Sicarii. I consider this a glaring and inexcusable error.

SOLOMON ZEITLIN

The Jewish Quarterly Review
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have come to expect illuminating and interesting analyses from Mr. Herberg, and his latest, "Assimilation in Militant Dress," is no exception. He makes a heroic proposal which, it seems to me, no one has a right to ask of another people; but when a man proposes it

for his own people, one can only give it profound appreciation and respect.

I find the entire magazine very interesting.

ROGER L. SHINN

Union Theological Seminary
New York City

In Reply

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Rabbi Nathan Wise answers the question, "Should Jews be 'Like Unto the Nations'?", with a resounding affirmative. That is his privilege. But he must recognize that in doing so he is running counter to normative Jewish tradition. He has the right to renounce that tradition, of course; but let him at least acknowledge that that's what he's doing. Let him not argue as if he were carrying forward the tradition and it was I who was adulterating it with my "Marxism." A curious way for "materialistic" Marxism to show itself—in depreciating the "physical" and exalting the "spiritual"!

Rabbi Wise makes no effort to controvert my reading of Israel's history and tradition. He simply makes the tradition relative to "circumstances" (a suspiciously "Marxist" procedure!) and implies that circumstances have changed. Of course they have—and not only in the past two centuries. The circumstances of Jewish life have changed drastically more than once in the course of the past two and a half thousand years, but the normative Jewish tradition, embodying the developing Prophetic-Pharisaic-Rabbinic outlook, has remained essentially self-consistent and continuous. That tradition, it seems to me, is classically expressed in Saadya's famous dictum: "Our people is a people only by virtue of its Torah," or as Dr. Finkelstein has recently phrased it: "The Jewish people must be maintained in order that their tradition may live. It is not the tradition that lives in order that the Jewish people be maintained."

I would not be so certain as Rabbi Wise seems to be as to the providential meaning of the dispersion. We read in the Talmud: "God scattered His people over the earth, for only so could the nations be gained for His service" (Pesachim 87b). The fact seems to be that the dispersion, like so much else in Jewish existence, is ambivalent: a curse and a blessing, or perhaps better, a burden turned into an opportunity for service to God and mankind.

Where did Rabbi Wise and Dr. Judah Goldin get the impression that I hold the Land of Israel to be "peripheral to (or, say, a minor theme in) the teaching of Judaism"? Certainly not from my article; there I say specifically: "Palestine has a great and indispensable role to play in the fulfillment of Jewish destiny but

this role is not to reabsorb the Galut and 'normalize' Jewish life along secular national lines. Palestine's destiny, rather, is to serve as the ideal pole of 'normality' in dialectic relation to the 'abnormality' of the Galut, each functioning as a norm and balance for the other."

In other words, the Land and the Galut are the two foci of Jewish existence: to be focal, I submit, is something very different from being peripheral. I oppose the view that denies the Land just as vigorously as I oppose the view that denies the Galut. Land and Galut are focal to Jewish existence; for the Jews, one implies the other.

But transcending both and everything is the Torah. Salo Baron (*A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, i, 83-84) describes the mature Prophetic viewpoint as follows: "The political independence of Jewish nationality may gradually vanish, the Jews may be more and more forced to abandon the country for foreign lands. . . . Not territorial basis, not even the highest religious expression of territorial anchorage, the Temple and its sacrifices, really matter; to obey the commands of the Lord in all places is what matters to the Jew. . . . Thus in days of great suffering and, in a profound sense, out of them, was born the idea of a Jewish people beyond state and territory, a divine instrument in man's overcoming of 'nature' through a supernatural process in the course of 'history.'"

I do not see that I have much to disagree with in the remarks of Dr. Goldin except that here and there he seems to misinterpret my views. But that is not of major importance. He states some significant truths and states them with force and passion. He does deplore my stress on Jewish "abnormality," but he himself says: "The world as it should be is the world where Israel's normalcy will finally be enacted." Exactly! *Until* the world is at it should be—and that, I presume, will not be until the "last days"—Israel's position in the world will remain an abnormal one. There may be some difference in our two formulations but surely they are not essential. There are, finally, a number of points in his letter that I might dispute, but since they do not seem to me to be relevant to my article, I will refrain from comment.

Dr. Zeitlin charges me with three factual errors: (1) I said Johanan ben Zakkai was *Ab Bet Din* of the Sanhedrin, whereas he was not; (2) I said that when Johanan appeared before the Roman commander he was accompanied by Joshua ben Hananya and Eliezer ben Hyrkanos, whereas there is no evidence to that effect; and (3) I called Eleazar ben Jair a Zealot leader whereas he was one of the Sicarii.

Of course, I am utterly incompetent to argue matters of scholarship with Dr. Zeitlin. I merely want to point out that only the third point has the slightest relevance to the argument of my article. Whether Johanan was or was not *Ab Bet Din*, whether he was or was not accompanied by his two disciples when he appeared before the Roman, is obviously immaterial to the validity of the thesis I was trying to establish. Even the last point—whether Eleazar belonged to the Zealots or Sicarii—is only of peripheral significance, as any one can see by glancing at my article. The conclusions would be exactly the same were the word "Zealots" replaced by "Sicarii" in all relevant passages.

However, in extenuation of my errors, I would like to state the following:

1. Johanan ben Zakkai is referred to as *Ab Bet Din* by Graetz and others. Here is what Graetz says (ii, 240): "Johanan ben Zakkai was made vice-president of the Sanhedrin." ("Vice-president," it is well known, is the usual way of rendering *Ab Bet Din* in English.)

2. My imagination apparently misled me in having Joshua and Eliezer accompany Johanan before the Roman commander. The accounts refer to Johanan alone.

3. Graetz (ii, 239) calls the Sicarii an extremist section of the Zealots: "Another band of Zealots . . . were called Sicarii. . . . The Sicarii belonged to the very refuse of the Zealots." Other histories and encyclopedias I have consulted say very much the same thing.

I am grateful to Dr. Zeitlin for calling attention to these points, which I intend to investigate further.

Finally, permit me to thank Dr. Rosenheim and Mr. Shinn for their good opinions of my article. I have certainly tried to express the attitude of traditional Judaism as I find it relevant to the perplexities of our time. It is good to have Dr. Rosenheim's word that I have succeeded to some extent.

WILL HERBERG

New York City

From Australia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As a rabbi from "down under" I wish to add my sincere compliments on the high standards which *COMMENTARY* has maintained ever since its advent. I have been reading your publication with great delight and am regularly looking forward to its arrival. In this remote community in particular, one appreciates a Jewish periodical of such varied and well presented Jewish interests.

RABBI I. PORUSH

The Great Synagogue
Sydney, Australia

BOOKS IN REVIEW

"Open Unto Us the Gate"

THE LANGUAGE OF FAITH: SELECTED JEWISH PRAYERS. Edited by NAHUM N. GLATZER. New York, Schocken Books, 1947. 128 pp. \$1.50.

Reviewed by DAVID DAICHES

THIS is the first publication of the Schocken Library series, and a most attractive little volume it is. Pleasing in format, beautifully printed and well laid out, it could stand as a model for this kind of book production. Schocken Books is to be congratulated on this opening of their new series: it augurs well for the future, as regards both form and content.

The selection of some fifty Jewish prayers, in Hebrew, Judeo-German (Yiddish), and Aramaic has been made with great tact, and well illustrates the three main sources of such literature: biblical, liturgical, and mystical. One is particularly grateful to the editor for making available some little known prayers in the third category, meditations of individual sages and mystics such as the piece from *Shaare Tzion* or the beautifully simple supplication of Elimelech of Lizhensk ("put it in our hearts that we may see our comrades' virtue, and not their failing"). In addition to a few Psalms, selections from the Prayer Book, and some private prayers and meditations, the editor has included some pieces that are more consciously "poems," such as the interesting *La-asot R'tson Koni* of Judah Leon Moscato (in regular sonnet form) and the lyrical *Kol Kochevei Voker* of Judah Halevi. Though these latter are interesting, they do not seem to be in the main tradition of Hebrew liturgical writing, in which form appears to emerge from the compulsion of the subject matter rather than to be imposed on the subject matter from without.

This is a point worth dwelling on. The poetic prayers of writers such as Judah Leon Moscato and Judah Halevi—particularly those of the former—are different in tone both from the elaborate and often too "clever" *piyutim* which punctuate the orthodox Jewish festival prayer

books and such characteristic Jewish liturgical pieces as the Eighteen Benedictions or the *Shomer Yisrael* ("Watchman of Israel"), both of which form part of the daily morning service. Full of biblical echoes though all Jewish liturgical writing is, those prayers that have maintained their place in the orthodox daily services (whether Ashkenazi or Sephardi) are characterized by an urgent sense of the necessity of making contact with God which tends to be absent in the more formal "poems" and in the fancier of the *piyutim*. "With much love hast thou loved us, O Lord our God, with great and abundant compassion hast thou taken pity on us, O our Father and King, for the sake of our fathers who trusted in thee." "Look kindly and mercifully, we beseech thee, on thy people." "May the father of mercies have mercy on a people that have been borne by him." That is the real note of the Jewish prayer book, the note that recurs most often and sounds most clearly in the Hebrew liturgy. And in these prayers the form is created by the emotion, so that (to make a comparison that is not as far-fetched as it may sound) formally they are much more like the early poems of Donne than the sonnets of Sidney or Spenser.

Consider the *Shomer Yisrael*, one of the finest of Hebrew prayers and one which is part of the Morning Service. The three stanzas here are all structurally alike, but the shape of the stanza is determined by the passion of the opening. The quality of this passion, incidentally, is quite lost in a translation, however skillful. Jacob Sloan's translation in this collection is conscientious, but it misses the whole point of the prayer by rendering both *goy* and *am* by the same English word, "people." The intense, searching quality of the emotion comes through by that very variation as the phrase is repeated. "Guardian of Israel, guard the remnant of Israel," says the first stanza, while the second pushes the same device further by beginning "Guardian of one nation, guard the remnant of one people." But even this does not convey the meaning of the original ("nation" is not a good rendering of *goy*, but one must use a different

word than "people") and fails to communicate that subtle shift in emphasis that the old-fashioned *ba'al tefila* in the *beth hamedresh* saw and conveyed by leaning on *goy* in chanting the first line and leaning, but a little differently, on *am* in the second. Yet this prayer is not a "poem" in the sense that Judah Leon Moscato's sonnet is a poem: the form has been created by the requirements of the emotion. The echoes and re-echoes of words like *shomer*, *echad*, *yisrael*, throughout the prayer show considerable technical skill, but clearly the prayer was not written in order to exhibit that skill.

THE finest (and one of the shortest) of all Hebrew prayers, in the opinion of the present reviewer, is the supplication towards the end of the concluding service for the Day of Atonement. It is a perfect short poem, but it is not written as a poem. As translated by Jacob Sloan it loses something by too much accuracy. Though the Hebrew does say literally "Open us a gate" and though *ki fana yom* means, as Mr. Sloan translates, "for turned is the day," surely the feeling of the prayer would be better conveyed by some such rendering as

*Open unto us the gate
At the time of the closing of the gate,
For the day is waning.*

*The day is fading,
The sun goes down and disappears.
Ah, let us come into thy gates.*

One must never take Hebrew tenses in their strict grammatical sense in translating from the Hebrew, nor must one take the presence or absence of the definite article too seriously. This little prayer, a final supplication to be allowed to enter the gates of forgiveness before the sun has completely set on the Day of Atonement, depends for its effectiveness on that note of urgency which is lost if one translates the verbs too literally. The urgency creates the form, and the form is perfect.

One might point to certain omissions. What about the important *Oleinu*? Though we are given the hymn which follows it and forms its second part in the daily service, its omission is a loss, for, as a powerful affirmative prayer, it occupies a very significant position in Jewish liturgy. The *Kaddish* is presumably omitted because it is not strictly a prayer but a "praise": but surely the relation between prayer and

praise has always been very close in Jewish tradition, and the distinction cannot be permanently upheld. It is at least significant that the prayers assigned by Jewish tradition to moments of crisis and affliction tend to be not prayers in the strict sense, but affirmations. It would also have been good to see in this collection such characteristic pieces as *V'hu Rachum Y'chaper-avon*, and the *Yaale V'yavo* which forms part of every festival service.

But this would make a larger volume than the collection we have before us, and it would be ungenerous to complain, especially as this collection includes several unfamiliar and attractive pieces of which the charming prayer of a shepherd "who did not know how to pray" is perhaps the most striking. Some will object to the rendering of the tetragrammaton as "Adonai," which seems somewhat intrusive in the English, and some will regret the lack of a favorite piece. But these can only be minor objections: it must be emphasized that this is a wholly admirable volume, which can serve equally as an introduction for those unfamiliar with Jewish liturgical literature and as an attractive anthology for the scholar.

That Devil Marx

THE RED PRUSSIAN: THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF KARL MARX. BY LEOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD. New York, Scribner's, 1947. 422 pp. \$4.00.

Reviewed by SOLOMON F. BLOOM

THIS is the case of the prosecution against Karl Marx. The original indictment handed in some years ago by E. H. Carr was critical but sober. Now Leopold Schwarzschild rings all the changes in the repertory of the trial attorney. He exploits every bit of circumstantial evidence and tears to tatters the moral character of the accused. This is understandable, since the principal charge is difficult to sustain. The charge is that Marx is responsible for all the totalitarian evils of our time. He fathered Bolshevism and thereby grandfathered Nazism. "... it is because of Marx that the rest of the world has for years been obliged to sacrifice one after another its liberal traditions to the necessity of self-preservation."

The question naturally arises, how is it that former biographers of Marx failed to see this? Our author has a plausible answer. He says they overlooked the criminal because they did

not know a crime had been committed. The *corpus delicti* has only recently turned up. "... the fruit [totalitarianism] which makes known the tree has in the meantime ripened and assumed tangible form." It was probably such reasoning that made David Hume despair of the existence of causes altogether.

Circumstantial evidence holds a certain dangerous fascination for rough-and-ready common sense. (If Socrates could marry Xantippe, was he really as bright as he is supposed to have been?) Thus Mr. Schwarzschild: Marx once organized a club which was ostensibly democratic but really a vehicle for communist ideas; his "fertile mind" had discovered the "front organization," which was to plague radical politics down to our own day. Next, exasperated by constant frustration, he invented character assassination as a political technique. "The whole world round there was always to be the old Marxian recipe for the defamation of one's brothers in Marxism: 'the party has been sold out,' 'they have betrayed the movement,' 'they show themselves as common scoundrels.' And the driving force behind this defamation was always the same the whole world round—an insane desire for power and domination."

Mr. Schwarzschild presents Marx as a lazy and unprincipled braggart, a malingerer with a keen but rabbinical mind, a procrastinator with a persecution complex and no "inner warmth," an irresponsible who could not even make a living. He craved to run a country, preferably a large one, and to make his "little Jenny . . . the first lady of Paris; or of Trier; or Prussia; of God knows where." The proletariat was merely an army to carry him to a throne. And he refused to describe the future society, not because it was a hard thing to do in an age when carefully-contrived Utopias were going to pieces, but because he could not disclose his plot to establish a system of muted slaves. His ideal was "a super-Prussian termite State, run by a sub-Prussian method."

Now it is true that our world is in a bad way, that the influence of Marx upon it has been considerable, and that Marx's personality was not irresistibly attractive. It is also true that a man's private character is pertinent to his public character. Even the pure scientists are discovering today that their personal ideals and aims are vitally related to their work. And for statesmen and social philosophers this has always been true. But Mr. Schwarzschild has

loaded the dice against Marx's private character and even then has not bothered to connect it with his public striving. Marx was a great man. Many of his "vices" as we see them here are merely reflections of his biographer's myopia.

Mr. Schwarzschild seems to think that making a living is some sort of virtue; I suppose he would say that making a very good living is divine grace itself. He seems to think that procrastination—especially when it means failure to deliver manuscripts on time to a publisher—is a crime. And he thinks he has established the larger point of Marx's destruction of liberalism by saying simply that the fate of freedom and justice under socialism is "logically determined by [Marx's] character as a human being." Was Marx omnipotent, that he could foist his own evil upon a plastic world? Are we all mice?

Mr. Schwarzschild's prosecution fails. And in nothing is its failure more apparent than in the means of covering it up. Mr. Schwarzschild attacks everything Marx liked, and—which is not necessary even for his purposes—he defends everything Marx attacked. Marx was a product of philosophical training; all philosophy is silly and sterile. Marx opposed Bismarck; Bismarck was a paragon of liberalism and cosmopolitanism. (You would have thought that the Iron Chancellor was at least as "Prussian" as Marx.) And critical examination is replaced by fantasy and pseudo-psychology:

"One day he was wandering home from the library. He was sick to death of economics. If he could only permit himself to free his thoughts from the unworthy fetters of facts and dates, and let them soar once more into the pure ether of speculation. What was he, after all: Pegasus or a cab-horse? An eagle of the spirit, soaring majestically above things in their entirety, or a frog, sitting in a swamp and snapping at flies? He was seized with an angry homesickness for the high-minded discussions about God, the World Spirit, the Absolute Idea, and the nature of the all-powerful Hegelian engine which sets in motion the history of mankind. What devil had seduced him into exchanging the high ideas of philosophy for the insipidities of economics?"

"Suddenly he stood still. A crazy thought had struck him. Before his mind's eye a thread was spinning its way in bizarre curves from philosophy to economics. The all-powerful engine! The great 'It'! Could it be that eco-

nomics was the great 'It'? A gust of wind blew down the street. Marx grabbed his hat. An interesting thought! A colossal thought!

"The discovery was that economics is the force that rules the world. Everything which has ever happened or ever will happen among human beings, has always had, and always will have, an economic cause."

Exhausted by four hundred pages of such talk, the defense rests.

Parables from Jewish Existence

THE ETERNAL LIGHT. By MORTON WISHENGRAD. New York, Crown, 1947. 412 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by DANIEL BELL

THE most extraordinary thing about Morton Wishengrad is that he can still cry, and is not ashamed of the fact. This is no mean accomplishment at a time when our emotions are drained from us by the repetitiveness of horror and in their place is pumped the euphoric sentimentalism of the standardized entertainments.

The fact that Wishengrad can still cry shows him to be a moral man. But wanting others to do so too calls for skillful power of communication lest the weeping become either mawkish or merely cathartic. This volume of Wishengrad's plays, a collection of twenty-six written during the last few years for *The Eternal Light*, the national radio program sponsored by the Jewish Theological Seminary, shows him to have a large talent and a great skill.

Radio writing has peculiar limitations. Like the screen and the theater, and as against the novel or painting, it controls the pace of presentation and imposes its own timing on the listener. But unlike the screen and theater, and like the campfire story-teller, its appeal is limited to the auditory sense. This limit creates a paradox. By requiring a great effort on the part of the audience, it permits tremendous imaginative participation and evocative response; but given its mass audience, radio dares not take the risk. Consequently it must narrow its range and exercise a great control over its material, making sure to put its point across by hanging it on an unmistakable thread-line. It sacrifices subtlety for theme.

Given the vagrant nature of audience listening habits, the radio writer must concentrate on attention-getting devices to keep the listener, and tag-lines to drive in the theme. Radio,

thus, has had to concentrate on *effects*, and writers such as Norman Corwin and Arch Oboler have made their reputation principally because of their skill in manipulating and extending the technical potential of sound in evoking emotional responses. When their plays are read, however, they seem flat and primer-like, something like a progressive school story-book for children rather than the free-ranging spontaneity of child-created fantasy that their plays occasionally resemble on the air.

WISHENGRAD's plays, most of them, read as well in print as they sound on the air, some even better. This may be due, in part, to the subject matter, which evokes associations far beyond the immediate action of the plays. But beyond that, it is due, I believe, to the fact that Wishengrad's material allows him to adapt and make flexible through his medium one of the most potent story-telling forms, the parable.

A parable, one might say, is an extended metaphor with an implicit moral. It is not a story told for its own wry humor or for the sake of a belabored point. Its specific intent is the illumination of a universal human situation in and through a particular instance; it may be told with lavish detail, but in its economy of purpose not one item is extraneous; its story is concise, but interpretation can be made on different levels of complexity; its meanings are cosmic, but its lessons immediately applicable. Its very form, thus, generates immediate response and identification.

Because Wishengrad's plays are essentially parables, the ones that "come off" best are those told by indirection, whose themes are morality and whose subject is "everyman." Conversely, those that miss fire are the plays that "preach" some message for a tailor-made occasion or which do not emerge from the whole cloth of community life. The play *Thomas Kennedy*, for example, which portrays the efforts of a Maryland legislator to eliminate bias provisions from the early Maryland state constitution, moves ponderously over the rickety structure of inter-faith speeches. *Brandeis*, an account of the awakening to Judaism by the jurist in his fifty-fourth year while arbitrating a labor dispute between an ILGWU business agent and a dress manufacturer—both of whom quote Talmud!—sounds forced and almost silly.

But these plays are in a minority. The dramatization of Hasidic tales or stories drawn from Jewish existence where *kehilla* (com-

munity), and consequently purpose, existed, are notably rich and provocative. For in these morality plays the message is muted in the narrative, and the gentleness of style and the softness of the words accent the dialectical interplay of the particular and the universal. But most important, the nature of the parable permits the stories to transcend the technical and sociological limitations of ordinary radio writing and allows a subtlety of subject that is rare.

ONE theological note can be traced and identified in the plays: the limitation of man before the power of God, and the creation of dignity through an awareness of that humility. As Rabbi Eliezer says in *A Chassidic Tale*: "I have greater love for the wicked man who knows he is wicked than for the righteous man who knows he is righteous. The first one is truthful and the Lord loves truth. The second one falsifies, since no human being is exempt from sin and the Lord hates untruth." This is a disturbing truth, for in the humility of man lies the greatest obstacle to injustice. A humble man will emphasize the tentativeness of any conclusion; against the greater absolute of God's power he will fear making absolute any action of his own. When men gain pride and arrogate to themselves dominion over others we have the earthly seeds of totalitarianism. Until the Messiah comes (and in Judaism, there is a suspicion that he can never come, *during time*) we cannot claim any absolute knowledge of what is justice; only those who accept the faith of a Messiah once-born can invoke such claim.

The theme of humility is elaborated in one of the finest of Wishengrad's plays, *The Thief and the Hangman*, which was produced, unfortunately, too late for inclusion in this volume. In this ancient fable of the Yemenite Jews, Micah steals bread, is caught and is sentenced to be hanged by the King's lieutenant. Micah's last request, and it must be granted for it comes from a condemned man, is to have planted the seed of the tree of life, passed on to him by his father, "the mystic tree called Chaim." Micah cannot plant the seed since, having stolen, he has unclean hands. The hangman is ordered to plant the tree, but he asks: "What is stealing?" Micah replies: "Taking something that doesn't belong to you, like my life." "I was afraid of that," the Hangman says. So he can't plant the seed either. Nor can the lieutenant, as he is sworn to uphold constituted law and law oftentimes steals the liber-

ty of a people. The king seeks to cut the Gordian knot but shrinks away when Micah reminds him that "Every man with power over his fellowman steals from his fellowman." Finally Micah asks the assemblage: "Your majesty, tax-collectors, law-officers, hangmen of society, I Micah, I stole because I was hungry. Why did you steal? . . . [thus] . . . when society plays the hangman, who is the hangman's hangman?"

While the code of Israel as presented in these plays is love of God and love of Torah, the law of God, the Jew can also call God to account when he has failed to act according to his own doctrine of Justice; and he can transgress law in order to safeguard the fundamental value of life. Wishengrad's plays also explore this theme.

In the *Parable of Reb Yisroel*, the Yom Kippur services are interrupted when Nachum the tailor, before repenting, scolds God. Nachum's defense is that his sins are small, but "God takes babies away from mothers and mothers from babies." The Reb's reply is: "I shan't scold you, only Nachum, Nachum my son, why did you let God off so easily? The things you said were not entirely false. Why didn't you press your advantage? Nachum, don't you see, you could have forced Him to forgive all mankind."

In the *Song of Berditchev*, also produced after this volume was in press, Reb Levi Yitzhak refuses to recite the sanctification of God on Yom Kippur and delays the services in order to testify against the Lord. The grievance is that God has limited his mercy for Israel, and that while the children of Israel constantly violate the ritual and the law, their everyday actions indicate their love of God, and that to test by ritual alone is as meaningless as to observe an ethic without ritual. Once the indictment is levied, the *Song* ends with the movingly chanted Kaddish of Levi Yitzhak. So great is Israel's love for God, we learn, that it has no fear of reproaching him.

In the play *Israel Salanter*, a rabbi calls upon his congregation, to violate the fast of Yom Kippur, for he has been told by the physicians that a day without food would further weaken a congregation already stricken by plague. And Rabbi Salanter tells his *minyan*: "There is even a time when a man may transgress every single one of the 613 precepts of the Torah, with the exception of the commandment against idolatry, the commandment against unchastity, and the commandment against murder. And this is

also such a time. For by our transgression not a single life but many lives are saved for the world. And what is more holy than life?"

It is this last remark, simple enough as it stands, that is the mark which distinguishes Judaism from all Oriental religions and constitutes the watershed dividing the Western view of man from the Eastern. Against the neo-Platonists, the gnostics, the practitioners of the Orphic rites, the Manicheans, the Buddhists, who claim that the world is controlled by evil forces, that the soul is imprisoned in matter which is evil and salvation requires the escape from matter and the transcending of time, the Judaic view affirms the value of the corporeal and the tangibility of the flesh. It is an earthly religion which insists that the problems of the world be solved in time, and by valuing life as the highest good, we deny anyone the absolute right to demand it.

If the statements of certain modern writers are true, then this distinction between the life-affirming view and the life-denying view is crucial to a coherent philosophy. For it is the insistence of writers such as the Barthian Denis de Rougement and the Catholic Father D'Arcy that many of our conceptions of marriage and morality, particularly the modern ennoblement of passion, represent Manichean and gnostic influences that essentially glorify a death wish. De Rougement has traced the modern romantic complex and the "eternal triangle" situation to the Tristan and Iseult story and located the wish for "the dark night" in the heretical influences it contains.

However, it is not only these modern pagan influences that draw attention away from earthly problems, but also, to some degree, the modern Christian religions themselves: the Augustinian City of God as against the City of Man; the adoption by the church, although purged in its theological rationalization, of the Manichean advocacy of celibacy; the Lutheran distinction of being "of the world but not in the world," and the exemption of secular authority from moral commitment; the Calvinist view of predestination and the insistence on asceticism. All of these, in diverse ways, fearing man and fearing life, tend to impose chains. Judaism has sought to establish the primacy of life without succumbing to hedonism on the one hand or pure spiritualism on the other.

ONE must not leave the impression that all Wishengrad's plays pose issues of such com-

plexity. But, as with any work of insight, they can be read at different levels. What does characterize most of them is a strain of sweetness and compassion, often tinged with whimsy. *The Broken Sabbath of Rabbi Asher* tells of a beloved rabbi, who, astray in the woods, lost track of the days and celebrated the Sabbath on Friday. In order to save the old *zaddik* from the realization of sin, the entire community celebrated subsequent Fridays as Sabbath, until one bright *chochim* conceived the idea of drugging the Rabbi on the false Sabbath eve, having him sleep through the day, and waking him on the true Sabbath eve, with all pretending that he had merely dozed off at the conclusion of the services.

Some months ago Meyer Levin wrote an article in COMMENTARY berating the Jewish community for failing to support those intellectual efforts of Jews that seek to raise and heighten Jewish consciousness. Wishengrad's plays, I fear, may suffer from the same failure of support. One slight gesture to the contrary, though, is possible. Some time ago someone asked Mr. Wishengrad: "Has your book been reviewed in COMMENTARY yet?" "No," he replied, "but I don't care. They'll give it to someone who'll write a review telling me that I'm not Tolstoy." No, Wishengrad is not Tolstoy. But he has much of the same warmth and humanity.

Where Progressivism is Vulnerable

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE. New York, Macmillan, 1946. 669 pp. \$3.75.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT. By GEORGE E. MOWRY. University of Wisconsin Press, 1946. 405 pp. \$4.00.

Reviewed by EDWARD N. SAVETH

IN 1912, a wave of political reform was sweeping the country. Woodrow Wilson, proponent of the New Freedom (a program in many respects like the New Deal), was nominated for the presidency by the Democratic party. The progressives in the Republican party were not so fortunate. Their clear majority in the Republican convention of 1912 was eliminated when the reactionary National Committee refused to seat certain progressive delegations. Outraged, Theodore Roosevelt, leader of the

progressives, withdrew from the convention and formed the Progressive party.

Essential to the success of the Progressive party as a separate political organization in 1912 were three things. First, the party needed local patronage. "Without the pecuniary rewards accruing from the petty office," says Dr. Mowry, "the courthouse politician, whose hand is necessary to maintain a permanent organization, soon finds other fields for his endeavors." Secondly, it needed the kind of money that is usually possessed by persons neither progressive nor liberal. Finally, it needed the leadership of national figures unqualifiedly devoted to the cause.

Roosevelt possessed tremendous popular appeal and was an ardent fighter for causes in which he believed, but he was also ambitious and a shrewd politician, and when his sympathies for the underdog clashed with his personal ambitions, the former generally came off second best. However, Roosevelt could get money from Frank Munsey, the erratic publisher, and especially from George W. Perkins, a Morgan partner. This helped him to topple the more sincere if less colorful LaFollette from the leadership of the Progressives.

Perkins, handsome, bright, and quite slick, was looked upon by the rank and filers as Wall Street's trojan horse in the Progressive camp. These suspicions were not altogether unjustified. Perkins had, at the first Progressive Convention in 1912, with Roosevelt's approval, prevented adoption of a strong platform resolution condemning the abuses of trusts and monopolies. In 1916, it was he and Roosevelt, far more than the mass of Progressives, who were discouraged at the prospect of another unsuccessful campaign. Now obsessed by the martial spirit and filled with hatred of Woodrow Wilson for his failure to plunge into the war immediately on the side of Allies, Roosevelt also had his weather eye cocked for a favorable political wind that might blow in 1920. Consequently, he was quite prepared to join Perkins in bringing an end to the Progressive party in 1916, refusing to be drafted as a candidate and not even showing up for the Progressive convention. The net effect of Roosevelt's assumption of leadership and subsequent desertion was to reduce liberal influence in the Republican party and prepare the way for the nomination of Warren G. Harding in 1920.

Mowry's book is a carefully documented study of the Progressive movement and Roose-

velt's relationship to it. It is the conventional academic treatment that covers the field conscientiously, even though it is lacking in depth and sufficient reference to earlier and later liberal movements in our history. William Allen White's *Autobiography*, on the other hand, is quite the opposite in its approach. It is full of garrulous recollections of men and events, important and unimportant. A rambling affair, it begins with birth and ends with death and is as strangely misshapen as only life itself can be.

WHITE was one of those who followed Roosevelt into the Progressive camp and, after the suicide of the Bull Moose movement, experienced no difficulty in rejoining the Republican stalwarts. He achieved a nationwide reputation in 1896 when, in an editorial in the *Emporia, Kansas, Gazette*, entitled "What's the Matter with Kansas?" he advised the farmers to raise more wheat and less hell and, incidentally, to vote for McKinley in preference to Bryan. Except for his Progressive aberration, White consistently served the most reactionary elements in the Republican party. He opposed the nomination of Harding, but later estimated him as "honest and courageous." He found leadership traits in Calvin Coolidge and regarded Hoover as his great friend. He had some sympathy with the social aims of the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, but advised Kansans to vote for Landon in 1936. Four years later, White became chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.

It is apparent that White's liberalism, like Theodore Roosevelt's, was hardly consistent. Yet, the American liberal movement took them both in and raised them to high position. That it could do so was because American liberalism was and is a loose and sprawling doctrine synthesizing good intentions, economic heresy, political reformism, and the Protestant conscience. The fact is, American liberalism is such a confused hodgepodge that almost anyone can borrow a heritage from it: fascist, Communist, or democrat. Once this quality in American liberalism is recognized, the careers of men like Tom Watson and John T. Flynn are somewhat more understandable.

It also explains why White could consider himself a "patient liberal." He did in the course of his long career express some liberal views, but his main ideological moorings were in the Republican camp. "Our American experiment," he wrote in 1938, "has succeeded

in bringing comfort, some luxuries, to probably 85, certainly 80 per cent of the American people." But apart from the issue of whether or not White was a liberal, what is most significant about him is that in over forty years of editorial writing, although he expressed an opinion on almost every conceivable subject, one seeks in vain for the basic philosophic framework guiding these opinions. It may be argued that White from his editorial office in Emporia was giving Main Street's opinion of the passing parade—and Main Street is notoriously unlikely to take the long-range view. However, neither Main Street nor its spokesmen, because of their deliberate and even boasted short-sightedness, have given us anything by way of heritage to cope with the problems of the atomic age.

WHAT lessons for political action can the liberals of today derive from the experience of the Progressives? First, to beware of the political glamor boy who likes a fight, but who cannot withstand the frustration of temporary setbacks. Second, to beware of those who join to wreck you. Third, to be mindful of the difficulties involved in a third party—organization on a nationwide basis, financing, traditional voting habits. Fourth, to remember that the effect of deserting the two major parties is to effectively turn them over to the reactionaries.

Beyond these, liberals must reckon with the fluctuation of what might be described as the liberal cycle in American history. The appreciation by the American public of liberalism and liberal political movements seems to be limited to a certain span of years, after which a period of reaction sets in. Liberalism and liberal political plans, regardless of how well-laid, must adjust themselves to the cycle. Even as it did in 1920, contemporary liberalism appears to have run its course, and to attempt to have a third party effort coincide with the ebb of the liberal cycle is to invite disaster.

If liberals are disconcerted by this pessimistic view of the possibilities of third party action, let them be heartened by the realization that the ultra-reactionary camp is also hampered by the difficulties of forging a dissident political organization. Moreover, the possibility of a third party is greater from the Right than it is from the Left, because it is not today's liberals who have captured the traditional spirit of third party movements in America—but the reactionaries. Henry Wallace does not sound like

William Jennings Bryan or any of the other leaders of the important Populist revolt of the nineties; but Dr. Townsend does, and so does John T. Flynn. Compare the publications and appeals of the Populist demagogues of the nineties with those made by Fascist orators today, and you will find some striking similarities. In fact, their main point of difference is that the Fascist orators are more often anti-Semitic.

But both Populism and Progressivism were intensely nationalistic movements within the Anglo-Saxon Protestant American tradition. The fact that Western farmers were Populists and Progressives did not make them more tolerant of Negroes, Jews, and Catholics. Nor does willingness to unite on a program of opposition to the grinding exactions of trusts, monopolists, and bankers necessarily induce a more enlightened attitude toward one's fellow man. There is undoubtedly an important relationship between liberalism and the rights of minorities. But it should also be remembered that a major bulwark in protecting minorities against political action from the Right is certain of the undemocratic features in our governmental system against which liberals perennially crusade.

The City of the Future

COMMUNITAS: MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD AND WAYS OF LIFE. By PERCIVAL AND PAUL GOODMAN. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947. 141 pp. \$6.00.

Reviewed by CHARLES ABRAMS

THIS is not an ordinary book on city planning. It is oblong and will therefore not fit into one's bookcase; it is illustrated by cartoons; it jumbles the authors' social views with their views on physical planning; when one gets ready to shout agreement on one page, one is driven to brooding by the next.

But then, according to the blurbs, Architect Percival dislikes efficiency, while Paul's ideas are "a ballet . . . as cerebral as a chess game where the players have been hopped up with benzedrine." You are granted a kind of explanation at the end of the book: "Somewhat playful we trust it is; for the dialectical muse cannot help but be both tragic and comic; for she is full of reversals."

If one could only dismiss this book with the same disdain as that with which the two au-

thors occasionally treat their readers! But the Goodmans cannot be so lightly handled. They out-Mumford Lewis in their disregard for whether their ideal community plan may or may not be attained in our current economy; they are hardly as eloquent as Mumford nor as productively passionate, nor are their values as clearly stated; but they share with him the virtue of looking beyond the horizon of today's skyscrapers to the blueprint of a culture and a society their plan will be set into—which is brave. But I wish they could state the aim as clearly as Mumford does. I suspect that their light-mindedness is really a cover for timidity.

UNLIKE other generalizers in city planning, the Goodmans are ready to consider economics and present concrete plans, and here is where the benzedrine wears off and their contributions demand sober consideration. Their plans for Manhattan Island and Long Island City represent bold thinking. The Goodman plan of Manhattan Island may not be precisely attainable unless we start from scratch after being atom-bombed out of existence. But parts of the plan are attainable. And, as a whole, it represents a broad, daring, over-all approach to the planning process. Had we been informed by a similar philosophy a decade ago, we would not have erected the traffic highways that today bar the logical development of New York's riverways for recreation.

Much of the book is concerned with a discussion of various plans ranging from that of Patrick Geddes and the Garden City to Buckminster Fuller and the Dymaxion. Bellamy, Le Corbusier, Veblen, Borsodi, Henry George, and a whole gamut of thinkers, dead and dying, weave through the manuscript. Surplus and daring rather than scarcity and restraint are the dominant motifs.

The Goodmans perform their best service in their inspirational capacity. Cities cannot be dismantled and rebuilt along the neat lines of

a rhapsodic blueprint. There are sad entrepreneurial truths and political realities. Yet interest in living is more important than interest on capital. And somewhere between city building and castle building lies a reachable goal. To state it is the true function of today's really imaginative planner.

Perhaps to the surprise of the Goodmans of the world, let it be said that we have learned a great deal in the last few years about adjusting the capitalistic society so it can function to produce such dreams as the Goodman plan of Manhattan or their plan of Long Island City. America's housing needs require that in the next fifteen years we build homes equal to about half our existing store. This supplies the impetus for city planning in America which industrial dislocation and devastation have supplied for England. And when we consider that it takes only three days' cost of World War II annually to replace every slum in America, or no more than about 10 per cent of the current military budget, we now recognize that American capitalism can survive America's rebuilding without offending the precepts of either Alexander Hamilton or Andrew W. Mellon.

What we should realize, and realize soon, is that large-scale master plans are beginning to make sense, and small spotted rehabilitation is making less and less sense. We can no longer subscribe to the idea that the best way to appease our hunger for a decent life is to curb our appetites. The fight for planning is becoming increasingly political instead of economic, and on that plane blueprints and daring projections of cities of the future such as those of the Goodmans serve a vitalizing function. If capitalism survives in America, it will be because those (like the Goodmans) who demand better horizons than capitalism seems to offer them, may supply the very inspiration that modifies the growing rigidity of capitalism and makes it workable.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

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